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ABSTRACT 
The recent increase in high-profile insider cyber exploits indicates that current 
insider threat analysis (ITA) is insufficient to handle the growing insider threat problem. 
Well-established academic literature agrees that information overload is a problem ITA 
must overcome because ITA remains a human-intensive task. Two conceptual strategies 
to overcome information overload include reducing information and distributing 
information among additional people to accommodate the load.  
This dissertation applies attribution theory and process loss theory to test two ITA 
factors: ignorance and teamwork. A laboratory experiment with a convenience sample of 
48 ITA-trained, top secret–cleared participants supported the research. Participants 
performed ITA with National Insider Threat Task Force training scenarios and applied 
the adjudicative guidelines for access to classified information. Teamwork conditions 
resulted in slightly higher accuracy at a significant cost of time, indicating that ITA 
analysts are best organized in different structures per informational and temporal 
constraints. However, ignorance level had little effect on ITA analyst accuracy. ITA 
analysts were substantially more accurate at implication scenarios but slightly better than 
chance at exoneration scenarios. Lower decision confidence associated with exoneration 
scenarios indicated that ITA analysts are more likely to guess when presented with an 
exoneration scenario. Further research involving larger independent samples and 
temporal constraints is necessary to verify these findings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Once a science-fiction fantasy, cybercrimes are a quotidian worry in the 21st 
century; protections that were tech savvy only five years ago seem now as rudimentary as 
not leaving the key under the mat. Today, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, 
automated software patching, anti-virus software, and copious cybersecurity protections 
offer little more than a false sense of security to victims of cybercrime.  
While the average hit is modest—perhaps an individual’s identity or a small 
business’s assets—sensational cyber megabreaches that affect thousands of people and 
cost organizations millions of dollars to rectify are now commonplace and, for many 
organizations, expected.1 Overall, cybersecurity breaches cost an average of $7.01 
million per attack, a figure that increased 7% in 2016 alone (Ponemon, 2016), provoking 
a 35% increase in federal cybersecurity funding—which climbed from $5.9 billion in 
2007 to $19 billion in 2017 (Fischer, 2016). Nevertheless, incidents are increasing 
steadily (Wilshusen, 2014), hits are ever harder to remedy, and defensive strategies are 
losing ground to ingenious workarounds. Despite their adherence to well-established 
cybersecurity practices, major corporations such as Target, Home Depot, eBay, and 
JPMorgan Chase have suffered severe incursions, illustrating that vulnerability is not 
merely the lot of the unsophisticated, careless, and naive.    
The federal government is also inadequately defended, with notable victims 
including the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and Department of Homeland Security. These targets were well aware of the existential 
threat that insufficient cybersecurity posed, especially after 2013—a cautionary year in 
cybersecurity history due to the infamous Target breach. Yet the flaws and inadequacies 
of their systems were typically identified only after the damage was done. On average, 
breaches are identified ten months after the event; half are not intended as malicious, but 
stem from human error or glitches in the system (Ponemon, 2016).  
                                                 
1 Cyber data breach liability insurance available at https://www.thehartford.com/data-breach-
insurance; https://www.travelers.com/small-business-insurance/data-breach-insurance.   
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In other words, about 50% of breaches are caused by an insider, whether directly 
or indirectly, knowingly or not. The remaining 50% are attributable to an outsider (IBM, 
2015). Of these breaches, phishing attacks comprise the highest share of reparation costs 
(33%; Roumani, Fung, Rai, & Xie, 2016). I categorize these attacks as insider in this 
work because successful phishing requires that insiders give away trusted network 
credentials. Regardless of the high proportion of insider causation, researchers 
overwhelmingly prescribe the same fatigued, outsider-oriented remedies in response—
chiefly, variations on “defense in depth,” automatic software updates, and timely 
detection and response (National Science and Technology Council, 2016). The academic 
literature is replete with outsider-based diagnostics such as systems designed with 
insufficient security in mind, programmers validating code incorrectly, best practices 
neglected, and detection and response preferred over defense in depth. Progress in the 
security field is generally incremental, achieved by new spins on old concepts. This 
dissertation does not revisit external threat mitigation efforts, but rather charts a new 
direction by examining the little-understood problem of threats from within the system.  
At first glance, insider threats to cybersecurity are a low base–rate problem. 
Snowden- and Manning-level breaches, though disastrous, are few and far between 
compared to traditional outsider attacks. Thus, the popular conception of a mainstream 
cybersecurity attack tends to exclude the idea of insider agency. In reality, however, 
when necessity and sufficiency are included, by definition, in the root causes of cyber-
attacks, events that lack an insider threat component are rare. Take, for instance, the 2016 
Democratic National Committee hack, wherein John Podesta gave his credentials in 
response to a phishing email, thereby acting as a cooperative insider. Cybersecurity 
systems are designed to grant access to those with legitimate credentials; the DNC’s 
system functioned correctly by doing nothing to stop the masquerade. The attacker relied 
on Mr. Podesta’s inside action and could not have succeeded without it. 
While it is clear that cybersecurity breaches generally rely on some form of 
insider cooperation and system vulnerability for success, “insider threat” remains an 
ambiguous term. For instance, consider the Flame virus propagated through the Microsoft 
update service. The update service is implicitly trusted by millions of computer users, 
 3 
rendering it a type of insider agent. The update service ought to be a sterling example of 
impregnable behavior. It has valid network credentials and automatic behavior far more 
predictable than that of its error-prone human organizational counterparts. And the action 
of the Flame malware is utterly contrary to the intentions of its developers and the 
expectations of Microsoft customers. But however robust and innocuous the update 
service is, it undeniably cooperated with the Flame virus to provide entree, without which 
the latter would be harmless. How, then, should the existential threat premise of Flame be 
classified: insider or outsider? Either answer must account for the relevance of the other, 
yet the traditional cybersecurity view is fogged by either/or. 
Insider threats complicate the problem of defense. They transform the traditional 
(and comforting) view of cybersecurity from a well-defined problem—against which one 
might conceivably build a digital wall—into a messy conundrum with frustrating 
parameters that varies in solubility based on the information available to the analysts 
charged with seeking out insiders who threaten cybersecurity. Johnson, (2006, p. 82) 
offers that insider threats are problematic for cybersecurity because insiders are better 
positioned to explain away concerning behavior.  
Insider threat analysts use available information to make causal attributions for 
observable behaviors. The absence of relevant available information introduces 
vulnerability in the form of “ignorance” defined as the lack of relevant knowledge or 
awareness. Insider threat analysts lack conclusive information with which to predict an 
insider threat in the making, because prediction denotes that the attack has yet to occur. 
Thus, insider threat analysis (ITA) differs from traditional forensics, in which network 
security analysts investigate a cybersecurity breach because, for the latter, the knowledge 
that there was a breach is sufficient to structure parameters for the problem. 
ITA is poorly suited to algorithms and sensor triggers. The principle that 
“cognizance of the serious potential threat posed by information-system insiders should 
lead to complementary technical and nontechnical solutions” (McNamara, 2000, p. 84) is 
considered by the investigator as critical in ITA, which remains a mind-intensive task 
(Goldberg, Young, Memory, & Senator, 2016; Cappelli et al., 2012, p. 14). Regardless of 
value conveyed, the $75 billion cybersecurity industry focuses primarily on technical 
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solutions that do little to counter the ubiquity of insider threats in systems whose controls, 
by design, allow access to anyone authorized. While the literature may describe insider 
threat–indicator ontologies and threat-actor taxonomies, studies pertaining to ITA are 
few.   
A. INSIDER THREAT ANALYSIS AND ANALYSTS 
The specialists most often needed to deal with internal threats are analysts and 
investigators. Analysts offer a nontechnical solution to insider threat mitigation, working 
to identify threats before an incident occurs and in many cases uncovering embryonic 
crimes during assessments. Investigators, by contrast, require, at minimum, reasonable 
suspicion of a crime having occurred before an investigation is launched.  
Analysis is a mentally demanding task that requires the ability to see patterns in 
“apparent chaos” (Garst & Gross, 1997, p. 10). Garst and Gross and Cappelli et al. agree 
that information overload is the primary factor to overcome in creating order from 
information “chaff” (Cappelli et al., 2012, p. 196). Generally, there are two ways to 
reduce information overload: reduce the amount of information or add more workers to 
process the load. Drawing from well-established theories of structural contingency 
(Galbraith, 1977, p. 28; Thompson, 1967, p. 59–65; March & Simon, 1958, p. 158), 
Galbraith and Thompson identify horizontal specialization as a means to divide an 
information-processing task among several people so they can better accommodate the 
work. Task division requires an eventual reassembly that reduces productivity in the form 
of process loss. Specific to group work, process loss refers to a suboptimal performance 
effect that arises from inefficiencies in how the group works together (Steiner, 1966). A 
competing approach is to reduce the information an analyst must accommodate. There is 
presently no empirical research that demonstrates conclusively how either method affects 
analyst performance in terms of time, accuracy, and confidence. This dissertation seeks to 
fill the gap in research by organizing ITA analysts in horizontally specialized teams and 
as individuals to assess how each differs in analyst time, accuracy, and confidence under 
various information loads. 
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ITA may be sensitive to process loss because ITA work deals with processing 
ambiguous information. Problem solving with ambiguous information is difficult because 
such information is open to multiple interpretations. According to classic organizational 
theory, a group can approach a difficult problem-solving task by assigning parts to 
specialists to “almost certainly speed up the solution process and … improve the quality 
of solutions” (March & Simon, 1958, p. 181). While this may hold true for programmatic 
tasks for which the solution is customized to fit a well-defined problem, there is scant 
research testing this proposition on uncircumscribed problems that lack a well-understood 
solution process.  
An individual’s information-processing capacity varies with the complexity of the 
information presented. For instance, the letters “D,” “O,” and “G” are merely three units 
of information, unless there exists a priori a familiarity with the English word for canine, 
in which “DOG” is a single informational unit (Simon, 1996, p. 66). A lack of a priori 
context may exist when interpreting the ambiguous information inherent to ITA. 
Information-processing capacity may shrink disproportionally as the number of 
unfamiliar information units increases (Eppler & Mengis, 2004).  
Threat analysts often employ up to 11 information sources (or references) in their 
work, including access and event logs, polygraphs, and user monitoring (Guido & 
Brooks, 2013; Brackney & Anderson, 2004). Increasing the number of references tends 
to be useful when investigating a known crime; the investigators can usually handle any 
number of references because they know what they are looking for (Jackson, 2014; 
Coffee, 2015). The same does not appear to hold true for threat assessments, in which 
analysts do not know if a crime has been, or will be, committed and must therefore sift 
through all available references in assessing threats (German & Stanley, 2007). Their lack 
of information or context creates ignorance, which varies depending on what references 
are available and in use.2 Insider threat analysts must navigate multiple levels of 
ignorance to infer the existence of insider threats.  
                                                 
2 Per Holtzman (1989) and Denby (1999), there are various levels of ignorance that alter how humans 
account for a lack of information in decision making. The greater the ignorance level, the less 
circumscribed a problem becomes because decision makers must accommodate unknowns within a 
decision system. 
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Under increased demand to predict and prevent crime, “federal, state and local 
governments are increasing their investment in fusion centers” (German & Stanley, 2007, 
p. 3). Fusion centers are intended to promote information sharing among federal 
agencies, and ITA hubs share a common purpose: assessing all available information to 
predict and prevent crime. However, fusion centers “are ineffective or provid[e] little 
value” (Coburn, 2015, p. 7), and the same may be true of ITA programs. The difficulty is 
that increasing the number of references and analysts involved in a task inevitably 
increases information load and coordination overhead, precipitating information overload 
and process loss (Steiner, 1972). Anticipating this problem, organizations tend to use 
specialization to overcome the cognitive limitations of personnel (Galbraith, 1977, p. 13). 
This tactic, despite funding boosts, has done little to decrease insider threats. The 
problem requires new focus; the alternative lens of organizational-contingency theory 
offers insights into real contexts and constraints, and a platform on which to build new 
solutions (Galbraith, 1977, p. 28).  
B. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Insider threats are an ever-changing problem, eluding detection (Oltsik, 2013; 
Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2014) and contributing to a range of harmful and 
devastating blows such as intellectual property theft and unauthorized disclosure 
(Proudfoot, Boyle, & Schuetzler, 2016; Axelrad & Sticha, 2013; Baracaldo & Joshi, 
2013; Chinchani, Iyer, Ngo, & Upadhyaya, 2005). ITA is a human-intensive task that 
requires alert interpretation of acontextual information (Goldberg, Young, Memory, & 
Senator, 2016; Cappelli et al., 2012, p. 14). Information overload is a known problem for 
ITA (Cappelli, et al., 2012, p. 196; Garst & Gross, 1997). Reducing information or 
dividing information processing tasks between teams of people are methods to overcome 
information overload but the effects of implementing either solution in an ITA task are 
not conclusive. Ignorance, or a lack of contextually relevant information, is inherent in 
ITA—it cannot be exorcised. A serious gap in the cybersecurity research is the lack of 
empirical evidence by which to understand how teamwork and ignorance affect insider 
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threat assessments.3 In the absence of this data, we do not know how best to organize 
insider threat analysts as they work under various information constraints. 
1. Research Purpose 
The lack of applicable theory that describes, explains, and predicts performance 
leads many to share the view that ITA is more an art than a science (Utin, 2008, p. 168; 
Sellen, 2016; Wittcop, 2017). The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate the 
controllability of ITA by manipulating conditions of teamwork and ignorance and 
measuring insider threat analyst performance in terms of accuracy and time. This is 
important because this research provides evidence that ITA is scientifically understandable 
and analyst time and accuracy are experimentally controllable. This dissertation applies 
attribution theory, a product of cognitive psychology, to evaluate how analysts collectively 
and individually make attributions in various levels of ignorance. Process-loss theory, a 
product of organizational theory, is applied to the cognitive dynamics of teamwork to 
explore ITA as a specific use case. Test results are examined to suggest principles for ITA 
organizational approaches under various informational constraints.  
2. Research Question 
This dissertation research emerges from the general question, “Is insider threat 
analyst performance controllable?” Theories of attribution and process loss hold promise 
in applying two key factors, ignorance and teamwork, that may affect performance, 
measured as productivity within a given time. Thus, the specific research question studied 
in this dissertation is, “How do ignorance and teamwork affect analyst accuracy, time, 
and confidence?” 
3. Research Approach 
This research tests attribution and process-loss theory as applied to ITA by means 
of a laboratory experiment that varies two levels of ignorance under two conditions of 
                                                 
3 This research defines ignorance levels according to Denby & Gammack’s (1999) taxonomy covered 
in Chapter II. This work tests two levels of ignorance, high and low, that loosely relate to “Gordian” and 
“Watsonian” ignorance, respectively. 
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teamwork and measures how each affects analyst accuracy, time, and confidence. 
Ignorance is operationalized as “high” and “low.” Teamwork is operationalized as 
“horizontally specialized” and “none.” The experiment measures the social impact and 
information-overload effects operationalized as two dependent measures: “perception of 
information overload” and “perception of social impact.”  
The theoretical relationships between the research constructs fit well within a 
two-by-two factorial design. Bowing to Kerlinger and Lee (2000, p. 225), 
there is something salutary about reducing a research problem to a 
crosstab. In fact, if you cannot write a diagrammatic paradigm of your 
research problem in either analysis of variance or crosstab form, then the 
problem is not clear in your mind, or you do not really have a research 
problem. 
Crosstabs are employed to provide a framework for examining interactive effects clearly 
and intuitively. The experimental design considers the effects of various conditions of 
teamwork and ignorance on accuracy, time, confidence, information overload, and social 
impact, as presented in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Research Design  
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C. CONTRIBUTION 
A dense body of research describes an interaction between organizational 
structure and task performance wherein process loss occurs when problems are solved 
collectively. A typical experiment generally evaluates the role of these concepts in a 
clearly defined task such as rope pulling (Ringelmann, 1913), LEGO-man assembly 
(Staats, Milkman, & Fox, 2012), research-model development (Schippers, 2014), and 
crisis mapping (Mao, Mason, Suri, & Watts, 2016). Staats et al. provide evidence that 
additional workers can decrease performance after some optimal point, but Mao et al. 
demonstrate that adding workers increases performance. This discrepancy arises for two 
reasons: the workload was not the same for the teams, and Mao et al.’s experiment 
required little interdependence. These experiments set unambiguous parameters by 
assigning participants a task with an expected outcome that is known to the participants 
beforehand. The experiments do little to assess team dynamics for tasks that involve 
participants who must solve problems given aconextual information. By contrast, this 
research evaluates the performance of teams and individuals in solving more ambiguous 
problems—specifically, insider threat analysis. 
In evaluating how teams and individuals perform causal attributions under various 
levels of ignorance, this work extends the field of attribution theory.4 By focusing on the 
number of available references as a factor of information load, I follow a research 
challenge on overload factors in real-life contexts (Jackson & Farzaneh, 2012). The 
findings of this research illuminate how insider threat analysts perform under various 
organizational and informational constraints.   
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II of this dissertation synthesizes relevant literature on specialization, 
attribution, process loss, social impact, information overload, and introduces the 
philosophical underpinnings of the present work. Chapter III discusses research design, 
experimental apparatuses, the criteria for participant selection, and analytical framework. 
                                                 
4 The theory of attribution states that people will search for the reason that certain events occur when 
the cause is hidden. Attribution theory is covered in more detail in Chapter II. 
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I present a unique means of simultaneously assessing the effects of teamwork and 
ignorance via a two-by-two factorial design. This work outlines data-analysis methods in 
Chapter IV and addresses threats to internal and external validity. Findings are reported 
in Chapter V; Chapter VI concludes with implications, limitations, recommendations for 
improved insider threat analyst performance, and suggestions for future research. 
E. SUMMARY 
This introduction presented a brief background of the insider threat to 
cybersecurity. The chapter cited relevant research that suggests information overload is a 
problem for insider threat analysis. Two methods of reducing information overload 
followed: reduce the information, and distribute the load among additional people. 
Information reduction makes ignorance a testable construct and information distribution 
makes teamwork another testable construct. Both methods of managing information 
overload have performance implications predicted by well-established theories of 
attribution and process loss that this dissertation subjected to empirical testing. This work 
organized the constructs within a two-by-two factorial design with five dependent 
measures: time, accuracy, confidence, perception of information overload, and perception 
of social impact. This chapter concluded with the scientific contributions of this work and 
a brief summary of how this dissertation is organized.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a background of the insider threat to cybersecurity and 
focuses on theories of attribution and organizing. The work surveys current literature that 
offers the reader a definition of insider threats and a description of insider threat analysis. 
The work reviews well-established science philosophy and offers information science as 
a tool to better describe, explain, and predict analyst performance. 
This chapter first surveys the insider threat literature and identifies a theoretical 
concept, information overload, as a problem for ITA to overcome. The work then reviews 
ignorance, or reducing relevant information, as a conceptual method to overcome 
information overload; as an alternative, theories of organizing offer teamwork as a 
method for distributing information load between people. The work continues with 
effects of ignorance predicted by attribution theory and effects of teamwork predicted by 
process loss theory. The review describes how ignorance and teamwork affect ITA in 
terms of performance, namely time and accuracy. This literature review subsequently 
presents relevant research used in Chapter III to operationalize ignorance, teamwork, and 
performance, and concludes with eight testable hypotheses drawn from the literature.  
A. CYBERSECURITY 
Outsider cyber threat analysis, herein referred to as “computer network defense” 
(CND), uses a deductive–analytic inquiry system to identify network exploits. 
Cybersecurity personnel can use deductive–analytic inquiry because they identify specific 
malicious indicators after known attacks; they then submit the indicators to published 
reputation lists (Sanders, Randall, & Smith, 2014, p. 176). The indicators generally involve 
a set of recognizable patterns uniquely identified as signatures. Network-protection 
hardware and software, including insider threat detection software, use signatures to 
recognize cyber threats (Sanders et al., 2014, p. 204). Because signatures identify known 
threats only, contemporary cybersecurity methods tend to follow the “detect and respond” 
paradigm. “Detect and respond” reduces reliance on prevention by increasing human 
analysis and active responses (Schwartau, 1999, p. 36). This shift in the way of 
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cybersecurity thinking balances traditional “defense in depth” with human analysis. Both 
methods allow authorized access by design and view cybersecurity from an outsider 
perspective. Insiders with authorized access do not fit within this CND analytical domain, 
and detecting their risky behavior requires a different way of thinking.     
Insider threat analysts use an inductive–consensual inquiry system to identify 
potential attackers. Insider threat analysts must resort to inductive-consensual inquiry 
because deductive rules do not work with insiders due to the variable contexts 
underpinning insider behavior. Inside attacks differ from outside in that outsiders are more 
easily detected as intruders when their means of access are found to be illegitimate. Insiders 
have authorized access already and can “more easily justify or explain away their 
activities” (Johnson, 2006, p. 82). Insiders can also redirect suspicion; an example is those 
who are best positioned to detect deceivers are constrained by pre-emptive retaliatory 
discrimination accusations and whistleblower program abuses in order to deflect attention 
from the insider threat to the person who may detect them (Catrantzos, 2012, p. 117). 
Furthermore, insider threats need not necessarily be malicious (Hunker & Probst, 2011).  
Insider threat experts present insider threat indicators such as “financial and 
personal stressors” as factors for ITA (Silowash, Cappelli, Moore, Trzeciak, Shimeall, & 
Flynn, 2012, p. 29). Such indicators are not signatures because they do not deduce insider 
threats. Signature-based protection alone is not effective against this range of internal 
threats, because such threats do not have signatures (Cole & Ring, 2006, p. 20). Analysts 
use a combination of lessons learned from past cases and specified indicators to assign 
behaviors meaning so they can better identify insider threats (Cappelli, Moore, & 
Trzeciak, 2012, p. 196; Faber, 2015).  
1. Insider Threats to Cybersecurity 
Insider threats are essentially agents of an organization with a propensity to harm 
the organization. This definition includes trusted impostors, negligent non-malicious 
trusted people, and trusted software. Established theories of organization posit a fit 
among people in the organization and its structure, technology, and inputs and outputs 
(Nadler, Tushman, & Hatvany, 1980; Galbraith, 1977; Leavitt, 1965). The organization is 
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less an entity per se than an artificially constructed relationship among entities. 
Organizations emerge when shared beliefs create a pattern of labor divisions that 
collaborate toward a purpose (Galbraith, 1977, p. 3), and good organizations have parts 
that interact to achieve this common purpose (Ashby, 1962, p. 111). Thus, an agent who 
is not working toward the common purpose does not fit well in the organizational 
structure and may be a threat.   
When insider threat problems are approached from a CND perspective, a 
fundamental translation problem emerges with how CND and ITA analysts communicate 
with each other. CND analysis is data centric, with a focus on collection and network 
heuristics (Sanders et al., 2014, p. 11; Bejtlich, 2013, p. 9). By contrast, ITA is not 
centered on network data, but focuses on perceiving the context of behaviors (Cappelli et 
al., 2012, p. 14). The ITA and CND communities may appear similar because cyber-
attackers generally gain access to a system by masquerading as authorized inside users. 
ITA and CND personnel may both work to protect the same network information, but 
they live, work, and communicate in different worlds.  
It is well established in network security theory that network defenses will 
eventually fail (Sanders et al., 2014, p. 7; Schwartau, 1999, p. 26). While the current best 
practice is to learn from past attacks to identify similar instances in the future, cyber-
attacks need be successful only once to exact irrecoverable damage (Cappelli et al., 2012; 
FireEye Inc., 2013). For this reason, cybersecurity theory tends to organize attacks 
according to an eight-step method (McClure, Scambray, Kurtz, & Kurtz, 2012), with a 
corresponding “intrusion kill chain,” as a cyber-defense methodology (Hutchins, 
Cloppert, & Amin, 2011, p. 3). The problem with a CND-centric viewpoint is that 
attackers generally use automated attack methods that overwhelm the human capacity for 
timely response—92.9% of system-compromising attacks happen in a matter of minutes 
(Verizon Inc., 2016). Having compromised a system, the attacker generally operates with 
impunity; but if cyber-defense includes an insider threat component, it is possible to 
command greater control over the targeted space.  
Insiders can be expected to operate in a predictable manner because they are a part 
of an organizational design. That is to say, we may not know how or when an intruder 
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gains access, but we should be able to tell an outsider’s network identity from a proper 
insider’s because the outsider will behave differently than we expect of an insider. 
Likewise, many researchers agree that anomaly detection is an integral component for 
insider threat analysis (Brdiczka, Liu, Price, Shen, Patil, Chow, Bart, & Ducheneaut; 2012; 
Young, Memory, Goldberg, & Senator, 2014; Gavai, Sricharan, Hanley, Signhal, & 
Rollerson, 2015; Sanzgiri & Dasgupta, 2016). Recent advances in user entity behavior 
analytics (UEBA) software claim to detect behavioral anomaly, but the technology does not 
eliminate the need for human analysis (Armerding, 2015). Human insider threat analysts 
determine if anomalous inside network behavior, if not otherwise explained, is a threat.  
It is useful to apply an insider threat lens to all cyber-attacks because attackers 
generally gain access and operate as authorized users. Nearly one-third of breaches are 
directly attributable to insiders and nearly two-thirds use legitimate credentials to access 
the victim network (Net Diligence, 2015). High-profile cyber-attacks tend to be insider 
jobs. The hack of the Ashley Madison website, for example, is thought to have been 
perpetrated by an insider (Symantec, 2016). In the 2013 Target breach, credentials from a 
trusted third party—a heating and air conditioning subcontractor—were used to install 
malware on point-of-sale devices. Attackers also leveraged stolen credentials from a 
trusted third party for access in the OPM breach, and, in turn, OPM staff acted as insider 
threats themselves when they failed to properly secure sensitive data according to 
industry standards and federally promulgated policy. OPM cybersecurity staff did not 
exploit vulnerability but their negligence exposed OPM’s data to hackers. A 
congressional report on the breach indicated that OPM’s people, not cybersecurity 
technology failures, were to blame for the breach because there was a discernible pattern 
of negligence that left the agency vulnerable to attack. According to the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, “had OPM implemented basic, required security 
controls … when they first learned hackers were targeting such sensitive data, they could 
have significantly delayed, potentially prevented, or significantly mitigated the theft”; the 
Committee went on to state that “the longstanding failure of OPM’s leadership to 
implement basic cyber hygiene, such as maintaining current authorities to operate and 
employing strong multi-factor authentication, despite years of warnings from the 
 15 
Inspector General, represents a failure of culture and leadership, not technology” 
(Chaffetz, Meadows, & Hurd, 2016, p. ix). These examples indicate that cybersecurity 
should include an insider perspective because guards, though present for duty, introduce 
vulnerability in the form of illusory security when sleeping on the job. 
2. Insider Threat Analysis 
Insider threats to cybersecurity are pervasive; no lock can keep out one who holds 
the key. There is no universally accepted definition of an insider threat, but the literature 
contains common themes. According to Cappelli et al. (2012), insiders are people; Bishop 
et al. (2014, p. 253) describe an insider as an “activity execution agent,” whether a person 
or a program; Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, and Bulford (2010) assert that insiders are the 
actions of a threat actor, as distinct from the physical actor himself. In this sense, 
authorized actions can be threats when performed by an actor who has good intentions and 
diligence, but commits harmful acts. All concur, however, that insiders have some kind of 
authorized access with sufficient privilege to put an organization’s data, processes, or 
resources at risk. Some authors argue that insider threats involve malice (Schultz, 2002; 
Cole & Ring, 2006, p. 7), whereas others include unintentional negligence (Hunker & 
Probst, 2011; Contos, 2006, p. 149). Hunker and Probst (2011) conclude that actors can be 
impostors who do harm through authorized access. The Department of Defense (DOD) 
adds any threat of espionage, terror, unauthorized disclosure, and sabotage, regardless of 
intent (Department of Defense[DOD], 2014), to the definition. All agree that insider threat 
actors are trusted agents with the propensity to harm. 
The inevitability of risk associated with trusted agents, expressed by the ancient 
dilemma, quis custodiet ipsos custodes? remains a serious problem. Attacks may cause 
irreparable damage, subject to little remedy, before law enforcement officials are aware 
(Cappelli et al., 2012; Contos, 2006; Cole & Ring, 2006).5 Traditional enforcement 
measures can do little to defend against insider threats because investigations commence 
after the offense. Meanwhile, the emergence of new forms of anti-stalking laws, school-
                                                 
5 Quis custodiet ipsos custodes is a Latin phrase from the Roman poet Juvenal’s Satire IV, line 347 
translated as “Who watches the watchmen?” 
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safety legislation, and restraining orders suggests a movement toward identifying would-be 
culprits proactively. 
The insider threat literature is inundated with taxonomies of actors and ontologies 
of indicators, but little attempt is made to research the analysts whose job is to seek out 
these threats. Insider threat analysts may synthesize many references to detect when an 
insider is not behaving as expected and infer if that behavior presents a risk. An 
investigator follows up on the threat analyst’s inference using deductive reasoning to 
determine if the insider identity is a security risk or an impostor, or if there is a legitimate 
explanation for the unexpected behavior. These analysts attempt to identify malevolent 
inside actors before they can use privilege to do harm—that is, they watch the watchmen. 
They do so by identifying and validating behavior that has a propensity for harm.  
Gary Kline’s (1998) recognition-primed decision making concept provides a 
theoretical basis that insider threat analysts’ intuition must be informed by some 
foundational precepts. Incidentally, there are 13 “adjudicative guidelines for determining 
eligibility for access to classified information” that define risky behaviors (Adjudicative 
Guidelines, 2016; Carney & Marshall-Mies, 2000). The guidelines, however, are not 
deductive rules; they are subjective in nature. For instance, each guideline has 
“conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying” with each 
accompanied by “conditions that could mitigate security concerns” (Adjudicative 
Guidelines, 2016, p. 530; emphasis added). The guidelines note that conditions 
themselves are also subjective such as “conduct which may make the individual 
vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure” (emphasis added). This absence of well-
defined parameters is why humans, instead of computers, are required to perform insider 
threat analysis.  
The human-dependent nature of ITA commonly surfaces in operational settings. 
A contemporary example is how a popular insider threat software title flagged user 
activity that matched .”ru,” the top-level Russian domain. The software found “ru 4 
realz?” a phrase that did not imply involvement with Russian content; software analytics 
would conclude the same. However, the human analyst investigated what he interpreted 
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as a use of juvenile language and discovered that the insider was soliciting a minor for 
illicit sexual behavior. Indicators that lack explicitly programmed instructions for 
computer software go unseen if not for human analysis. Thus, humans must contextualize 
ambiguous behaviors and determine if violations of the adjudicative guidelines exist.  
ITA requires different skills than those required for an investigation because the 
nature of the problem differs. ITA problems tend to be messy, and the difficulty of 
solving them increases geometrically as ignorance is introduced into the analysis. 
Ambiguity tends to make ITA indivisible into a smaller, more manageable problem. 
Problems that have better-defined parameters tend to be more structured, increase in 
difficulty linearly with complexity, and are divisible. For example, a typical children’s 
wood block puzzle may be solvable with or without the puzzle frame. The puzzle frame 
bounds the problem, informs the expected outcome, and allows deductive analytics, thus 
simplifying the solution. When using the puzzle frame, a child knows if he has the correct 
number of pieces and can deduce the solution is correct. Given the same puzzle pieces 
with no bounding frame, he proceeds by examining the relationships among the pieces 
and infers a most likely correct solution based on his predicate knowledge. In this case, 
the puzzle solver uses abductive reasoning—that is, he transitions from observation to 
theory, using the simplest and most likely explanation—so there is no guarantee of truth. 
He does not know if he has all the pieces, or too many or unrelated pieces. If he has no 
relevant knowledge of the expected solution, it is likely he will not be certain of a correct 
solution if he sees it. He determines that the problem has been solved correctly when the 
pieces seem to fit together or the outcome looks right based on his predicate knowledge.  
In life and science, a set of observations may permit many consistent explanations 
(Lombrozo, 2007), but the best explanation may be insufficient to establish a premise of 
truth, which requires that the explanation be both necessary and sufficient (Musgrave, 
1988; Lipton, 1993). That is to say, an explanation should posit a cause that can account 
for the effect observed, and that cause should be sufficient in itself to produce the effect. 
Fein and Vossekuil (1998) expand upon Musgrave and Lipton’s views, offering three 
assumptions that underpin threat assessment: the behavior must be discernible, a link 
between past behaviors and a potential attack must exist, and an interaction between 
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actor, environment, and target must be evident. Fortunately, inside actors are known to 
leave a trail of evidence before a breach that demonstrates interactions among actor, 
environment, and target (Baracaldo & Joshi, 2013; Brdiczka et al., 2012; Cappelli et al., 
2012; Moore, Cappelli, & Trzeciak, 2008). Thus, a priori identification of insider threats 
is theoretically feasible, given sufficient information. 
3. Toward an ITA Theory 
Scientific theories shape our understanding of world phenomena (Thagard, 1993, 
p. 33). According to Ruben (1975, p. 66), there is no scientific theory without order, and 
all theory assumes the world is rationally ordered to some degree. Theories comprise 
interrelated constructs, propositions, and definitions that explain phenomena with 
meaningful representations by specifying the relationships between constructs (Kerlinger 
& Lee, 2000, p. 64). According to Creswell (2014, p. 54), a theory may appear as an 
“argument, discussion, figure, or rationale” that explains phenomena. The building blocks 
of this rationale are presented in Feigl’s (1970) “orthodox view” diagram, which 
illustrates constructs linked to observations, and vice versa. Ronald Giere’s (1991, p. 32) 
model of a scientific episode similarly describes these links as relationships between four 
elements: real world, model, data, and prediction. Following Giere’s interpretation, a 
model is a theory that should conform to some particular aspect of the real world that we 
observe as data. If the model is correct, the prediction should agree with the data; this 
gives data meaning and enables prediction in the real world. To Giere, agreement 
between the real world, model, data, and predictions displays the power of a theory.  
To say a theoretical model is true is to say that it has some correspondence with 
the real world (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p. 188). Rudolf Carnap (1956) asserts that all 
observations can be defined in theoretical language through what he calls “rules of 
correspondence.” To Carnap, the observable (a measurable relationship between mass 
and temperature) is more meaningful than the unobservable (speculative metaphysics), 
and correspondence truth theories suggest that there is some direct empirical observation 
that provides evidence of truth. Observation has its limitations, however, chiefly to do 
with predicate knowledge, and observational language cannot communicate an 
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understanding of theoretical terms (Hesse, 1970). In other words, two people can see the 
same object from the same viewpoint, but based on their prior knowledge they will 
experience the object differently because observation is an activity of the mind more than 
the eye (Hanson, 1958). Therefore, this research draws on the broad theoretical domain of 
cognitive psychology to investigate insider threat analysis. 
4. An Information Science Approach to ITA 
Current investigations seek to predict the behavior of a cyber-attacker via 
computer programs that identify evidence of an attack based on known predications. A 
cyber threat that exploits a system in an expected way should thus be detected; yet threats 
that act unexpectedly subvert cyber-defenses and must be watched for. David Hume’s 
philosophy might see the cyber security problem as a “matter of fact” and the insider 
threat problem as a “relation of ideas” (Hume, 2004, p. 14). When new threat vectors are 
exploited, cyber-defense analysts are incapable of predicting the cause because 
conception a priori is more a matter of chance than recognition. Much of the problem 
with causality is what Hume calls a problem with induction. To Hume, “it is impossible 
to discover causes and effects for any new observation, and any supposition thereon is 
completely arbitrary” (Hume, 2004, p. 17). Consistent with these insights, a recent 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report reveals that cybersecurity comes short 
in “identifying root causes of issues” (Goldenkoff, 2015, p. 18).  
Hume’s philosophy on inductive reasoning explains the limits to identifying 
unknown threats. Pedro Domingos framed the induction problem in his 2015 book The 
Master Algorithm with the question, “How can we ever be justified in generalizing from 
what we’ve seen to what we haven’t?” (p. 58). Threat assessment strategies such as 
profiling, automated decision making and guided professional judgment are at least three 
methods that attempt to accommodate the demands of threat assessment (Reddy, Borum, 
Berglund, Vossekuil, Fein, & Modzeleski, 2001). Of these, guided professional judgment 
is the only strategy that suggests a move from a deductive–analytic inquiry system to one 
that allows for multiple perspectives. 
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Ian Mitroff, an expert on unbounded systems thinking (UST), echoes Hume by 
stating that neither method (agreement or analysis) can establish “one of the most 
fundamental principles in science—causality” (Mitroff & Linstone, 1993, p. 86). He goes 
on to present both the consensual and analytical as components of the “technical 
perspective” (p. 97), which proceeds from an objective epistemology because it perceives 
the meaning of things as they exist independent of the mind (Crotty, 1998, p. 5). A more 
complete view would include additional perspectives, as digital data are only a partial 
contribution to understanding the overall picture (Johnson, 2006, p. 176). The UST 
approach seeks to balance the technical perspective with organizational and personal 
perspectives (Mitroff & Linstone, 1993, p. 107). The approach fits ITA because it 
interrelates three perspectives—the objective (technical), constructivist (organizational), 
and subjective (personal)—into a single inquiry system that offers a more complete way of 
knowing (p. 99). 
Insider threats urge a UST approach to a messy, multifaceted problem. Threat 
actors exhibit identifiable behaviors that should indicate an existing latent threat; in 
retrospect, the same indicators are components in an investigator’s trail of evidence. Many 
indicators can be used to bring an event into context when examined through technical, 
organizational, and personal perspectives. For instance, network activity (a technical 
indicator), personnel duties and roles (an organizational indicator), and financial status (a 
personal indicator) may collectively identify an insider threat, manifest an imposter, or 
exonerate an innocent party; individually, however, they offer insufficient information.  
Insider threat analysts assess information from multiple sources to identify 
sequences of events that suggest suspicious behavior (Faber, 2015). While computer 
sensors can generate data at an overwhelming rate that is difficult to manage (Jackson & 
Farzaneh, 2012; McAfee, Brynjolfsson, Davenport, Patil, & Barton, 2012), new big data 
technologies make the data more manageable to human counterparts—at the cost of context 
(Wang, 2013). Humans can reassign meaning to the data in a given context a posteriori 
because of their ability to continuously adapt to environmental changes (Simon, 1996, p. 
53). For instance, a quote from a celebrity figure may mean something entirely different if 
spoken by a politician, and humans will intuitively discern the meaning based on the 
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quote’s context. Rule-following computers are incapable of this adaptation due to 
variations in contextual relevance (Gordon, 2016; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). According to 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus, computers suffer from a “common sense” problem (p. 79). 
It follows, then, that humans are at some point necessary to interpret the data 
required to perform an effective analysis (Goldberg et al., 2016; Sanders et al., 2014, p. 
13). There are, however, known limitations to human information-processing capacity 
(Simon, 1996, p. 81). As a result, humans introduce vulnerability in the form of 
information overload (Shenk, 1997; Oppenheim, 1997; Kirsh, 2000). The robust body of 
research on information overload (for example, Jackson & Farzeneh, 2012; Klausegger, 
Sinkovics, & Zou, 2007) generally describes the phenomenon in terms of time (Schick, 
Gordon, & Haka, 1990), information complexity (Edmunds & Morris, 2000), and 
individual information-processing capacity (Eppler & Mengis, 2004; Simon, 1996).  
Time, information complexity, and information-processing capacity may be 
related in ITA analysis much as time, quality, and cost are related in the theory of 
constraint (Goldratt & Cox, 2016); as information complexity increases and time is held 
constant, information-processing capacity must also increase. Human limitations in 
information-processing capacity explain much of the problem with contemporary 
cybersecurity (Simon, 1996, p. 87).   
The intersection between computer data and human information is a crucial point 
of investigation, involving aspects of human information behavior. There is consensus 
that the study of human information behavior should have primacy over programmatic 
information behavior in such studies (Spink, 2000; Bates, 1999). Computers are 
programmed, and thus computer information behavior is an engineering task. Human 
information behavior, on the other hand, is not programmatically defined; it must be 
understood first, and computers subsequently programmed to interact with the 
information appropriately. Understanding human information behavior is, in this sense, 
the result of a competent scientific inquiry of information (i.e., a science of information).   
Information science is an appropriate avenue through which to study 
cybersecurity because it is an interdisciplinary science that examines unseen forces 
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governing both manual and mechanical techniques of information use (Taylor, 1966), 
especially the properties, storage, movement, and processing of information for optimal 
utility (Zins, 2006; Borko, 1968). Examining those forces that govern the optimal flow of 
information, specifically between computer data and the cybersecurity personnel who 
process them as information, lies firmly within the bounds of information science.  
5. Related Work 
Fraud theory research is a closely related thread of work (Dorminey, Flemming, 
Kranacher, & Riley, 2012). Donald Cressey’s seminal work with the “fraud triangle” in 
1953 provided three necessary but not individually sufficient conditions for accounting 
fraud. According to Cressey, “trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive 
of themselves as having a financial problem which is non-shareable, are aware that this 
problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial trust, and are 
able to apply to their own conduct in that situation verbalizations which enable them to 
adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons with their conception of 
themselves as users of the entrusted funds or property” (1953, p. 30). Cressey claimed 
that violations of trust required a minimum of some non-shareable problem, opportunity, 
and rationalization. 
To Cressey, the very conception of fraud in the mind of a trusted agent defines that 
agent as a trust violator. Under Cressey’s conceptualization, cyber penetration testers 
would be trust violators, as would anyone who understands a financial accounting system 
well enough to exploit it undetected and conceives a notion to do so, regardless of his 
integrity. Such a violation is not observable with the disputable exception of a polygraph 
examination.  
Many scholars expanded on Cressey’s work (Schuchter & Levi, 2013; Kassem & 
Higson, 2012). Wolfe and Hermanson’s (2004) work changed the triangle to a quadrangle 
with the addition of capability. The “fraud diamond” included four conditions for 
accounting fraud: incentive, opportunity, rationalization, and capability. Wolfe and 
Hermanson agree with Cressey that a rationalization component assumes there is some 
inner voice that must be overcome to commit fraud. Albrecht (1984) replaced 
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rationalization with integrity, theorizing that poor personal integrity is a condition that 
suggests higher fraud risk. While the model makes sense, neither rationalization nor 
integrity is readily observable unless the insider has a documented history of crime.  
Kranacher, Riley, and Wells’s (2011) “money, ideology, coercion, ego” (MICE) 
model expanded Cressey’s “problem” component into a four-part model with a multi-
perspective “ideology” component. According to Kranacher et al., ideology can motivate 
fraud without desire for personal gain—for instance, the loan officer that clandestinely 
modifies a loan document so he will not be forced to evict a single mother and her eight 
young children after her husband, the sole breadwinner, was killed in combat while 
fighting for all citizens—including the bank employees—freedom. Ideology in this sense 
would negate rationalization, at least in the sense that the behavior is wrong from the loan 
officer’s perspective.  
Perspective fundamentally changes how predicate fraud elements are understood. 
From a cybersecurity standpoint, opportunity for the fraudster is the same thing as 
vulnerability for the organization he attacks. Furthermore, fraud is only one type of 
insider threat. The fraud triangle is used to assess the risk of financial fraud to help 
financial organizations better predict fraud (Morales, Gendron, & Guenin-Paracini, 
2014). According to Cappelli et al. (2012), insider threats can also be saboteurs, spies, 
and information thieves. In this sense, the fraud triangle will do little to predict nation-
state cyber espionage. 
Richards Heuer’s (1999) Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) is an eight 
step method developed through the Central Intelligence Agency to help intelligence 
analysts overcome confirmation bias and other analytic shortcomings. The ACH 
framework requires that an analyst list all possible explanations to answer a question 
when information is unavailable for certainty. Using this method, an analyst can logically 
exclude unlikely explanations by organizing the explanations and evidence against each 
explanation in a tabular format. Analysts must ignore evidence that confirms any 
explanation and as a result, the explanation with the least evidence against it is the most 
likely explanation. Failure to find evidence against several explanations does not prove 
the explanations, but rather indicates that additional information is necessary to disprove 
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multiple explanations until there is one most likely remaining. A problem with the ACH 
method is that analysts must conceptualize explanations a priori. However, in reality, 
threat analysts must put anomalous behaviors into context in order to identify if an insider 
is a threat before following up with an investigative method such as the ACH. 
The fraud triangle and the ACH methods are tools that investigators may use to 
infer genuine insider threats after identified by analysts. Opportunity, rationalization, and 
pressure loosely relate to the means-motive-opportunity trifecta established in criminal 
proceedings. Nick Catrantzos offers another similar trifecta, the “target, open door, and a 
dark corner” method of insider threat assessment (Catrantzos, 2012, p. 3). Catrantzos’s 
method focuses on the environment and intent rather than the work of the insider threat 
analyst. Certainly there are more methods for assessing risk, and this research does not 
intend to juxtapose them. Rather, this research examines how teamwork and ignorance 
conditions affect insider threat analysis performance.  
B. COGNITIVIST PERSPECTIVE 
The way an analyst discerns insider threats depends upon the psychology-based 
tools the analyst employs. Paradigms that could explain insider threat analysts’ processes 
include behaviorism, constructivism, and cognitivism. Behaviorist learning theories are 
based on stimulus–response associations that do not involve the role of memory (Ertmer 
& Newby, 2013). A behaviorist learning theory may be appropriate for cyber network 
defense (e.g., responding a certain way to known malicious signatures), but it does not 
work well with insider threats that have no signatures. Constructivist learning theories are 
problematic because they assume new information builds on extant knowledge. This is 
problematic because many observable behaviors do not always have the same meaning 
when judgments are predicated on subjective knowledge. Cognitivist learning theories 
are appropriate for insider threat analysis research because they deal with how people 
solve problems (Mandler, 2002). ITA requires analysts to identify behaviors and make 
inferences to a cause. The theory of attribution is an applicable cognitive learning model 
because it deals with the reasoning of cause and effect. 
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1. Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory is an artifact of cognitive psychology that is concerned with 
how people assign causal explanations for certain events (Harvey, Madison, Martinko, 
Crook, & Crook, 2014). Attribution theory posits that people will attribute behavior to 
either internal or external factors based on observations. Behavior attributed to internal 
cause assumes the behavior is under personal control; otherwise the behavior is 
attributable to some external cause. Fritz Heider’s (1958) seminal work on attribution 
theory suggests that people act as naïve psychologists as they search for the reason 
certain events occur. Attribution theory is widely applied to educational contexts 
(Weiner, 1972), marketing (Laczniak, DeCarlo, & Ramaswami, 2001), and recently to 
insider threats (Posey, Bennett, & Roberts, 2011). This research applies attribution theory 
to analysts who seek out insider threats. 
People have an innate drive to give causal explanations. According to Hieder, 
“attribution is part of our cognition of the environment. Whenever you cognize your 
environment you will find attribution occurring” (Harvey, 1984, p. 428). Attribution 
theories examine how people gather, combine, and perceive information to make causal 
judgments (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Perhaps the most popular, well-established attribution 
theory that focuses on how the perceiver attributes cause to an actor’s behavior is Harold 
Kelley’s (1973) covariation model.  
Kelley’s covariation model explains how social perceptions are used to make 
attributions for observed behaviors. The model is well suited for ITA because it is 
indifferent to intent. According to Kelley’s model, factors that influence attributions to 
either internal or external causes include consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness. The 
consensus element explores why a person’s behavior may deviate from the behaviors of 
others in the same situation—when consensus is high, people tend to attribute a behavior 
to some external cause. Consistency relates to how consistent a behavior is for the 
specific situation over time; when consistency is high, people tend to relate the 
anomalous behavior to some internal cause. Distinctiveness questions if the behavior is 
distinct among similar situations. When distinctiveness is high, people also tend to 
attribute a behavior to an internal cause. How each of the factors co-vary predicts 
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whether people attribute anomalous behavior to an internal or external cause. Kelley’s 
model loosely relates to Baracaldo and Joshi’s (2013, p. 237) precursors known to insider 
threats. Anomalous behavior attributed to an external cause may exonerate a suspect, 
while attribution to an internal cause may implicate insider threats. 
According to Kelley and Michela (1980, p. 471), people use past subjective 
judgment to determine if there are “multiple sufficient causes” or “multiple necessary 
causes.” The difference is analogous to “OR” and “AND” Boolean operations. In the case 
of multiple sufficient causes (AND operation), several authors stress the significance of 
schemata in causal attributions (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Oliveria, 2007; Kelley, 
1973; Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1979). Kelly and Michela (1980, p. 471) defined a 
causal schema as “a description of the common person’s conception of how two or more 
causes combine to produce a certain effect.” As schemata interact with multiple 
behaviors, people must accommodate multiple schemata simultaneously to assign 
attribution to a set of behaviors. This implies that additional cognitive resources are 
necessary to accommodate the need to make attributions. Oliveira (2007, p. 13) theorized 
“once schemata is formed there will be a resistance to change.” A reasonable explanation 
for the “resistance to change” is that schemata changes increase cognitive load when 
people confirm or reassign attributions as they reconcile new information.  
2. Cognitive Load Theory 
A major challenge to insider threat analysis is overcoming information overload 
(Cappelli et al., 2012, p. 196; Garst & Gross, 1997). The first recorded conceptualization 
of information overload may be credited to King Solomon, who 3,000 years ago warned 
that the making and studying of books is endless and will eventually weary the body. He 
concluded that wisdom can be summed up as “fear God and keep his commandments.” 
Clearly, the conceptualization of information overload is not new. 
There are known limitations to human information processing capacity (Simon, 
1996). Cognitive performance is known to degrease when information processing 
demand exceeds the capacity to process it (Sweller, 1988). Information overload is a 
phenomenon that occurs when the demand for information processing exceeds that 
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capacity primarily due to processing time constraints (Schick, Gordon, & Haka, 1990). A 
body of research in the 1990s named the phenomenon, including Shenk’s “data smog” 
(1997, p. 31) and “information-fatigue syndrome” (Oppenheim, 1997, p. 246). The 
academic literature explains it in terms of several factors that collectively limit the 
capacity to accommodate information-processing demand (Eppler & Mengis, 2004; 
Jackson & Farzaneh, 2012). Well-established research agrees that there is an optimal 
balance between information-overload factors and decision-making performance (Miller, 
1995; Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967).  
Meadow and Yuan (1997, p. 701) point out that data refers to a “set of symbols 
with little or no meaning to a recipient” and information to a “set of symbols that does 
have meaning or significance to the recipient.” According to Meadow and Yuan, data has 
the potential to be information, but may not be perceived as such. For instance, an 
unwitting threat analyst may look through pages of sensor feeds and extract little 
information, but a focused analyst may be overwhelmed with information because he is 
able to “see” more in the data.6 The literature also suggests that after the optimal point is 
exceeded, information-processing capacity will dramatically decrease (Miller, 1956; 
Griffeth, 1998). Starbuck and Milliken (1988) found that sense-making under conditions 
of low awareness contributes to information processing limitations.  
a. Information Overload 
There are competing precepts of load as an information measure. One 
conceptualization is the number of cues (Chewing & Harrell, 1990) or chunks (Simon, 
1996, p. 81) presented and subsequently used for decision making. Working, immediate 
memory is generally limited to seven chunks, give or take two (Miller, 1956). The 
alternative conceptualization is similar, but defined by time limitations. Farace et al. (1977, 
p. 103) express information in common units called “messages” and conceptualized load as 
a rate. In this sense, information overload occurs when the number of messages within a 
certain period exceeds information-processing capacity (Schick et al., 1990). This 
                                                 
6 I use “sensor feeds” as a generalization for any packet captures, web logs, access logs, or other 
machine-generated data. 
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alternative view holds that an individual who has the required time available to process 
information is not overloaded. The two information-load conceptualizations are the same, 
with the exception of time as a component factor. Farace and Schick’s definition represents 
continuous decision-making operations and Simon’s is momentary.  
The literature articulates several factors that contribute to information overload 
(Jackson & Farzeneh, 2012). These can be divided among properties of the environment 
(Eppler & Mengis, 2004), the individual (Haasse et al., 2014), and information 
complexity (Klausegger, Sinkovics, Zou, & Joy, 2007). This research focuses on the 
relationship between the individual and the information complexity—specifically, 
information sources (Edmunds & Morris, 2000). Measures for information overload are 
not new; previously validated surveys measured the perception of information overload 
in prior published studies (Karr-Wisniewski & Lu, 2010).  
b. Information Sources 
Humans generally make decisions under constrained time, knowledge, and 
information-processing capacity (Gigerenzer, 2001). As a result, information sources are 
beneficial up to some optimal point, after which additional sources become a burden 
(Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006). A widely held explanation from cognitive load theory 
posits that information-processing capacity is limited by an individual’s working memory 
(Sweller, 1988). As a result, people tend to prune all but the most useful information 
sources (Savolainen, 2007).  
Following Herbert Simon’s (2000) bounded rationality concept, Karr-Wisniewski 
and Lu (2010) suggest that information pruning will happen when information-processing 
capacity is exceeded, a process that differs from first determining which information 
sources are most useful. Recall that threat analysts must query all sources because, unlike 
investigators, they do not know which source is most useful a priori. Savolainen (2015, 
p. 619) offers that people generally use a “withdrawal strategy” to keep information 
sources to a minimum in order to prevent information overload a priori. There is 
substantial research on the factors that contribute to information overload (Eppler & 
Mengis, 2004), but there is yet no empirical test of the number of references as an 
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independent factor. Jackson and Farzaneh’s (2012, p. 531) theory-based model of 
information overload includes information sources as a factor, but they assert that 
additional research is needed to determine the “values and accuracy” of the factors.  
There are multiple concepts of an information source as a factor of information 
overload. Wu (2005) distinguishes between electronic and print resources. Bawden and 
Robison (2008) add that resources are available in an overwhelming number of media 
and formats. Dempsey (2008) states that a source is an entry point into an information 
network. Burns and Bossaller (2012) suggest that sources can be the communication 
technology used to access information. It follows that an information source is 
distinguished by mode of transmission, format, technology, and access. 
The research on information overload agrees that too much information will do 
more harm than help. This view holds that there is some optimal load point at which all 
other points are suboptimal, assuming that information underload is also detrimental. 
Following the time-agnostic view of information load, this dissertation conceptualizes the 
lack of relevant information as ignorance. In this sense, information load is conceptualized 
inversely, whereby an analyst who has all the available information required for solving a 
problem lacks ignorance and one with no information available to solve a problem 
(including information that there is a problem) is fundamentally ignorant. 
3. The Taxonomy of Ignorance 
It is difficult to make causal attributions when information is missing and if we do 
not know what is normal, it is hard to identify what is anomalous. Theories of causal 
induction posit that prior knowledge informs causal inference (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 
2009). It stands to reason that ignorance can affect how people make attributions, 
especially when multiple people with diverse experiences are involved in making 
attributions. Samuel Holtzman (1989) categorized the lack of information available for 
decision making, or ignorance, into seven qualitatively distinct levels. The two highest 
levels represent problems that allow monotonic reasoning and the remaining levels 
require non-monotonic reasoning; a form of reasoning for which conclusions can be 
invalidated with new information (McCarthy, 1986) 
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The nature of loosely circumscribed problems requires convergence at a deeper 
level of ignorance than one must accommodate for a highly circumscribed problem. That 
is to say, as ignorance decreases, a problem becomes more circumscribed. Holtzman’s 
(1989, p. 27) taxonomy of ignorance levels each require different ways of thinking in 
order to solve the type of problem each level represents. There is little progress toward 
this understanding of ignorance with the exception of Denby and Gammack’s (1999) 
models of ignorance for decision support systems. Though not perfect, the taxonomy 
presents seven levels of ignorance that ipso facto represent different problem types. 
Table 2 presents the taxonomy of ignorance. 
Table 2.   Taxonomy of Ignorance. Source: Denby & Gammack (1999). 
Ignorance Level Description Knowledge Required 
Combinatorial Computational task too difficult, e.g., problem with 
10
40
 variables. 
Mathematics model 
available; use of 
supercomputers. 
Watsonian Cannot make the connection from all the clues; 
solution method incomplete. 
Method for determining 
the important facts from 
the unimportant ones, 
and drawing the right 
conclusion. 
Gordian King Gordius tied a knot for the future king of Asia 
to untie. Alexander the Great was able to “untie it” 
by cutting the knot with his sword, thus solving the 
problem in an unusual way. 
Lateral thinking—are 
there “rules” to be 
broken? 
Ptolemaic Attributed to the Greek Mathematician and 
astronomer, Ptolemy, whose model of the universe 
centered around a stationary earth. 
Evidence and 
observation of reality. 
Magical “No one knows how it works, but everyone knows 
that it works,” e.g., the use of Aspirin and other 
similar drugs. 
Trial and error. 
Dark No model is available but one is aware of the 
issues, e.g., “What is Life?,” “Consciousness,” etc. 
Future of science. 
Fundamental Unaware of issue. (Ignorance is bliss!)  
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It appears Holtzman would affirm that ITA proceeds from at least a Gordian level 
because ITA is closely related to the circumscription problem. Circumscription problems 
are known to involve non-monotonic reasoning. Insider agents continuously produce 
information, so ITA appears to be non-monotonic process. However, analysts must make 
decisions based only on the information available during a single inference cycle. 
Inference cycles are essentially recognize–act events based on the available information 
at a specific moment, so the reasoning involved appears monotonic (Meadows, Langley, 
& Emry, 2014). 
Holtzman’s taxonomy does not explain how much one level differs from another. 
Also, combinatorial ignorance is not so much a problem of ignorance as it is a lack of 
information-processing capacity. Ptolemaic ignorance, from Ptolemy’s astronomical 
model, assumes there are multiple explanations to account for the same observations. In 
the case of Ptolemy’s ingenious geocentric model of the solar system, the data, model, 
observation, and predictions all fit. As did the Copernican model, which was simpler, yet 
both models were the product of the same level of ignorance. Ptolemaic ignorance is 
better classified within the philosophic principle of Ockham’s razor. Problem solving 
under conditions of fundamental ignorance is not testable in a laboratory because the very 
knowledge of the problem reduces the ignorance level. 
The remaining ignorance levels (Watsonian, Gordian, magical, and dark) can be 
quantitatively specified in a more parsimonious taxonomy. Watsonian ignorance, from 
Sherlock Holmes’ famous “elementary, my dear Watson,” represents a problem with all 
the information necessary to deduce a solution; one need only solve the problem. Gordian 
ignorance derives its name from King Gordias’ legendary knot left for the future ruler of 
Asia to untie. Alexander the Great drew his sword and cut the knot. In this case, 
Alexander knew the end result and he subjectively bounded the problem so he could 
solve it. Magical ignorance takes its name from knowing something is so, but not 
knowing how it is so. In other words, magical ignorance allows knowledge that a 
problem has a solution, but not what the solution is. Those with magical ignorance must 
pick the best of solution possibilities informed only by existing knowledge. Dark 
ignorance is simply an awareness of the problem with no other information. Dark 
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ignorance includes ignorance of the possibility of a solution such that one must look at 
how problem components are interrelated to determine if any solution is feasible. A 
proposed refinement of Holtzman’s taxonomy is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Proposed Taxonomy of Ignorance Refinement. 
Ignorance Level Knowledge Allocation Knowledge Required 
Watsonian (1) Problem, expected end result, 
bounds of the problem. 
Solution 
Gordian (2) Problem, expected end result, 
and no bounds to the problem. 
Problem space + 
Solution  
Magical (3) Problem, knows there is an end 
result but not what it is, and no 
bounds to the problem. 
Recognition + 
Problem space + 
Solution 
Dark (4) Problem, does not know if 
there is a solution to the 
problem, and no bounds to the 
problem. 
Inter-relationships + 
Recognition + 
Problem space + 
Solution 
 
ITA problems are both monotonic and loosely circumscribed at the instant of a 
single inference cycle. Dark, magical, and Gordian ignorance levels are not solved by 
obtaining more information such that the solution is clear. Doing so would decrease the 
ignorance level of the problem until the problem becomes a well-circumscribed 
Watsonian problem. Rather, if one were to solve a problem at deeper than Watsonian 
ignorance, he must reason through possibilities that seem to present a feasible solution 
and select the best one at that time. Thus, I infer that ignorance is relatively low under 
Watsonian conditions. 
Detectives investigate known infractions and identify a suspect by establishing 
means, motive, and opportunity (Swanson, Chamelin, Territo, & Taylor, 1992). Insider 
threat analysts have no such luxury. They do not know if an infraction was committed or 
malevolent insiders are present, so they must infer that a sequence of events is best 
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explained by a latent insider threat (Ard, Bishop, Gates, & Sun, 2013). These factors 
explain why ITA differs from investigation and requires an alternative way of thinking 
(Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, & Berglund, 1999).  
McCarthy’s (1980) circumscription concept described a loosely circumscribed 
problem in a formal decision system. McCarthy reasoned a qualification problem from 
sentences of logic. For instance, one can go into infinite regress when qualifying what it 
takes to make a boat float, but it is relatively simple to assume a boat floats unless 
something explicitly prevents it. Little has changed over the last 30 years, and the 
circumscription problem persists in the cybersecurity domain. Computers are partially 
capable of bounding circumscription problems through a pseudo-cognitive approach with 
expressly defined processes modeled off of humans (Kelly, 2014; Oltramari, Ben-Asher, 
Cranor, Bauer, & Cristin, 2014). Human minds naturally handle these problems because 
human reasoning can make assumptions from experiences that relate to a particular 
observation. 
Ignorance effects are intuitive and implied by extant literature; the question lies in 
considering how well humans fill in the gaps to overcome ignorance when making causal 
attributions. For instance, Holtzman (1989) described the famous geocentric astronomical 
model that Ptolemy presented to explain the motion of the heavenly bodies. Ptolemy’s 
model convincingly solved the problem, but his model was incorrect. Insider threat 
analysts similarly make attributions by accommodating ignorance with convincing 
explanations. McCarthy’s (1980) circumscription principle posits that unavailable 
information may change a decision if made available. A contemporary perspective would 
ask, “Does ignorance cause incorrect insider threat assessments?” An acceptable answer 
to this question leads to the first hypothesis for empirical testing: 
Hypothesis 1: A higher level of ignorance will cause lower analyst accuracy. 
4. ITA References 
The effects of ignorance emerge from a lack of information just as the effects of 
overload emerge when the information resources available do more to hinder than aid. 
Reichardt (2006, p. 105) introduces “reference overload” as a term from library science, 
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viewing information overload from the perspective of the information giver, in a library 
context. According to Reichardt, reference overload occurs when a library presents too 
many relevant information sources to a patron. The patron views this as information 
overload, while “librarians could consider it ‘reference overload’” (p. 106). He 
distinguishes reference overload from information overload because patrons are not 
information overloaded when reference overloaded—rather, it is the opposite. A possible 
mitigation is to “try to find the balance between listing too many versus not enough 
resources” (p. 108).  
Insider threat analysts are known to use information from a number of references 
(Faber, 2015). There are at least 11 documented ITA references, including human 
resources (HR), security audit (SA), counterintelligence (CI), and social intelligence (SI) 
(Guido & Brooks, 2013; Maybury et al., 2005; Brackney & Anderson, 2004). Kelly and 
Anderson (2016) acknowledge that some agencies use more references than others, but 
offer no evidence that more references over a baseline capability affects analyst accuracy 
or promptitude.  
The law of diminishing marginal returns is an economic principal stating that 
when a resource is increased and all else is equal, the resulting benefit will eventually 
diminish (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2001). This law is called the “marginal-productivity 
idea” in information science (Iselin, 1988). The marginal-productivity concept basically 
confirms that increasing the number of references will provide relatively less additional 
information. A common example is social-networking services. Myspace was once the 
only prevalent online social-networking information source; if a user had a social-
networking presence in 2003, chances are it was limited to Myspace alone. Today, a user 
may have a profile on Myspace, Facebook, LinkedIn, Snapchat, Tinder, Twitter, 
eHarmony, and Yelp, among others. Profiling an individual based on his social-network 
presence requires a different amount of effort today, but the benefit of processing seven 
profiles is not necessarily seven times greater than one. This is consistent with current 
research that suggests providing more information does not necessarily result in better 
crime prediction (Jackson, 2014; Levin, Bean, & Martin-Browne, 2012) and may prevent 
proper analysis (Sanders et al., 2014, p. 439). This implies that references must not 
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provide irrelevant or duplicate information, but must offer additional perspectives to be 
useful. 
The UST multiple perspectives approach (Mitroff & Linstone, 1993, p. 99) as a 
framework for reference selection loosely relates to the multiple factors described in 
Kelley’s (1973) covariation model. Both the UST model and the covariation model 
describe organizational and personal perspectives that together provide more meaning 
than either individually. References that support multiple perspectives are important 
because insider threat analysts require a synthesis of information from various references 
to perform their duties (Greitzer & Ferryman, 2013; Cappelli et al., 2012). Additional 
references help to give patterns meaning (Libicki & Pfleeger, 2004) and decision-making 
performance generally improves when more relevant information is available (Manis, 
Fichman, & Platt, 1978).  
Anecdotal law enforcement information-sharing success stories perpetuate the 
idea that the availability of more references enables predicting and preventing crime 
(Executive Order No. 11587, 2011), and that in some cases references did not directly 
contribute to a thwarted attack (e.g., U.S. v. Shahzad, 2010). Since the 9/11 World Trade 
Center attack, the movement to increase references via information sharing has become a 
central security focus, as reflected in two national strategies (White House, 2007; White 
House, 2012). In line with these strategies, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
implemented a policy that requires the integration and synchronization of programs 
across the DOD, through a capability that involves diverse specializations and 
communities (DOD, 2014). Coincidentally, multibillion-dollar outlays for fusion centers 
that bring together nearly every law enforcement–related specialty and reference under 
the sun have become the sine qua non in preventing crime (Government Accountability 
Office, 2010). Persistent questions about the value of such efforts remain unanswered 
(Davies & Plotkin, 2005, p. 62). Notwithstanding substantial outlays in personnel and 
technology, however, there remains little to show for these investments (Permanent 
Select Committee on Investigations, 2012, p. 9).  
The substantial increase of information available for threat assessments may have 
a related overload effect. There are two concepts of information overload that confuse the 
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meaning of Garst and Gross’s work. One is a time-centered view that suggests an analyst 
will experience information overload under time constraints (Schick et al., 1990). The 
other centers on memory, suggesting that an analyst will experience information overload 
when the number of cues exceeds the limitations of working memory (Simon, 1996, 
p. 81). These concepts create ambiguity—do too many cues or too high a rate of 
information present a problem? If it is too many cues, then decreasing the number of 
references may be an appropriate strategy to mitigate information overload. If rate (i.e., 
too little time allotted), then simply increasing the number of insider threat analysts to 
process the information may best mitigate overload. Following the theory of constraint, 
more information should increase the time required to process the information. Such 
postulates lead to my second and third hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: A lower level of ignorance will cause higher analyst time.  
Hypothesis 3: A higher level of ignorance will cause lower analyst confidence. 
According to organization theory, organizational structure can affect human 
information processing performance (Lenz, 1981). I argue that organizational structure 
and ignorance create specific effects and may affect analyst accuracy and time, and could 
interactively affect perceptions of information overload. An empirical test of ITA with 
people organized in teams or as individuals to see how structure interacts with various 
information constraints may take us a step closer to understanding why large investments 
in ITA programs appear to have little effect on analyst performance. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
In classical organizational theory, an organization is a social artifact “set up to do 
something” (Porter, Lawler, & Hackman, 1975, p. 69). The contingency theory of 
organizational design is that “there is no one best way to organize” and “not all ways to 
organize are equally effective” (Galbraith, 1977, p. 28; Thompson, 1967, p. 78). Some 
organizational theories hold that organizations employ people to accomplish a shared task 
“through division of labor” (Galbraith, 1977, p. 3); others state that organizations do so as 
“coordinated activity systems” (Daft, 2007, p. 10). Organizations generally receive inputs 
and, through some interdependent relationship, produce outputs to accomplish a common 
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goal (Farace, Monge, & Russell, 1977). These descriptions imply that an organization 
consists of individuals in a group who, with or without division of labor, accomplish a 
common goal.  
1. Organizations as Information Processors 
Classical theories of organizational management tend to view organizations as 
output-oriented producers (Simon, 1973).7 Simon cites Peter Drucker’s conceptualization 
of the post-industrial society as a contemporary view of organizational information 
processing. According to Simon (1973), many modern organizations focus on how best to 
make decisions rather than simply on producing widgets—that is, they process 
information. This theory of organizations as information processors is consistent among 
several well-established organizational theorists (Galbraith, 1974; Tushman & Nadler, 
1978; Levitt et al., 1999). Information-processing organizations are limited to the 
constraints experienced by all output-oriented organizations. Specifically, the individual 
producer, whether machine or human, has a limited capacity for information processing 
work. As a result, information-processing organizations tend to use division of labor to 
share information-processing tasks.  
Applying a contingency-theoretic lens applied to information-processing 
organizations implies that there are multiple ways for organizations to process 
information, and some ways may be better than others. According to Klausegger et al. 
(2007), organizational design may play a significant role in information overload. 
Specifically, the disintermediation that occurs as a result of removing steps between the 
information and the consumer (Sarkar, Butler, & Steinfield, 1995) reduces the overall 
encumbrance within a communicating system. Division of labor compels 
disintermediation in information-processing organizations, but allows greater 
information-processing capacity (Cukrowski & Baniak, 1999). 
Tushman and Nadler (1978) focused on task complexity and task interdependency 
as factors to consider when determining the proper fit between environmental constraints 
and information-processing demands, arguing that effectiveness is associated with the fit 
                                                 
7 See Wren (2005) for a review of classical organizational-management theory. 
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between the demands and the capacity available to process information. Further research 
on information underload agrees with Tushman and Nadler’s contingency theory 
(O’Reilly, 1980; Griffeth, Carson, & Marin, 1988). Drawing from O’Reilly (1980), 
performance in information-processing organizations, unlike material-processing 
organizations, may also be degraded by underload conditions. Tushman & Nadler’s 
optimization problem for information-processing organizations is shown in Table 4, 
indicating that the contingency theory in information-processing organizations is a classic 
optimization problem. 
Table 4.   Information Processing Contingency Matrix. 
Source: Tushman and Nadler (1978, p. 619).  
 Information processing capacity 
High Low 
Information processing 
requirements 
High Match Mismatch 
Low Mismatch Match 
 
Contemporary organizational-contingency theory offers an ontology of 
organizational configurations and coordination systems theorized to optimally 
accommodate various constraints. Mintzberg (1980) posits that organizations can be 
structured as machine bureaucracies, professional bureaucracies, adhocracies, simple 
structures, or divisionalized forms to accommodate environmental uncertainty, control, 
and expertise demands and conditions. Each configuration represents a structure that 
integrates subunits into a greater whole. Information-processing organizations, regardless 
of structure, must make decisions based and built on the interpretations of the lowest 
subunit—the personnel who interpret data. 
Interpretation is a waypoint between data and information, requiring a human 
mind when contextual relevance is prone to change. Assuming Heraclitus is correct that 
change is certain, computers are incapable of interpretation under conditions of dynamic 
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contextual relevance because computers programmatically follow rules (Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 1986). To the extent that contextualization is an interpretative activity, it is 
closely related to Weick’s (2005) conceptualization of sense-making. 
Contextualization is basically a human sense-making activity, as stimuli are 
organized into a framework (Weick, 1995, p. 4) that allows a person to “comprehend, 
understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate, and predict” (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, 
p. 51). Starbuck and Milliken (1988) found that sense-making under conditions of low 
awareness contributes to information-processing limitations. The literature, however, 
tends to describe sense-making as an organizational-learning process required for 
“consensually constructed, coordinated system of action” (Taylor & Van Every, 2000, 
p. 275). The dynamic interactions between sense-making elements create knowledge 
(Nonaka, Toyama, & Nagata, 2000). Nonaka et al. (2000) assert that context necessarily 
precedes knowledge. Without proper context, a view cannot be communally justified as a 
true belief because differing predicate knowledge applies (Hesse, 1970; Hanson, 1958). 
This implies that intermediation exists between individual and team sense-making. I infer 
that the same is true of individual and team contextualization. Thus, intermediation is a 
result of division of labor in an information-processing task that includes 
contextualization. 
Media synchronicity theory describes a similar phenomenon within a group 
information exchange. According to Dennis, Fuller, and Valacich (2008), communication 
has a convergence dimension in addition to conveyance. The theory provides that 
communication requires both dimensions, conveyance and convergence, for successful 
completion of any task that involves more than one individual. Media synchronicity 
theory concludes that media fit for a communication task affects communication 
performance and face-to-face is the best medium for convergence.  
Division of labor requires eventual reassembly. Similarly, reassembly logically 
compels interdependence among subunits. Thompson (1967) presents three types of 
interdependence that accommodate reassembly, contingent on increasingly complex 
organizational structures. Pooled interdependence is described by Thompson (1967, 
p. 54): “Each part renders a discrete contribution to the whole and each is supported by 
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the whole.” Sequential interdependence includes pooled interdependence and takes a 
serial form, such that the output of a preceding subunit becomes the input of a subsequent 
subunit, in the manner of an assembly line. Reciprocal interdependence includes 
sequential interdependence, but the output of the subsequent subunit becomes the input of 
the preceding subunit. This research evaluates the effect of information processing under 
conditions of reciprocal interdependence against that of non-interdependent information 
processing. The two conditions of interdependence fit the descriptions of the two insider 
threat–mitigation organization designs presented by Kelly and Anderson (2016).  
Groups generally perform better than individuals at complex tasks (Kerr & 
Tindale, 2004). Related research suggests that group decision making is better than an 
individual’s (Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schultz-Hardt, 2007). Antecedent 
research demonstrates that a judgment from each of 50 people is equal to 50 judgments 
from one person (Farnsworth & Williams, 1936). Mao, Mason, Suri, and Watts (2016) 
find that teams outperform independent workers at complex tasks. Related research tends 
to be consistent in other domains (Nielsen, 2011; Cheung & Palan, 2012; Kerr & Tindale, 
2004). Theories of specialization and process loss may explain why large, well-funded 
programs leveraging ITA teams have not resulted in decisively better analyst 
performance; but no conclusive evidence yet exists in the academic literature. This debate 
requires empirical testing to confirm or refute these postulates as reflected in the fourth 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Teamwork will cause higher analyst accuracy than 
individual work. 
2. Specialization Theory 
Specialization theory was first documented in a dialogue between Socrates and 
Adeimantus in Plato’s Rebublic. Socrates reasoned that men are best served by 
specializing in the production of certain things and trading those things according to 
need. Otherwise, each man must alone produce everything he needs. Adam Smith 
expanded on division of labor (or specialization) in his Inquiry into the Wealth of 
Nations. Smith’s theory of specialization holds that a group of persons who are 
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specialized for subcomponents of a complex task is more efficient than a group 
comprising the same number of people who individually perform the same task.  
Specialization is understood as an advanced form of division of labor that allows 
the worker to become more skilled at a certain task (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000). In 
classic organizational theory, specialization is “the degree to which tasks are subdivided 
into separate jobs” (Daft, 2001, p. 10). I interpret this to mean that each separate job 
requires a separate individual to fill the role. Organizations typically create a division of 
labor to overcome the limited information-processing capacity of individuals (Simon, 
1962). In this scheme, workers are specialized to perform a smaller task that is within the 
limitations of individual information-processing capacity. Specialization hypothetically 
overcomes the cognitive and knowledge limitations of human beings, but simultaneously 
increases interdependence between work roles (Galbraith, 1977, p. 13; March & Simon, 
1958, p. 159).  
A team is generally defined as a group of people working together to perform a 
common task. The role of specialization among teams carries sufficient importance such 
that a team is sometimes defined as a group of cooperative workers that produces 
something specifically by performing different tasks and functions (Becker & Murphy, 
1994). A specialized team is characterized by interdependence among work roles that 
draws on explicit knowledge, and a team with no specialization is characterized by the 
consolidation of work roles that draw on implicit knowledge (Farace, 1977, p. 20). 
Regardless of specialization, the terms “team” and “group” are generally interchangeable 
under the condition that individual members collectively perform a common task.   
Current research suggests that specialized teams perform better at highly 
circumscribed tasks, but there is little literature on the effects of specialization on loosely 
circumscribed tasks that introduce confounding complexities (e.g., ITA; Mao, Mason, 
Suri, & Watts, 2016). For instance, Staats et al. (2012) mention studies employing 
LEGOs to test specialization theory, but LEGO problems, regardless of complexity, are 
bounded by number and shape and generally have a known solution (e.g., LEGO set 
10188, “Death Star”). The exception to Mao et al.’s observation are experiments related 
to Nielsen’s (2011) conceptualization of micro-expertise in crowdsourcing, but micro-
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expertise by definition presupposes that someone in a large crowd already knows a 
solution to a particular problem.   
In a rare test of teamwork on a loosely circumscribed problem, Mao et al. (2016) 
assigned teams of various sizes to a loosely circumscribed task and found that 
performance increases with team size. Mao et al. tasked groups with analyzing 1,567 
tweets to determine areas of crisis. The results were benchmarked against a gold standard 
provided by experts to determine group performance. Unfortunately, the number of 
tweets was not proportional to the persons in the group, resulting in an information load 
that was suitable for large groups, but overloaded smaller. Had Mao et al. equally 
distributed the information load per individual; it is likely the results would have been 
more consistent with the findings of prevailing research. 
A natural consequence of specialization is the need for integration; in other 
words, specialization breaks a task into narrowly defined roles that compel an eventual 
reassembly (Thompson, 1967, p. 75). Information-intensive tasks can cause problems 
with integration because specialized knowledge is hard to interpret when it is not 
received in the same context in which it was sent (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000). An 
information barrier may arise between specialists who perceive the world from different 
viewpoints, probably impeding knowledge integration. Additionally, people generally 
overestimate how well they communicate knowledge to others. Newton (1990) 
empirically demonstrated the phenomenon by having some test participants tap the 
rhythm of 25 well-known songs, and having other participants attempt to identify the 
song by listening to the taps. Half of the tappers predicted that the listeners would 
identify the songs, but only 2.5% of the listeners could correctly identify any of the 
common songs. Related research demonstrates similar findings in the tone of text 
messages (Keysar, 1994). This implies that the interdependence compelled by 
specialization can have a restrictive effect on a team’s integrative capacity. Large 
information-processing tasks tend to require increased specialization (Drucker, 1988, p. 
47), at least to some optimal point that, once surpassed, may result in negative 
consequences (Hammer & Champy, 1993, p. 51).  
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3. Process Loss Theory 
It is safe to assume that people act differently when in the company of others, and 
that is the premise behind Bibb Latane’s social impact theory. According to Latane 
(1981, p. 343), social impact is any change in the “physiological states and subjective 
feelings, motives and emotions, cognitions and beliefs, values and behavior, that occur in 
an individual, human or animal, as a result of the real, implied, or imagined presence or 
actions of other individuals.” A popular example is provided by Solomon Asch (1951), 
who found that individuals are likely to submit an obviously erroneous response to a 
stimulus in order to conform to an incorrect majority. Latane was involved in several 
subsequent experiments that verified this effect in a number of social situations (Latane 
& Darley, 1970; Latane & Dabbs, 1975; Freeman, Walker, Borden, & Latane, 1975; 
Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 1979). Latane offers a general theory of social impact that 
describes social force as a function of strength, immediacy, and number of persons 
present.8 This implies that, ceteris paribus, teams will perform differently from 
individuals and team performance may be affected by group size. Survey instruments that 
measure social impact have been validated in prior research (Mulvey & Klein, 1998). 
An intuitive linear relationship exists between number of workers and capacity for 
work. For instance, one horse provides one horsepower; two horses provide two 
horsepower, or double the energy of a single horse. However, a large body of research 
suggests that team performance has a curvilinear relationship with team size and at some 
point may exhibit a negative relationship. The counterintuitive relationship between team 
size and performance is known as the Ringelmann effect, named after experiments in the 
early 20th century by German psychologist Maximilien Ringelmann. 
Ringelmann demonstrates that productivity per individual worker decreases as 
team size increases for simple tasks such as rope pulling and milling flour. According to 
Ringelmann, “When several sources of motive force work simultaneously on the same 
thing, the utilizable force of each is less, with the same fatigue, than if the sources of 
                                                 
8 According to Latane (1981), strength is the salience of those in the group (generally determined by 
age or status) and immediacy is determined by proximity in space or time and absence of some intervening 
barrier. 
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motive power function separately” (1913, p. 19). Ringelmann observes the effect by 
varying the number of workers turning a flour-mill capstan. When additional workers are 
added to the capstan, at some point individuals may tread the capstan without adding 
pressure, and even allow the capstan harness to tug them, increasing the work for other 
team members performing the same task (Kravitz & Martin, 1986). Ringelmann’s (1913) 
empirical findings followed a similar experiment that involved pulling a rope, in which 
he observed individual and total forces on the rope using a recording dynamometer. The 
results shown in Table 5 indicate a negative relationship between team size and 
individual performance.  
Table 5.   Relative Performance as a Function of Group Size. 
Source: Ringelmann (1913, p. 9). 
# of 
Workers 
Furnished 
per worker 
Total 
1 1.00 1.00 
2 0.93 1.86 
3 0.85 2.55 
4 0.77 3.08 
5 0.70 3.50 
6 0.63 3.78 
7 0.56 3.92 
8 0.49 3.92 
 
Ringelmann’s work was not published in his time, but many subsequent scientific 
contributions have verified and explained this phenomenon under various conditions of 
task complexity—notably, Ivan Steiner’s (1966) paper on process loss theory. 
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Steiner’s process loss theory offers several explanations for the Ringelmann 
effect, based on organization contingency. Steiner identifies five models that can explain 
the productivity of a group; the four that best explain process losses are discussed here 
(Steiner, 1972, ch. 2). The additive model addresses the relationship between group size 
and individual productivity loss as a function of “coordination links” between the team 
members contributing to a task. This model requires that all team members perform the 
exact same function, such as pulling a rope. The relationship Steiner discovered follows 
the principal of Metcalfe’s law, which states that n(n-1)/2 is the number of 
communication links for n nodes. Thus, two workers require 1 link, 4 require 6, and 8 
require 28 links. According to Steiner, these links are nearly proportional to the 
discrepancy between potential and actual productivity. The research suggests that those 
pulling the rope may have been unsynchronized in such a manner that sporadic tugs 
ultimately lowered performance.  
Steiner’s disjunctive model accounts for tasks in which productivity is determined 
by the performance of the most competent member. The effect is common to knowledge-
industry professions like nursing, wherein a single expert in the operating room may save 
a life and the absence thereof may cost one (Benner, Tanner, & Chesla, 2009, p. 236). 
This phenomenon is what Benner calls “pooled expertise,” a similar concept to Neilson’s 
(2012, p. 26) “microexpertise.” According to Neilson, as group numbers increase, so does 
the likelihood that someone in the group has a solution to a particular problem. Steiner 
cites Smith (1953, p. 572) for mathematical proof of pooled expertise.  
According to Smith, a randomly selected group of four persons in a normal 
distribution will have the statistical likelihood of containing one person in each of the 
20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th competency percentiles. Thus, the most competent person in a 
group is likely to be in the 80th percentile, and it follows that the most competent person 
in a seven-person group is likely to occupy the 87.5th percentile. Mathematically the 
larger the team size, the greater the odds of having a more highly competent member. 
However, process loss also increases, due to an increase in insignificant members—there 
are equal odds of a more incompetent person on the team.  
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Describing the opposite effect is the conjunctive model, in which team 
performance is measured by the performance of the weakest link, for example, in a 
human chain (Steiner, 1972). Cybersecurity is an example of a complex task in a 
conjunctive model because “cyber-security operators must achieve perfect defense to 
keep out intruders” (Bejtlich, 2013, p. 11). Imperfect defenses leave an organization 
vulnerable, and an attacker need only exploit a single vulnerability to harm the whole. 
Thus, in a conjunctive model, a team with four competent members may perform better 
than one with seven competent members and one incompetent.  
Finally, classical division of labor is an example of Steiner’s complementary 
model. A complementary model assumes that no individual team member acting alone 
has the resources to complete a group task. Staats et al. (2012) support Steiner’s 
complementary model, demonstrating that a two-person team may outperform a four-
person team in LEGO assembly. In a complementary model, process loss can occur any 
time someone on the team finishes a subtask before someone else. 
Each of Steiner’s models has some process loss that may explain why individual 
productivity tends to decline as group size increases. There are, however, alternative 
explanations, including the phenomenon whereby “individuals expend less effort when 
working collectively than when working individually” (Karau & Williams, 1993, p. 681). 
Closely related literature tends to explain this phenomenon as a function of social loafing. 
Social loafing is such a significant problem that some regard the practice as a 
“disease” (Latane et al., 1979, p. 831) and those who loaf as “deadbeats” (de Pillis, 2016, 
p. 273). Several experiments demonstrate a negative relationship between the number of 
persons assigned to a task and individual effort (Staats et al., 2012; Sorkin, Hays, & 
West, 2001; Harkins, Latane, & Williams, 1980). Both menial and cognitively 
stimulating tasks are degraded by the social-loafing phenomenon (Robbins, 1995). It can 
be hard to detect productivity loss due to an individual within a group on an additive task 
because the more diligent members of a team tend to compensate for the deficiency of 
loafers (Schippers, 2014). This implies that individual performance must be measured, 
and participants must know that they are individually evaluated, in controlling for social 
loafing. Ingham, Levinger, Graves, and Peckham (1974) ruled out coordination 
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difficulties as a cause of social loafing. Thus, social loafing and coordination are defined 
in this research as independent factors that may contribute to process loss in team tasks 
that require information processing. 
The demand for coordination increases as interdependence increases (Katz-
Navon, 2005) and intermediation compels increased coordination as information-
processing requirements increase. It follows that an informational view of group process 
will place greater focus on coordination over mere cooperation (Grant, 1996). 
Coordination neglect theory (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000) tends to explain coordination 
problems as related to a negative synergy in team performance on interdependent tasks. 
Heath and Staudenmayer (2000) found that inadequate communication and insufficient 
translation were two factors causing coordination neglect, and both arise from the 
fundamental process involved with the division of labor. According to Heath and 
Staudenmayer, inadequate communication is simply the absence of communication when 
communication is necessary, and inadequate communication may be rectified by 
integrating efforts on an ongoing basis. This implies that a team in constant 
communication working a truly complementary task will not suffer from coordination 
neglect under the condition that messages are fully understood.  
Translation problems are persistent because even face-to-face, real-time 
communications cannot rectify a translation problem. Translation problems arise when 
people try to communicate but are biased by their own knowledge, such that the message 
received is not the message sent yet both speaker and listener mistakenly perceive that the 
communication was successful. This problem is what some researchers call the curse of 
knowledge (Heath & Heath, 2006; Rubio-Fernandez & Glucksberg, 2012). In a striking 
example of how specialization can affect communication, Hinds (1999) demonstrates that 
people tend to communicate less effectively as their expertise in a specialty increases. 
Experts may lose the ability to communicate with novices, even when they perceive 
themselves as communicating effectively or dumbing it down so novices can understand. 
Process loss theory describes counter-intuitive productivity impedance that this research 
seeks to test in the context of ITA with the fifth hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 5: Teamwork will cause higher analyst time than 
individual work. 
D. ITA PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
No standard metric exists to evaluate the success of an ITA program in reducing 
insider threats (Greitzer & Ferryman, 2013); in fact, the Department of Homeland 
Security rated the ITA measurement problem second on the 2005 INFOSEC hard-
problems list. Currently, federal ITA programs gauge success by benchmarking against 
each other (NITTF communication, Appendix A). I present a way forward by evaluating 
the literature for common performance themes and applying those themes to ITA analysis 
for an objective performance measure. 
According to Jay Galbraith, an organizations’ performance is measured by “the 
degree to which they seem to accomplish their objectives” (1977, p. 1). Performance 
metrics focus on effectiveness (Maizlish & Handler, 2005, p. 53) and are simple, 
expressed in time or money as a percentage (Jaquith, 2007, p. 25). Speier et al. (1999, p. 
345) measure decision-making performance in terms of “decision accuracy and decision 
time.” Recent research on process loss in group collaboration measured performance in 
terms of accuracy and time (Marler & Marett, 2013). Following extant research, I 
measure performance in terms of accuracy and time. 
There are two competing concepts of analyst accuracy measurement. The 
prevalent measure is the number of insiders who were prevented from becoming insider 
threats. This measure, however, is not falsifiable or objectively verifiable, unless all 
insider threats truthfully admit to wanton or negligent threat behavior. Furthermore, an 
employee cannot be compelled to incriminate himself in discourse with his employers.9 
Thus, the prevalent measure is only valid for a count of those who voluntarily identify 
themselves as insider threats. As a result, there has yet to be any standard objective ITA 
                                                 
9 According to the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Garrity v. New Jersey (1967), no statements can be 
compelled under threat of termination. Furthermore, compelled statements cannot be used in a subsequent 
criminal investigation.  
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performance measure across federal agencies.10 A second measure is the number of 
reasonably warranted insider threat behavior cases referred to an investigative authority. 
Kelly and Anderson (2016) found that an ITA investigation process requires an 
analyst to elevate a case to an investigation when threats are considered sufficiently 
significant. This implies that the more often analysts can correctly identify and elevate 
warranted cases within a given time, the higher the likelihood an insider threat will be 
discovered in that time. Organizations that are set up to process information generally 
focus on optimizations that allow the organization to properly process more information 
while consuming fewer resources and less time. I propose that, as insider threat analysts 
become more effective at identifying and elevating cases of concern; the organizational 
performance, in terms of promptitude and accuracy, will improve.  
Expectancy theory suggests that incentives positively affect task performance 
granted no incentive can increase performance into the realm of the impossible (Bonner, 
Hastie, Sprinkle, & Young, 2000). Bonner and Sprinkle (2002, p. 303) offer guidance 
directly relevant to laboratory studies by pointing out that “researchers have been 
encouraged to employ incentives in experimental studies so that subjects are sufficiently 
motivated and participate in a meaningful fashion,” and go on to cite “numerous studies 
show[ing] that monetary incentives and assigned goals generally have additive effects on 
performance.” Bonner and Sprinkle conclude that assigned goals and monetary incentives 
have independent, positive effects on performance. Everett, Price, Bedell, and Telljohann 
(1997) point out that the positive effects of performance incentives also manifest in 
survey research, with a 50% increased survey return rate for incentivized survey returns. 
Consistent with these findings, Stolovitch, Clark, and Condly (2002, p. 2) specifically 
state, “To focus on and persist in working toward a goal: Tangible incentives increase 
performance by 27%.” This research leveraged performance incentives to reduce the 
likelihood of participants to guess during insider threat analysis. The research also 
introduced a confidence measure to capture any residual guessing effect. 
                                                 
10 See Appendix A; the correspondence with the National Insider Threat Task Force provides no 
objective measures for any federal insider threat program. 
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E. ANALYST CONFIDENCE 
In reality, it is impossible to know how many insider threats analysts overlook as 
a percentage. Furthermore, a person must be in the act for an analyst to know for sure if 
an insider threat would have carried out an attack against his organization if not identified 
by an analyst. This problem poses a philosophical quandary for theory pertinent to ITA. 
Insider threat analysts operate knowing there are unknowns. They use available 
information to make inferences into unavailable information. As a result, they cannot be 
definitively sure about a threat assessment; they must rely on how confident they are that 
their threat assessment is correct. It follows that an insider threat analyst who elevates a 
case and is uncertain about his decision has done little more than make a random guess.  
Classic organization theorists agree that information processing organizations 
reduce uncertainty by acquiring more information (Galbriath, 1973). Daft and Lengel’s 
(1986) media richness theory expanded the classical view by delineating a distinction 
between uncertainty and equivocality. According to Weick (1979), information stimulus 
with multiple interpretations increases the equivocality of that information. As a result, 
additional information with high equivocality offers little in reduction of uncertainty. 
Media richness theory suggests that the information transmission medium must be 
capable of conveying meaning along with data so information is received in the proper 
context. Media synchronicity theory extended media richness theory into team dynamics 
(Dennis et al., 2008). The media theories strongly suggest negative confidence effects 
with increasing the number of people in a communicating system due to ambiguity that 
results from information distortion. This debate is ideal for empirical testing in an ITA 
context presented in hypothesis 6. 
Hypothesis 6: Teamwork will cause higher analyst confidence than 
individual work. 
Attribution theory predicts similar confidence behavior because “fewer 
noncommon effects resulted in more confidence and more extreme inferences about the 
actor” (Kelley & Michela, 1980, p. 462). Insider threat problems are non-absolute and a 
propensity for information equivocality may increase when more than one mind is 
involved in the same inference cycle. This phenomenon is not new; for instance, March 
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and Olsen (1976) assert that increasing the number of decision makers increases the 
length of the decision process. This implies that, given various amounts of information 
and an increase in the number of people who must generate an explanation for 
observations, it becomes more difficult to converge ideas into common explicit language. 
An interaction is reflected in hypothesis 7 implied by the social impact posited in 
hypothesis 8. 
Hypothesis 7: Teamwork and ignorance will interactively affect 
perceptions of information overload. 
Hypothesis 8: A lower level of ignorance will cause higher perceptions 
of social impact. 
F. SUMMARY 
This literature review presented salient research describing the theoretical 
concepts within the focus of this dissertation. The chapter introduced literature covering 
insider threats to cybersecurity and the concept of insider threat analysis. This overview 
identified information overload as a conceptual problem for analyst performance. I 
proposed reducing relevant information (operationalized as ignorance) and distributing 
information between teams of people (operationalized as teamwork) as methods to reduce 
information overload so that ITA analysts can perform better. The work draws inferences 
from attribution theory, a product of cognitive psychology, and process loss theory, a 
product of organization theory, that predict how variations in ignorance and teamwork 
may affect analyst performance, namely accuracy and time. Eight hypotheses emerged 
subject to empirical testing in a laboratory experiment: 
 Hypothesis 1: A higher level of ignorance will cause lower analyst 
accuracy. 
 Hypothesis 2: A lower level of ignorance will cause higher analyst time.  
 Hypothesis 3: A higher level of ignorance will cause lower analyst 
confidence. 
 Hypothesis 4: Teamwork will cause higher analyst accuracy than 
individual work. 
 Hypothesis 5: Teamwork will cause higher analyst time than individual 
work. 
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 Hypothesis 6: Teamwork will cause higher analyst confidence than 
individual work. 
 Hypothesis 7: Teamwork and ignorance will interactively affect 
perceptions of information overload. 
 Hypothesis 8: A lower level of ignorance will cause higher perceptions of 
social impact. 
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III. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
Chapter I identified two conceptual strategies for overcoming information 
overload: reducing information, and distributing the information among more people to 
better accommodate the load. Theories of attribution and process loss covered in Chapter 
II introduced the theoretical implications for both concepts. This chapter approaches the 
two concepts as measurable constructs: ignorance and teamwork, respectively. The 
literature review defined performance as a concept of productivity within an amount of 
time, operationalized as ITA accuracy and ITA time. This chapter operationally defines 
each predictor, dependent, and blocking variable and relates the variables within a 
factorial research design. 
The literature reviewed in Chapter II strongly suggests that ignorance and 
teamwork will affect ITA accuracy and time. This chapter presents a research design that 
provides an empirical test for the eight hypotheses which emerged from that review. The 
experiment assesses the theoretical implications of ignorance (operationalized as high and 
low) and teamwork (operationalized as horizontally specialized and none) within the 
context of ITA. This chapter also provides the rationale for the research design selection 
and laboratory experimentation. 
This chapter outlines the experiment participant selection, enumerates the 
laboratory experiment procedure, presents survey instruments, and describes the web-
based experiment apparatus. This section offers role based access control as a method of 
partitioning insider threat scenarios and references between test groups in order to 
electronically enforce variations of ignorance and teamwork. The chapter concludes with 
the rationale for laboratory experimentation.   
A. EXPERIMENT METHODOLOGY 
The academic literature strongly implies that ignorance and teamwork have 
dynamic performance effects. This experiment will evaluate the effects of ignorance and 
teamwork to determine if the theoretical constructs behave predictably in a realistic ITA 
application. 
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1. Research Design 
The research variables fit well within a 2 x 2 factorial design. Ignorance is varied 
between two conditions: high and low. Teamwork is varied between two conditions: 
horizontally specialized and none. There are five dependent variables including accuracy, 
time, confidence, perception of information overload, and perception of social impact. 
The research design is presented as a two-by-two factorial analysis crosstab in Table 6.  
Table 6.   Research Design. 
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Time 
Confidence 
Information overload 
 
2. Procedure 
The experiment followed a standard procedure that took between thirty minutes 
and two hours to complete. Prior to the experiment, each participant received an informed 
consent document to satisfy the requirements of the institutional review board (IRB). The 
informed consent document explained the nature of the research and the task 
requirements. The IRB protocol is in Appendix C. The experiment commenced with an 
entrance survey that collected demographic data. ITA followed the entrance survey, and 
the experiment concluded with an exit survey that measured ITA accuracy, time, 
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performance, confidence, information overload—and for teams, the perception social 
impact. The experiment took place in a distraction-free location.  
The experiment procedure for individuals was as follows: 
1. Participant receives a website login ID and password, unique to their 
assignment in the experiment design.  
2. Participant logs on to http://www.kellyapparatus.com and views a 
welcome message with experiment instructions. 
3. Participant views an instruction video that explains how to maneuver the 
ITA apparatus. 
4. Participant skims the adjudicative guidelines. 
5. Participant completes the entrance survey. 
6. Clock starts when the entrance survey “submit” button is pressed. 
7. Participant receives the scenario stimulus. 
8. Participant reviews the available references. 
9. Participant performs a threat assessment of the insider’s behavior. 
10. Participant creates an insider threat analysis case with a case management 
survey. 
11. The clock stops when the case management survey is initiated. 
12. Participant submits their insider threat assessment. 
13. Participant completes the exit survey. 
The experiment procedure for teams assigned high ignorance is as follows: 
1. Each participant receives a separate website login ID and password, 
unique to their place in the experiment design.  
2. Both participants log on to http://www.kellyapparatus.com and views a 
welcome message with experiment instructions. 
3. Participants view an instruction video that explains how to maneuver the 
ITA apparatus. 
4. Participants skim the adjudicative guidelines. 
5. Participants each complete separate entrance surveys. 
6. Clock starts when the entrance survey “submit” button is pressed. 
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7. Participants receives scenario stimuli numbered 1 and 2. 
8. Participants 1 and 2 review the Scenario 1 stimulus. 
9. Participant 1 reviews their own references. 
10. Participant 2 informs Participant 1 of the information in Participant 2’s 
references. 
11. Participant 1 performs a threat assessment of the insider’s behavior. 
12. Participant 1 creates an insider threat analysis case with a case 
management survey. 
13. Server records clock time as soon as the case management survey is 
initiated (this is the ITA end time for Participant 1). 
14. Participant 1 submits their insider threat assessment. 
15. Sever records clock time as soon as the case management survey is 
submitted (this is the ITA start time for Participant 2). 
16. Participants 1 and 2 review the Scenario 2 stimulus. 
17. Participant 2 reviews their own reference. 
18. Participant 1 informs Participant 2 of the information in Participant 1’s 
references. 
19. Participant 2 performs a threat assessment of the insider’s behavior. 
20. Participant 2 creates an insider threat analysis case. 
21. Server records clock time as soon as the case management survey is 
initiated (this is the ITA end time for Participant 2). 
22. Participant 2 submits their insider threat assessment. 
23. Sever records clock time as soon as the case management survey is 
submitted. 
24. Participants 1 and 2 complete individual exit surveys. 
The experiment procedure for teams assigned low ignorance is as follows: 
1. Each participant receives a separate website login ID and password, 
unique to their place in the experiment design.  
2. All participants log on to http://www.kellyapparatus.com and views a 
welcome message with experiment instructions. 
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3. Participants view an instruction video that explains how to maneuver the 
ITA apparatus. 
4. Participants skim the adjudicative guidelines. 
5. Participants each complete separate entrance surveys. 
6. Clock starts when the entrance survey “submit” button is pressed (this is 
the ITA start time for Participant 1). 
7. Participants receives scenario stimuli numbered 1, 2, 3, 4. 
8. Participants 1, 2, 3, 4 review the Scenario 1 stimulus. 
9. Participant 1 reviews their own references. 
10. Participants 2, 3, 4 inform Participant 1 of the information in each of their 
individual references. 
11. Participant 1 performs a threat assessment of the insider’s behavior. 
12. Participant 1 creates an insider threat analysis case. 
13. Server records clock time as soon as the case management survey is 
initiated (this is the ITA end time for Participant 1). 
14. Participant 1 submits their insider threat assessment. 
15. Server records clock time as soon as the case management survey is 
submitted (this is the ITA start time for Participant 2). 
16. Participants 1, 2, 3, 4 review the Scenario 2 stimulus. 
17. Participant 2 reviews their own reference. 
18. Participants 1, 3, 4 inform Participant 2 of the information in each of their 
individual references. 
19. Participant 2 performs a threat assessment of the insider’s behavior. 
20. Participant 2 creates an insider threat analysis case. 
21. Server records clock time as soon as the case management survey is 
initiated (this is the ITA end time for Participant 2). 
22. Participant 2 submits their insider threat assessment. 
23. Sever records clock time as soon as the case management survey is 
submitted (this is the ITA start time for Participant 3). 
24. Participants 1, 2, 3, 4 review the Scenario 3 stimulus. 
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25. Participant 3 reviews their own reference. 
26. Participants 1, 2, 4 inform Participant 3 of the information in their 
references. 
27. Participant 3 performs a threat assessment of the insider’s behavior. 
28. Participant 3 creates an insider threat analysis case. 
29. Server records clock time as soon as the case management survey is 
initiated (this is the ITA end time for Participant 3). 
30. Participant 3 submits their insider threat assessment. 
31. Sever records clock time as soon as the case management survey is 
submitted (this is the ITA start time for Participant 4). 
32. Participants 1, 2, 3, 4 review the Scenario 4 stimulus. 
33. Participant 4 reviews their own reference. 
34. Participants 1, 2, 3 inform Participant 4 of the information in each of their 
individual references. 
35. Participant 4 performs a threat assessment of the insider’s behavior. 
36. Participant 4 creates an insider threat analysis case. 
37. Server records clock time as soon as the case management survey is 
initiated (this is the ITA end time for Participant 4). 
38. Participant 4 submits their insider threat assessment. 
39. Sever records clock time as soon as the case management survey is 
submitted. 
40. Participants 1,2,3,4 complete individual exit surveys. 
 
3. Experiment Apparatus 
The web-based knowledge sharing environment (KSE) uses SharePoint to restrict 
or allow information access with role based access control (RBAC). SharePoint is a 
popular Microsoft product with the same look and feel of the ubiquitous Windows 
operating system and the Office productivity suite, featuring an intuitive interface and 
ease of use. SharePoint is popular among federal insider threat programs as a case 
management tool. 
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The apparatus features a networked environment directly connected to the World 
Wide Web under the domain “www.kellyapparatus.com.” This apparatus, accessible via 
personal computer (PC) running any common web browser, provides a precise means of 
recording elapsed time for analysis and directing individual users to specific information. It 
also includes a survey function to record perceptions of information overload, social 
impact, and ITA confidence—all relative to each participant’s preselected experimental 
condition. 
a. How the Apparatus Functions 
The apparatus contains four scenarios from the National Insider Threat Task 
Force (NITTF) training course that serve as the experimental stimulus. Each scenario 
comes with eight references—that informs both organizational and personal perspectives. 
The organizational perspective references inform generalizations to organizational norms. 
The personal perspective references are specific to the individual. An example of the 
organizational perspective is an email log of everyone in the organization and the 
personal perspective is the content of a specific person’s email. Information is presented 
from the general (organization) to the specific (individual), operationally defined as high 
and low ignorance, respectively. The SharePoint RBAC presents alternating references 
for each scenario, ensuring that no single participant receives the same reference twice. 
The experiment assigns teamwork conditions based on the ignorance assignment of 
participants. Teams with a high ignorance assignment consist of two people, and teams 
with a low ignorance assignment consist of four. Participants assigned no teamwork 
include those with both conditions of ignorance. Every participant in the experiment 
performs ITA on one scenario as independent samples. Table 7 presents the relationship 
between ignorance, teamwork, and scenario. 
 60 
Table 7.   Relationship between Ignorance, Teamwork, and Scenario. 
 
b. Teamwork 
References are individually assessed or distributed, depending on the teamwork 
category a participant is assigned. Participants with no teamwork access all references for 
one scenario. Teams assigned high ignorance receive two scenarios. Those with low 
ignorance assignments receive four. Each team receives specific references—then 
assimilates those references, and informs a single insider threat analyst of pertinent 
information contained within. Team participants are assigned two references each under 
both conditions of ignorance. 
c. Ignorance 
Ignorance is varied between high and low conditions. The more information the 
participant has, the lower the ignorance level. Non-ignorance is not testable because the 
participant would already know the solution to the scenario and fundamental ignorance is 
not testable because the participant would not know to perform ITA. This research 
subscribes to levels of ignorance because it deals with the lack of relevant knowledge or 
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information. Greater ignorance implies less information. Likewise, an analyst who is not 
ignorant in some respect need not perform ITA; he would simply identify the insider 
threat. Thus, some level of ignorance is inherent to ITA.  
This research divides information into specific “references” organized by 
perspective. Low ignorance participants receive a total of eight references per scenario 
and high ignorance participants receive a total of four references per scenario. High 
ignorance references inform an organizational perspective of the insider, and low 
ignorance references inform both organizational and individual perspectives. The 
demarcation between perspectives uses Kelley’s (1973) covariation model to partition the 
references. The organization perspective allows analysts to perceive consensus behavior. 
The personal perspective allows analysts to perceive consistency and distinctiveness 
behavior. High ignorance participants are not told that they have fewer references than 
low ignorance participants—because the mere knowledge of missing information may 
change the outcome of a decision (Brem & Rips, 2000). This knowledge is controlled 
using the KSE’s RBAC configuration—which hides links to the additional references 
from high ignorance participants and ensures that no distracting “access denied” 
messages appear to tip them off. The KSE counterbalances references between team 
members, so no team member receives the same reference more than once. 
d. Scenarios 
Pilot testing calibrated the experiment apparatus. Pilot testers ensured there were 
no spelling errors and demonstrated the apparatus functioned properly.  
Forty-eight additional participants comprised the experiment sample. Participants 
understood that all permitted information was available—and that they would only use 
that information to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to escalate the case 
to a formal investigation. No additional information was allowed, because any further 
inquiries could “tip off” the insider—and cause them to change their behavior and draw 
attention to the growing “trail of evidence.” All participants received the same 
instructions that incorrect responses would forfeit the performance incentive. A pre-
recorded video instructed participants to role play the scenario as if they were working in 
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the interests of national defense—but also to be careful not to initiate unwarranted 
investigations that could damage someone’s career. A one-ounce silver American Eagle 
bullion coin provided a performance incentive that further simulated the severity of 
incorrect ITA. Participants understood that they would not receive the reward if their 
assessment was not the same as that determined by the NITTF outcome expectation. 
Participants performed insider threat analysis on four similar insider threat 
scenarios created by the NITTF. I slightly modified the scenarios to ensure they were 
approximately equal in analysis time. Each participant received one of four scenarios for 
insider threat analysis. One scenario contained a malicious insider threat, one a non-
malicious insider threat, and the remaining two contained no insider threat. I counter 
balanced the order of scenario presentation to account for any learning effect. The 
scenarios are provided in Appendix B(E). 
e. Data collection 
Participants evaluated each scenario on separate inter-networked PCs. The 
experiment proceeded through four phases: instruction, entrance survey, ITA, and exit 
survey. An introductory webpage oriented participants to the experiment and explained the 
ITA task. An instruction video demonstrated how to navigate the apparatus and perform the 
ITA. The introductory webpage and video were unchanged for all experiment sessions. An 
entrance survey collected demographic information operationalized as blocking variables. 
The entrance-survey items are presented in Table 8. 
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Table 8.   Entrance Survey. 
Question Possible answers 
Which most generally describes your predisposition to an 
accused?  
I am not asking how you think it should be, rather, how you are 
truly predisposed. 
Guilty until proven 
innocent 
Innocent until 
proven guilty 
Do you have any professional experience with insider threat 
analysis? 
Threat analysis 
Investigations 
Both threat analysis 
and investigations 
No professional 
experience with 
either 
How many years’ experience do you have? [Text Box]  
What is your age? [Text Box]  
What is your gender? Male 
Female 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? Bachelor’s degree 
Master’s degree 
Doctoral degree  
Post-Doctorate 
Are you aware of the term “insider threat?” Yes 
No 
Server time [Calculated value] 
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The participants indicated whether the case warranted escalation through a case-
management survey, which was taken directly from the case worksheet provided by the 
NITTF insider threat course materials. References were locked and participants could not 
go back to assimilate more information after case creation. The apparatus locked the 
reference to guarantee no further ITA after the server recorded the ITA end time. The 
case worksheet is presented in Table 9. 
Table 9.   Case-Management Worksheet. 
Question Possible answers 
Please describe the details of the incident  
(i.e., who, what, where, why, how) 
Memo text box 
Is this case warranted for escalation at this 
time? 
No 
Yes 
I feel confident that my threat assessment 
is correct  
9-point Likert 
Server time  [Calculated value] 
 
This research sourced exit-survey items from published surveys intended to 
measure the perception of personal performance and information overload (Moser & 
Soucek, 2010; Karr-Wisniewski & Lu, 2010) and social impact (Mulvey et al., 1998). 
Survey items concerning perceived personal performance and information overload are 
presented in Table 10, while the social-impact survey items are presented in Table 11. 
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Table 10.   Perceived Information-Overload and Personal-Performance Survey 
Items. Adapted from Soucek and Moser (2010). 
Information Overload Possible answers 
For my scenario, I was overwhelmed by the amount of information 
I had to process to make a decision. 
9-point Likert 
Did you solve your scenario individually or with a team? Individually 
Team 
Table 11.   Perceived Social-Impact Survey Items. 
Source: Mulvey and Klein (1998). 
Perceived Social Impact Possible answers 
I rushed through the task because I was considerate of my 
teammate’s time. 
9-point Likert 
 
I evaluated each participant response for accuracy after ITA completion. Each 
participant who correctly answered the case according to the outcomes designated by the 
NITTF training course received an accuracy score of 1. Incorrect responses received a 
score of 0. Participants with a 1 received a Silver Eagle, as promised. The survey items, 
case worksheet items, and task times replicated to a master spreadsheet in real time.  
4. Sample Justification 
Sample size and selection were carefully considered for internal/external validity. 
This research considered participant eligibility to best represent the population of federal 
insider threat analysts and identified a convenience sampling opportunity for the best 
approximation to that population. 
a. Participant Eligibility 
The sample selection included only volunteers at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS). The sample was selected from candidates who met the basic ITA eligibility 
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requirements outlined in the SPAWAR OPNAV N2N6I report, “Insider Threat Program 
Overview, Summary, and Recommendations.” This report was generated at the Carnegie 
Mellon University (CMU) CERT Insider Threat Center—a federally funded research and 
development center (FFRDC) that has been sponsored since 2001 by the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and is widely recognized as an expert authority on insider threats. The 
requirements outlined in the OPNAV N2N6I report restrict eligible candidates to federal 
employees with a top secret (TS) security clearance who are employed as GS–12 
equivalents (O–3) or higher.11 TS requirements imply that those cleared for TS access are 
cognizant of the conduct expected to hold that level clearance. The requirements for GS–
12 positions imply that those eligible have at least some graduate level education.12 
I assume that TS-cleared GS-12 and higher federal employees who are eligible for 
ITA positions are comparable to TS-cleared officers enrolled at NPS, because the 
clearance-screening requirements and educational level are similar—both are in federal 
service, and 96% of military students at NPS are at the O-3 pay grade or above.13 The 
TS-cleared personnel at NPS are required to maintain insider threat awareness education 
as a part of mandatory cybersecurity training. Thus, a good representative sample of TS-
cleared NPS students and GS-12 or higher staff should generalize to similar federal 
employees selected for ITA positions. 
b. Sample Size 
The experiment leveraged a sample size of 48 divided equally between four 
independent test groups. Thirty is a common minimum sample size for experiments 
                                                 
11 The general schedule (GS) classification covers the majority of civilian white-collar federal employ. 
Typical job requirements for insider threat analysts can be found at 
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/448714100; Military/general schedule equivalence chart can 
be found at 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/archive/11aarch/11a_06_appendix_b_Dec08.pdf. 
12 Typical education requirements for DOD/Navy general schedule can be found at 
http://www.secnav.navy.mil/donhr/Documents/CivilianJobs/DOD_Qualification_Standard_For_GS-
1102.pdf 
13 NPS population statistics can be found at 
http://nps.edu/Images/Docs/Factbook%202013%20PDF.pdf. 
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published in creditable academic and industrial journals (Orcher, 2005, p. 45).14 Generally, 
a sample size is selected as a function of the population Z score (Z), population standard 
deviation (σ), and the highest acceptable deviation between the true mean and sample mean 
(d); e.g., n = Z
2
σ
2
/d
2
 (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 297). The population standard deviation is 
yet unknown for this research. Drawing from Slovin’s formula, when given a population 
size (N) and probability of error (e), “the sample size n can be obtained by the formula n = 
1 + Ne
2
” (Guilford & Frucher, 1973, p. 13). Thus, a 48-participant randomly selected 
sample from a 430-person population of TS-cleared students and staff at NPS amounts to a 
.13 probability of error. A random sample of 208 participants would be required to reduce 
the probability of error to .05. For this research, several nonparametric analytic tests 
compensated for the low sample size. This convenience sample was necessary due to the 
limited number of readily available participants at NPS; however, it is acceptable because 
of the relatively homogenous education and training backgrounds of the participants. A 
convenience sample is generally acceptable for the preliminary exploration of a hypothesis 
(Orcher, 2005, p. 47).  
5. Main Variable Operational Definitions 
Teamwork is operationally defined as either horizontal specialization or none. 
Horizontal specialization is a classic management style that divides a functional task 
between specific departments. For groups containing participants assigned horizontal 
specialization, references are divided among individuals within a team. Participants who 
are assigned no specialization are presented with all references and work scenarios 
individually. 
Ignorance is operationally defined as high or low—and measured as either four 
and eight references, respectively. References for this research include:  
 (A) HR personnel data  
 (B) SA security review  
                                                 
14 Sample sizes for closely related research is varies widely; i.e., n=32 (Tuttle & Burton, 1999), n=36 
(Ingham et al., 1974), n=70 (Robbins, 1995), n=84 (Chidambaram & Jones, 1993), n=168 (Linden et al., 
2004), n=258 (Mao et al., 2016), n=374 (Haase et al., 2014), n=457 (Stark et al., 2007), n=644 (Schippers, 
2014). 
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 (C) CI continuous evaluation 
 (D) SI supervisor interview 
 (E) HR evaluations 
 (F) SA access logs 
 (G) CI cyber security 
 (H) SI peer interview 
High ignorance consists of four references (A,B,C,D), and low ignorance consists 
of eight (A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H). The identifying letters correspond to the references assigned 
to each participant, as given in Appendix B(E). 
Time is operationally defined as the period in seconds that a participant uses to 
perform ITA. 
Accuracy is operationally defined as correct or incorrect. 
Confidence is operationally defined as the degree of decision confidence, using an 
ordinal value measured on a nine-point scale. 
Perception of information overload is operationally defined as agreement with the 
survey statement “for my scenario, I was overwhelmed by the amount of information I 
had to process to make a decision,” using an ordinal value measured on a nine-point 
scale. 
Perceived Social impact is operationally defined as agreement with the survey 
statement “I rushed through the task because I was considerate of my teammate’s time,” 
using an ordinal value measured on a nine-point scale. 
6. Main Variable Attributes 
Theoretical concepts are assigned meaning via operational definitions (Hughes, 
1986). As a scientific theory must be falsifiable, refutable, and testable, it follows that 
operationally defined concepts need be measurable constructs. Proper hypotheses play a 
necessary role in falsifiability, because they allow scientists to subject theoretical 
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constructs to empirical testing.15 In this research, teamwork and ignorance are theoretical 
concepts that must be linked to empirical observation to validate their meaning as 
constructs.16 Thus, quantifiable measurement of these concepts is pursued to yield 
objective and empirically acceptable findings. Lord Kelvin masterfully expressed the 
importance of empirical observation in 1883. 
I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and 
express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot 
measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a 
meager and unsatisfactory kind. (as cited in Thomson, 1889, p. 73) 
The independent variables are operationalized as teamwork and ignorance. The 
dependent variables are operationalized as time, accuracy, performance, confidence, 
information overload perception, and social-impact perception. 
a. Teamwork 
The first nominal independent variable, teamwork, is operationally defined as 
horizontally specialized or none. I chose horizontal specialization because it allows 
analysis at the individual level. This is because only one participant makes a threat 
attribution at a time and the information—not the decision—is split between multiple 
people on a team. Analysts assigned no teamwork individually assimilate all information. 
Analysts are organized based on their logon credentials to simulate either 
horizontal specialization or none. Each logon credential is associated with a specific 
scenario and reference selection. Each scenario is different, to ensure that analysts with 
no teamwork perform a task specific to their individual scenario. Horizontal 
specialization replicates the classical concept of task specificity in information processing 
(Daft, 2007). Separate information “departments” are each assigned specific references 
for shared analysis. In sum, individual participants review all references, but assess 
scenarios individually. Team participants review specific references individually, and 
then transmit the salient information to the specified analyst.  
                                                 
15 See Hempel 1966. 
16 See Feigl, 1970. 
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Teamwork participants may not view the references on another participant’s 
screen, transfer screen shots, or email copied-and-pasted operations to bypass the RBAC. 
All team members are allowed to view the same scenario stimuli, but only the designated 
participant may perform ITA for his assigned scenario. The designated participant for the 
particular scenario must retrieve information from his team mates to complete ITA. For 
each scenario, one participant plays the role of insider threat analyst—and only that role 
has access to all available information. The remaining members serve as support staff 
who assimilate information contained in multiple references and transmit pertinent 
information to the insider threat analyst. As in a relay race, each participant passes the 
baton to the next participant for ITA of a subsequent scenario. ITA is complete when the 
team has performed ITA on one scenario per participant. Table 12 presents the 
experimental relationships between scenario, teamwork, and ignorance. 
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Table 12.   Participant Scenario and Reference Assignments. 
Participant Scenario1
G1SHRLP1 1 2 A C B D RefA = HR Personnel
G1SHRLP2 1 2 B D A C RefB = Security Review
G1SHRLP3 3 4 A C B D RefC = Continuous Eval
G1SHRLP4 3 4 B D A C RefD =  Peer Interview
G1SHRHP1 1 2 3 4 A E B F C G D H RefE = Supervisor Interview
G1SHRHP2 1 2 3 4 B F C G D H A E RefF = CyberSecurity
G1SHRHP3 1 2 3 4 C G D H A E B F RefG = Access Logs
G1SHRHP4 1 2 3 4 D H A E B F C G RefH = HR Evaluation
G1SLRLP1 1 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G1SLRLP2 2 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G1SLRLP3 3 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G1SLRLP4 4 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G1SLRHP1 1 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G1SLRHP2 2 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G1SLRHP3 3 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G1SLRHP4 4 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G2SHRLP1 1 2 A C B D
G2SHRLP2 1 2 B D A C
G2SHRLP3 3 4 A C B D
G2SHRLP4 3 4 B D A C
G2SHRHP1 1 2 3 4 A E B F C G D H
G2SHRHP2 1 2 3 4 B F C G D H A E
G2SHRHP3 1 2 3 4 C G D H A E B F
G2SHRHP4 1 2 3 4 D H A E B F C G
G2SLRLP1 1 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G2SLRLP2 2 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G2SLRLP3 3 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G2SLRLP4 4 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G2SLRHP1 1 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G2SLRHP2 2 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G2SLRHP3 3 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G2SLRHP4 4 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G3SHRLP1 1 2 A C B D
G3SHRLP2 1 2 B D A C
G3SHRLP3 3 4 A C B D
G3SHRLP4 3 4 B D A C
G3SHRHP1 1 2 3 4 A E B F C G D H
G3SHRHP2 1 2 3 4 B F C G D H A E
G3SHRHP3 1 2 3 4 C G D H A E B F
G3SHRHP4 1 2 3 4 D H A E B F C G
G3SLRLP1 1 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G3SLRLP2 2 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G3SLRLP3 3 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G3SLRLP4 4 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G3SLRHP1 1 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G3SLRHP2 2 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G3SLRHP3 3 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G3SLRHP4 4 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
*** For server access controls, users are assigned to groups that rotate instead of rotating user group memberships.
Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 Scenario4
RefA = HR Personnel RefB = HR Personnel RefC = HR Personnel RefD = HR Personnel
RefB = Security Review RefC = Security Review RefD = Security Review RefA = Security Review
RefC = Continuous Eval RefD = Continuous Eval RefA = Continuous Eval RefB = Continuous Eval
RefD =  Peer Interview RefA =  Peer Interview RefB =  Peer Interview RefC =  Peer Interview
RefE = Supervisor Interview RefF = Supervisor Interview RefG = Supervisor Interview RefH = Supervisor Interview
RefF = CyberSecurity RefG = CyberSecurity RefH = CyberSecurity RefE = CyberSecurity
RefG = Access Logs RefH = Access Logs RefE = Access Logs RefF = Access Logs
RefH = HR Evaluation RefE = Evaluation RefF = HR Evaluation RefG = HR Evaluation
Scenario Scenario 1 Refs Scenario 2 Refs Scenario 3 Refs Scenario 4 Refs
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b. Ignorance 
The second categorical independent variable, ignorance, is operationally defined 
as high or low. Kelley’s Covariation Model informed the reference partition per 
organizational or personal perspectives. Participants assigned high ignorance are given 
references that primarily inform an organizational perspective requiring greater reliance 
on recognition to “fill in the gaps.” Participants assigned low ignorance are given 
references that inform both organizational and individual perspectives. For instance, a 
security review differs from access logs in perspective. The security review contains 
general information about deviations from organizational norms, whereas access logs 
contain information specific to the individual. As a result, the security review primarily 
informs an organizational perspective and access logs primarily inform a personal 
perspective. High ignorance groups receive references that inform the organizational 
perspective because “consensus,” an organizational perspective term, is the first 
consideration in Kelley’s covariation model. Low ignorance groups receive references 
that inform both organizational and personal perspectives. The organizational perspective 
informs the consensus component of Kelley’s covariation model and the personal 
perspective informs the consistency and distinctiveness components.  
(1) High Ignorance 
High ignorance presents the participant with four references that were generated 
by Agency XYZ (a fictitious organization): personnel data, security review, continuous 
evaluation, and peer interview.  
 The personnel file (A) contains employee information—including the 
insider’s marital status, family members, contact information, salary, job 
title, clearance level, work history, and disciplinary actions—to inform the 
perception of organizational fit of the insider under review.  
 The security-review file (B) contains compartment-access records, a 
summary of physical access, and a summary of computer access. The 
security-review file provides a technical perspective on the level of access 
the insider holds within the agency.  
 The continuous-evaluation file (C) contains external database 
information—including financial history, criminal history, and passport 
records—to reveal the consensus aspect on the insider’s activities. 
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 The peer interview (D) is an assessment of the insider from the perspective 
of a fellow employee. The peer interview provides the analyst with an 
organizational perspective. 
(2) Low Ignorance 
The low ignorance condition presents participants with all of the references 
provided under the high ignorance condition, along with an additional four that include 
more specific personal details and history.  
 The insider-evaluation report (E) details individual work performance and 
duties. The insider-evaluation report offers evidence to determine the 
consistency of the insider’s performance. 
 Detailed access logs (F) reveals individual physical accesses. The access 
logs reveal the consistency of access patterns. 
 The cybersecurity report (G) details individual user activity monitoring 
and data flows to and from foreign network domains. The cybersecurity 
report provides information that allows the analyst to evaluate if 
information flows are anomalous among co-workers.   
 The supervisor interview (H) provides a specific assessment of the insider 
from the perspective of the insider’s supervisor. The supervisor interview 
reveals the distinctiveness of the insider’s behavior. 
The relationship between references and individuals is illustrated in Table 12. 
These references are selected as consistent with guidance from CNSS directive 504, 
NITTF-2014-008, and a number of scholarly publications (Guido & Brooks, 2013; 
Maybury et al., 2005; Brackney & Anderson, 2004). All references and scenario stimuli 
are found in Appendix B. 
c. ITA Time 
The clock starts when analysis begins and stops when the participant commits to 
creating a case by initiating a case-management survey. I operationalize analysis starting 
time as the submission time of the entrance survey, because each participant is 
immediately presented a case stimulus after he completes the survey. I operationalize 
analysis ending time as the moment a participant commits to creating a case, because the 
actual recording of case details is ancillary to threat analysis. Analysis starting and ending 
times are automatically recorded by the KSE software. 
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The starting time for analysis by non-specialized participants is straightforward, 
but the starting time for team analysis must accommodate the interrelationships of the 
ITA team. Team analysis starting time is operationalized as the moment the last team 
member completes the entrance survey, because all team members must perform analysis 
simultaneously on each scenario. I assigned each participant to a specific scenario at the 
beginning of the experiment and counter balanced the scenario order between teams. 
Team members progress from one scenario to the next with a single participant 
responsible for an assigned scenario. The time each prior case is submitted is also the 
start time of the following ITA.  
d. ITA Accuracy 
The second component of performance in the experiment is accuracy, specifically 
whether a participant correctly identifies the insider threat. Scenario outcomes are 
assessed according to the NITTF-recommended outcomes in Appendix B(C)(2). I 
operationalize accuracy as a dichotomous value—assigning each correct ITA a score of 
1, and each incorrect ITA a score of 0.   
Correct responses to scenario stimuli require participants to identify risk factors 
from the “adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access to classified 
information” (2016; Carney and Marshall-Mies, 2000). Participants received as much 
time as they required to review the adjudicative guidelines prior to the start of the 
experiment. To simply state that behavior looks suspicious is insufficient. Participants 
investigate given references and explain why they perceive that an insider is a threat. 
That is to say, each participating analyst will use knowledge from the required TS 
clearance insider threat training and the adjudicative guidelines to discern insider threats. 
ITA performance measure is highly dependent on accuracy, though the accuracy 
measure is binary. A ceiling effect from correct analysis would make ITA time and ITA 
performance basically the same measure. Additional dependent measures—including 
ITA decision confidence, social-impact perception, and information-overload 
perception—increase the explanatory power of the experiment results in the case of 
overwhelming correct answers in all test groups. 
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e. ITA Performance  
Performance is basically a measure of effectiveness (Maizlish & Handler, 2005, p. 
53), which is generally the capacity to produce a desired outcome in a work process. 
common desired outcome is to produce as much as possible using minimal time and 
resources. This implies, ceteris paribus, that an insider threat analyst who quickly 
identifies a threat performs better than one who spends greater time on the same 
identification. It follows inversely that an insider threat analyst who fails to identify an 
insider threat—but wastes little time in the process—performs better than one who wastes 
more time on the same failure. 
According to NITTF, insider threat programs within the federal government 
generally benchmark against each other (see NITTF communication in Appendix A). I 
operationalize performance as an objective measure, calculated by benchmarking insider 
threat analyst performances against each other. In this way, I assess individual 
performance using the same method as current insider threat programs.  
Following Jaquith (2007, p. 25), performance metrics must be both simple and 
expressed as a percentage. I transform the ITA performance value to account for both 
correct and incorrect responses along a scale from 0 to 2. An insider threat analyst who 
takes longer to reach an incorrect answer receives a lower score than one who spends less 
time on an incorrect answer. No incorrect answers may result in a score of 1 or greater, 
and no correct answer may result in a score less than 1. I transformed analysis time to a 
scale of 0–1 to make the time values more meaningful for comparison between groups 
and individuals. Equation 1 illustrates the ITA time transformation. 
𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  
𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
 
Equation 1. ITATimeScore  
 
ITA Performance is operationally defined as ITA Time plus accuracy score. I 
transformed the performance score to make it more meaningful for comparison. The 
transformed performance score follows the form in Equation 2.  
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Performance = ITATimeScore + ITAAccuracy 
Equation 2. Performance Transform 
 
I give the performance value greater meaning at the individual level by 
accounting for both incorrect and correct answers. The ITA Performance measure is 
calculated on a scale from 0 to 2 to simultaneously identify time and accuracy. 
Performance is transformed to a percentage in Figure 2 and 3 to comply with Jaquith’s 
(2007, p. 25) concept of performance that is expressed in time and as a percentage.   
Since analysts must process a continuous stream of threat indicators, I consider 
the effects of time spent in incorrect analysis. Insider threats are known to leave a trail of 
evidence that consists of many indicators (Cappelli et al., 2012). I infer that the more time 
taken to arrive at an incorrect conclusion, the less time available for further threat 
analysis. I code both analysis time and accuracy values in such a way that both correct 
and incorrect ITA performance scores are meaningful. 
f. ITA Confidence 
ITA decision confidence is necessary because accuracy is a binary variable. Given 
the small sample size used for this experiment, random guesses may create a perception 
of higher performance—whereas in reality, the relationship between these factors may be 
nothing more than chance. Higher confidence implies that an accurate ITA decision is 
less likely the result of chance. I employ a nine-point Likert-type scale because previous 
research implies that an 11-point scale may be too complex and a five-point scale lacks 
sufficient resolution (Mead and Moseley, 2001). Scheibe, Skitsch, and Schofer (1975) 
find that participants most easily understand nine-point Likert items. Furthermore, Likert 
items have interval-level properties when they have descriptive adjectives (Von der 
Gracht, 2008). The Likert items in this experiment are derived from past-validated 
research surveys, with the exception of one ITA confidence item. 
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g. Information-Overload Perception  
Information-overload perception measures the effects of ignorance and teamwork 
as factors of information overload when time is not a factor in decision making. For this 
experiment, participants complete a pre-validated survey to measure their perception of 
information overload (Moser & Soucek, 2010; Karr-Wisniewski & Lu, 2010). The effects 
of information overload may explain variance in ITA accuracy and time. The 
information-overload perception value is the average of survey-item scores. 
h. Social-Impact Perception  
Social-impact perception measures the effect that ignorance has on the social 
information exchange between participants. This measure reveals whether ignorance 
variations or teammates’ loafing best explains variability in analysis time and accuracy. 
This experiment measures social impact with a pre-validated survey (Mulvey et al., 
1998). The social-impact perception value is the average of survey-item scores. 
7. Blocking Variable (Demographics) Operational Definitions 
Blocking variables are operationally defined as follows: 
 Experience is professional familiarity with ITA-relevant effect 
relationships that informs intuition; an interval value, each interval is 
measured as one year’s worth. 
 Age is time alive; an interval value, each interval is measured as one year.  
 Education is highest degree obtained; an ordinal value with four 
categories: bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, doctoral degree, and post-
doctoral degree. 
 Gender is chromosomal sex category; a binary categorical value: male or 
female. 
8. Blocking Variable (Demographics) Attributes 
The main research variables—teamwork and ignorance—may have effects 
explained by the sample selection. Research design does not account for the effects that 
experience, age, education, experience type and gender may have on the dependent 
variables. This research uses blocking variables to control for variability caused by 
 78 
factors not specifically identified in the main research design. Blocking variables are the 
properties of the individual participant—including experience, experience type, age, 
education, and gender. These variables arrange participants into groups (viz., blocks) that 
are similar—and as a result, they become variables that may account for some of the 
variation in dependent variable that is explained by demographics. 
a. Experience 
Experience is an ordinal value measured in number of years. Expertise tends to 
develop in a predictable manner (Dreyfus, 2004). Dreyfus does not offer a time bracket 
such as Herbert Simon’s (1996) ten-years-to-expert, or Malcolm Gladwell’s (2008) 
10,000-hour rule. However, the Dreyfus model of skill acquisition describes a five-stage 
progression from novice to expert that is sequential and additive. According to Dreyfus, 
novices learn to follow rules; advanced beginners memorize the rules; competents know 
why the rules apply, and where; proficients intuitively recognize the situations in which 
rules apply; and experts intuitively know the effects of their decisions. Thus, experience 
could explain some variability in the dependent variables. 
b. Age 
Age is transformed to an ordinal value that measures maturity,17 as age is a better 
indicator of maturity than expertise. Though an older person is not always mature, age is 
generally regarded as a rule-of-thumb correlative. Some participants, especially female, 
may take a hiatus from their profession to rear children, and economic downturns may 
have interrupted gainful employment for both sexes. Participants of an older age are 
likely to have additional life experiences that inform ITA. 
c. Gender 
Gender is a binary categorical variable determined by sex at birth. Brain function, 
structure, and chemistry are known to differ with gender (Cosgrove, Mazure, and Staley, 
2007), which can cause variability during ITA—e.g., in suspicion or apathy. Blocking by 
                                                 
17 Merriam-Webster defines maturity as a quality of “full development.” 
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gender, this study controls for the effects of gender on ITA performance, perceptions of 
information overload, and ITA decision confidence.  
d. Education 
Education accounts for the variance caused by the academic maturity of 
participants. Education is known to have a relationship with intelligence and there are 
various interpretations of that relationship (Ritchie, Bates and Deary, 2015). I assess 
education as the highest academic degree completed rather than years in academia, 
because more time in school does not necessarily mean more education—e.g., five versus 
three years for a bachelor’s degree could be due to a military deployment or financial 
factors. The product is the same degree, regardless of time that is otherwise measured by 
age or experience. 
B. JUSTIFICATION FOR LABORATORY EXPERIMENTATION 
The circumstances of the research are used to determine whether qualitative or 
quantitative methods are used in a given inquiry (Glaser & Strass, 1967, p. 18). 
Qualitative methods are generally used to generate a theory or probe a topic to get a sense 
of the theory base (Creswell, 2014, p. 110). The theory that emerges may then be verified 
with a quantitative method, such as laboratory experimentation (Jarvenpaa, 1988). As a 
qualitative foundation for this research, I probed the state of ITA with site visits, game 
mastered a massive multiplayer online war-game leveraging the Internet (MMOWGLI) 
(Mascolo, 2016), and made a qualitative data assessment of insider threat experts 
(outlined in Appendix D) cited in Kelly and Anderson (2016). The next step is theory 
testing per the “advancement of knowledge” continuum illustrated in Jarvenpaa (1988) 
and mentioned in Newman and Benz (1998, p. 13). 
Laboratory experimentation is advantageously employed when the research 
question begins with “how,” the researcher has control over variables, and the research is 
not focused on historical events (Yin, 2014, p. 9). The laboratory is an environment in 
which the researcher may control for confounding variables to produce replicable 
knowledge (Kerlinger & Lee, 2001). To these observations, I add that knowledge generated 
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through laboratory experimentation is more easily defended than other forms of 
knowledge.  
Pursuant to SECNAVINST 3900.39, NPS requires Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) approval for human-subjects research, as employed in this research. DODI 3216.02 
prohibits monetary compensation to federal employees as a method of participant coercion. 
This research provides monetary compensation in the research design, but not as a 
recruitment contrivance. Approval was obtained for this experiment, as provided in 
Appendix C. 
C. SUMMARY  
This chapter presented the research in a 2 x 2 factorial design. The design 
includes two main predictor variables, ignorance and teamwork, that this chapter 
described and operationally defined. The chapter also described and defined design 
blocking variables including age, gender, education, experience, and experience type. 
The design presented five dependent variables—ITA time, accuracy, confidence, 
perception of information overload, perception of social impact—and a dependent 
performance measure, ITA performance, calculated from ITA time and accuracy.  
This section described the sample selection requirements, sample size, and 
presented evidence that the sample is suitable for this research. The participants, who 
constitute a convenience sample, closely resembles the population of insider threat 
analysts according to security clearance, education, and pay grade.  
This chapter outlines a laboratory experiment apparatus capable of collecting data 
for testing the effects of teamwork and ignorance on ITA performance. The role based 
access control capabilities of a KSE, SharePoint, are leveraged to manipulate the 
independent variables. An experimental environment is established using an online data-
collection device (http://www.kellyapparatus.com). The KSE maintains survey responses 
and analysis time for each individual participant and organizes the results in an Excel 
spreadsheet. Performance measures are assessed as time and accuracy at the individual 
level of analysis, in a highly controlled and repeatable manner. The scripts necessary to 
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precisely recreate the web-based apparatus, along with the insider threat scenarios and 
references, are provided in Appendix B.  
Chapter III examines the characteristics of the data collected by the experiment 
apparatus and the statistical methods for analysis. I reduced the main research question 
(“how do ignorance and teamwork affect analyst accuracy, time, and confidence?”) to 50 
ancillary research questions. Each ancillary question supports the research with specific 
analytical method selection based on the characteristics of the data. Chapter IV presents 
the results of the data analysis. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
Chapter II explored the academic literature relative to the main research question 
“how does ignorance and teamwork affect analyst time and accuracy?” Chapter III 
outlines how the specific data are collected with the experimental apparatus for 
hypothesis testing. This research included several ancillary research questions to 
investigate each hypothesis. I include several blocking variables within the data analysis 
to better define the theoretical relationships between independent and dependent 
variables. The blocking variables were not included in the main research question, but 
preceded from ancillary questions. Each ancillary question compels a specific analysis 
method suitable to the data type. 
This chapter describes the analytical framework of the research design, including 
main and supporting inquiries. This work first statistically addresses the primary research 
questions with ancillary questions via several descriptive statistical methods. Descriptions 
of data characteristics justify the selection of the non-parametric tests covered in Chapter 
V. This chapter closes with assessments of internal and external validity. 
A. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This research demonstrates a two-part analysis to answer ten primary research 
questions. The research questions compel specific analytical methods to evaluate the 
causal effects of the predictor variables based on variable level. This work addresses each 
primary research question with several specific ancillary research questions. 
1. Primary Research Questions 
This research tests theories of attribution and process loss with ten primary 
research questions. 50 ancillary research questions were derived from the ten primary 
research questions and two supporting research questions. The primary research 
questions were: 
 Does ignorance affect ITA accuracy? 
 Does ignorance affect ITA time? 
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 Does ignorance affect ITA confidence? 
 Does teamwork affect ITA accuracy? 
 Does teamwork affect ITA time? 
 Does teamwork affect ITA confidence? 
 Does ignorance affect perceptions of information overload? 
 Does teamwork affect perceptions of information overload? 
 Does ignorance affect perceptions of social impact? 
 Do teamwork and ignorance interact? 
The supporting research questions were: 
 Do demographics affect ITA time, accuracy, confidence, social impact, 
and information overload? 
 Are there any statistically significant differences between experiment 
stimuli that could cause an experimentally fixed effect?  
2. Analytical Methods 
This research leverages a web server to submit questionnaires to each participant 
and record the elapsed time of analysis. Accuracy is the only categorical dependent 
variable and compels a binary logistical-regression-analysis method. ITA time is a 
continuous variable measured in seconds. Together, the two measures (accuracy and 
time) are a coded performance ratio on a continuum between 0–2. 
I assign teamwork and ignorance as dichotomous categorical variables identified 
by a participant’s web server logon credentials. Each of the four categorical conditions of 
specialization and ignorance are represented by 12 participants, for a total of 48 
participants. Table 13 presents independent and dependent variable data types. 
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Table 13.   Independent and Dependent Variables. 
Independent variables (Data): 
Teamwork (0/1) 
Ignorance (0/1) 
Age (# Years) 
Gender (0/1) 
Education (1–4) 
Experience (# Years) 
Scenario (1,2,3,4) 
Outcome (0/1) 
Dependent variables (Data): 
Insider threat analyst time (# seconds) 
Insider threat analyst Accuracy (1/0) 
Insider threat analyst performance (ratio) 
Insider threat analyst decision confidence (1–9) 
Information overload perception (1–9) 
Social impact perception (1–9) 
 
Variable data types are in parentheses. 
Table 14 lists specific questions derived from the more general research 
questions. Statistical tests are specific to certain data types; while statistical analysis 
methods may allow a combination of questions in a single analytical method, some 
questions require divisions among analytical methods because of variations in data types. 
For instance, accuracy, a dependent categorical variable, compels either a chi-square test 
or a logit regression, depending on the nature of the independent variable. This work 
leverages non-parametric tests to bolster the results of the parametric tests. Table 14 
summarizes 50 supporting research questions, data types, and statistical analysis 
methods. 
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Table 14.   Ancillary Research Questions, Variables, and Statistical Analysis Method. 
Main Research Questions [Independent (data)] 
<Dependent(data)> 
Analysis 
1 Does teamwork and ignorance interactively affect analyst 
performance? 
INDEP: Team(0/1); Ign (0/1) 
DEP: performance(ratio) 
ANOVA 
2 Does teamwork affect analyst performance? INDEP: Team(0/1) 
DEP: performance(ratio) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
3 Does ignorance affect analyst performance? INDEP: Ign(0/1) 
DEP: performance (ratio) 
ANOVA 
Mann Whitney U Regression 
4 Does teamwork and ignorance interactively affect analyst time? INDEP: Team(0/1); Ign(0/1)  
DEP: Time (# seconds) 
ANOVA 
5 Does teamwork affect analyst time? INDEP: Team(0/1) 
DEP: Time (# seconds) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U  
6 Does ignorance affect analyst time? INDEP: Ign(0/1) 
DEP: Time (# seconds) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U  
7 Does teamwork and ignorance interactively affect analyst 
accuracy? 
INDEP: Team(0/1); Ign(0/1)  
DEP: Accuracy (0/1) 
ANOVA 
8 Does teamwork affect analyst accuracy? INDEP: Team(0/1) Logit Regression 
 87 
Main Research Questions [Independent (data)] 
<Dependent(data)> 
Analysis 
DEP: Accuracy(0/1) Chi-square test 
9 Does ignorance affect analyst accuracy? INDEP: Ign(0/1) 
DEP: Accuracy(0/1) 
Logit Regression 
Chi-square test 
10 Does teamwork and ignorance interact with analyst confidence? INDEP: Team(0/1); Ign(0/1) 
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
ANOVA 
11 Does teamwork affect analyst confidence? INDEP: Team(0/1) 
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U  
12 Does ignorance affect analyst confidence? INDEP: Ign(0/1) 
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U  
13 Does teamwork and ignorance interactively affect perceptions of 
information overload? 
INDEP: Team(0/1); Ign(0/1)  
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
ANOVA 
14 Does teamwork affect perceptions of information overload? INDEP: Team(0/1)  
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
15 Does ignorance affect perceptions of information overload? INDEP: Ign(0/1) 
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
16 Does ignorance affect perceptions of social impact? INDEP: Ign(0/1) 
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
ANOVA 
Mann Whitney U 
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Fixed effects questions: [Independent (data)] 
<Dependent(data)> 
Analysis 
17 Does any scenario affect analyst time? INDEP: Scenario(1–4)  
DEP: Time (# seconds) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Kruskal-Wallis 
18 Does scenario outcome affect analyst time? INDEP: Outcome(0/1)  
DEP: Time (# seconds) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
19 Does any scenario affect analyst performance? INDEP: Scenario(1–4)  
DEP: performance(ratio) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Kruskal-Wallis 
20 Does scenario outcome affect analyst performance? INDEP: Outcome(0/1)  
DEP: performance(ratio) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
21 Does any scenario affect analyst accuracy? INDEP: Scenario(1–4)  
DEP: accuracy(0/1) 
Logit Regression 
Chi-square test 
22 Does scenario outcome affect analyst accuracy? INDEP: Outcome(0/1)  
DEP: accuracy(0/1)> 
Logit Regression 
Chi-square test 
23 Does any scenario affect analyst decision confidence? INDEP: Scenario(1–4) 
DEP: confidence(1–9) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Kruskal-Wallis 
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24 Does scenario outcome affect analyst decision confidence? INDEP: Outcome(0/1) 
DEP: confidence(1–9) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
25 Does any scenario affect perceptions of information overload? INDEP: Scenario(1–4) 
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Kruskal-Wallis 
26 Does scenario outcome affect perceptions of information 
overload? 
INDEP: Outcome(0/1) 
DEP: InfoOvld (1-9) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
Blocking variable questions: [Independent (data)] 
<Dependent(data)> 
Analysis 
27 Does age affect analyst time? INDEP: Age(#years) 
DEP: Time(# seconds) 
Regression 
28 Does gender affect analyst time? INDEP: Gender(0/1)  
DEP: Time(# seconds) 
Regression 
 
29 Does education affect analyst time? INDEP: Education(1–4)  
DEP: Time(# seconds) 
Regression 
 
30 Does experience affect analyst time? INDEP: Experience(#years) 
 DEP: Time(# seconds) 
Regression 
 
31 Does age affect analyst accuracy? INDEP: Age(#years) 
DEP: Accuracy(0/1) 
Logistic regression 
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32 Does gender affect analyst accuracy? INDEP: Gender(0/1)  
DEP: Accuracy(0/1) 
Logistic regression 
 
33 Does education affect analyst accuracy? INDEP: Education(1–4)  
DEP: Accuracy(0/1) 
Logistic regression 
 
34 Does experience affect analyst accuracy? INDEP: Experience(#years)  
DEP: Accuracy(0/1) 
Logistic regression 
35 Does age affect analyst performance? INDEP: Age(#years) 
DEP: Performance(ratio) 
Regression 
36 Does gender affect analyst performance? INDEP: Gender(0/1)  
DEP: Performance(ratio) 
Regression 
37 Does education affect analyst performance? INDEP: Education(1–4)  
DEP: Performance(ratio) 
Regression 
38 Does experience affect analyst performance? INDEP: Experience(#years)  
DEP: Performance(ratio) 
Regression 
39 Does age affect analyst confidence? INDEP: Age(# years) 
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
Regression 
40 Does gender affect analyst confidence? INDEP: Gender(0/1)  
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
Regression 
41 Does education affect analyst confidence? INDEP: Education(1–4)  
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
Regression 
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42 Does experience affect analyst confidence? INDEP: Experience(#years)  
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
Regression 
43 Does age affect the perception of information overload? INDEP: Age(#years)  
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
Regression 
44 Does gender affect the perception of information overload? INDEP: Gender(0/1)  
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
Regression 
45 Does education affect the perception of information overload? INDEP: Education(1–4)  
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
Regression 
46 Does experience affect the perception of information overload? INDEP: Experience(#years)  
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
Regression 
47 Does age affect the perception of social impact? INDEP: Age(#years)  
DEP: SocImpact(1-9) 
Regression 
48 Does gender affect the perception of social impact? INDEP: Gender(0/1)  
DEP: SocImpact(1-9) 
Regression 
49 Does education affect the perception of social impact? INDEP: Education(1–4)  
DEP: SocImpact(1-9) 
Regression 
50 Does experience affect the perception of social impact? INDEP: Experience(#years)  
DEP: SocImpact(1-9) 
Regression 
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B. DEPENDENT VARIABLE STATISTICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The characteristics of the dependent variable determined the appropriate statistical 
methods for each. Dependent variable data—including the accuracy, time, performance, 
and confidence of individual insider threat analyses—offer evidence that predicts the 
performance effects of teamwork and ignorance. This section describes the findings from 
descriptive statistics. 
The insider threat experiment divided 48 participants into four test groups of 12 
each. One group was evaluated under conditions of horizontally specialized teamwork 
and low ignorance, one under conditions of no teamwork and low ignorance, one under 
conditions of horizontally specialized teamwork and high ignorance, and the remaining 
under conditions of no teamwork and high ignorance. 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
This section outlines some descriptive statistics for performance, time, accuracy, 
confidence, information overload, and social impact data. The descriptive statistics show 
that analysis time ranged from 390 seconds for the fastest assessment to 2022 seconds for 
the slowest assessment. The average time to perform ITA was about 15 minutes. 
Participants were about 40% more accurate than not and were generally confident in their 
assessments and the accuracy score was reflected in the performance score. Information 
overload and social impact perceptions were generally low under all experimental 
conditions. Table 15 presents descriptive statistics from 48 participants in four test groups 
for range, mean, standard deviation and variance.  
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Table 15.   Descriptive Statistics—Range, Mean, 
Standard Deviation, and Variance. 
 
 N Range Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance 
Performance 48 1.5093 1.2515 .4582 .210 
Time 48 1632 923.71 384.122 147549.615 
Accuracy 48 1 .71 .459 .211 
Confidence 48 4 7.17 1.191 1.418 
InfoOvld 48 4 1.94 1.174 1.379 
SocImpact 24 3 1.83 1.049 1.101 
 
Data skewness reveals the asymmetry of the distribution (Field, 2013, p. 20). 
Time data was negatively skewed, indicating that there are some outliers who took an 
extraordinary time to complete the assessment. The negative skew in performance and 
accuracy scores together indicate that participants assessed scenarios correctly more so 
than incorrectly, and did so within relatively similar times. The high positive information 
overload and social impact skew indicates that the participants were seldom overloaded 
and overall, perceived little social impact. Tests of normality and visual representations 
of the distributions are covered in (Appendix E). 
Kurtosis tests reveal the height of the distribution central peak relative to the tails. 
The negative kurtosis of Performance data is due to the bimodal distribution created by 
the performance transform. The negative kurtosis in confidence data indicates that 
confidence scores were relatively even across the scale. The negative Accuracy kurtosis 
indicates that participants assessed scenarios accurately more than not. Table 16 presents 
descriptive statistics that describe the skewness and kurtosis of the data distributions. 
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Table 16.   Descriptive Statistics—Skewness and Kurtosis. 
 
 
N Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Performance 48 -.675 .343 -1.014 .674 
Time 48 .950 .343 .841 .674 
Accuracy 48 -.947 .343 -1.154 .674 
Confidence 48 .137 .343 -.872 .674 
InfoOvld 48 1.277 .343 .953 .674 
SocImpact 24 1.099 .472 .084 .918 
 
2. Correlation 
The dependent variables ITA time, accuracy, confidence, and perception of 
information overload are not highly correlated. High correlation implies that the 
dependent variables are measuring the same thing. High correlation is greater than .8 
(Field, 2013, p. 686). ITA performance and accuracy are highly correlated, because 
performance is measured as accuracy within a percentage of the highest analysis time. 
Although ITA performance is highly correlated with accuracy, it introduces an added 
benefit of measuring incorrect analysis against other incorrect analysis. Table 17 presents 
a matrix that presents correlations between the dependent variables. 
Table 17.   Correlation Matrix—Time, Accuracy, Performance, Confidence, 
Information Overload. 
            
  Time Accuracy Performance Confidence InfoOvld 
Time 1         
Accuracy 0.212(p=.147) 1       
Performance -0.201(p=.169) 0.914(p=.000) 1     
Confidence 0.075(p=.611) 0.285(p=.049) 0.254(p=.081) 1   
InfoOvld 0.075(p=.610) 0.044(p=.765) 0.013(p=.929) -0.129(p=.381) 1 
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C. VALIDITY 
Validity informs us whether the inferences to be drawn are meaningful and useful 
when applying scores from particular instruments (Yin, 2014, p. 46). Validity is 
categorized as internal and external. Internal validity assumes an objective epistemology; 
thus, the evidence appears valid depending on the statistical significance of the results. 
Internal validation concepts, beyond face validity, are generally measures of reliability. 
External validity is a claim of generalizability to something other than a specific 
experiment. It asks “how much does the experiment agree with the real world?” Both the 
internal and external validity of experimental results are assessed in this investigation. 
1. Threats to Internal Validity 
Causal relationships are validated scientifically by considering relationships in 
terms of statistical probability. There are threats to the validity of the inferences made 
from measurements when a researcher is not measuring what he intends to measure due 
to illusory correlations. Of the 11 documented threats to internal validity (Creswell, 2014; 
Graziano & Raulin, 1993; Campbell & Stanley, 1963), six are particularly relevant to this 
study.  
History is the greatest threat to internal validity. While the historical effect in this 
experiment is small for individual participants presented with just one scenario, an 
historical effect may manifest for those assigned to four-person teams who participate in 
four scenarios. They may tire of performing ITA, and perform worse with each new 
scenario—or conversely, they may warm up and perform better. They may adhere to 
imaginary time constraints and work to that anxiety instead of performing diligent ITA. I 
mitigated this threat to internal validity by asking all participants to perform ITA without 
intermission, in order to maintain focus. In addition, I issued one scenario per participant 
and informed them that they would receive compensation based solely upon the proper 
analysis of that scenario alone. The effects of social loafing were controlled by 
introducing individual accountability and compensation. I explained to participants that 
time is not a factor in their compensation, but request that they work as fast as possible to 
 96 
accomplish ITA. Furthermore, participants were not informed about successful ITAs until 
after the exit survey was complete. 
Maturation is a threat to internal validity because participants will improve at 
scenario assessment as they progress. Because each scenario is different, participants get 
better at assessing them by learning what to look for in the references and neglecting non-
pertinent information. I controlled for the effects of maturation by randomizing the order 
in which references were presented. No participant received the same reference twice, 
and therefore, they could not simply prune unnecessary information within the reference 
a priori. Access control features in the KSE prevented anyone but the intended recipient 
from viewing any reference under any scenario. The relationships among participant, 
scenario, and reference are given in Appendix B(B)(3). 
A sample selection that includes a participant who is knowledgeable about ITA 
may severely bias the results, because the presence of a team expert should elevate the 
relative expertise of the entire subgroup (Benner, 2009). To control for this threat, 
participants were screened for previous experience with the NITTF scenarios used in the 
experiment.  
No mid-experiment tweaks to instrumentation were made, as they might have 
biased the results of the experiment. Problems or missing information that came to light 
during the experiment applied to all participants. The experiment excluded information 
by design—otherwise, it would be a well circumscribed problem-solving exercise that 
relies heavily on deductive reasoning.  
There was no compensatory rivalry among groups; the groups did not know 
which received treatment. Each participant evaluated one scenario and is rewarded 
equally for a correct ITA. Individuals were not told they would be compared with other 
configurations of ignorance and teamwork. The KSE concealed the presence of additional 
scenarios and references with RBAC.  
Temporal separation among subgroups reduced the possibility of communication 
among them and mitigated the diffusion of treatment effects. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that some participants may inform others of the correct responses to their assigned ITA 
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scenario, in defiance of a nondisclosure agreement. Participants were unable to observe 
others while awaiting their turn, and participants did not know who would perform 
subsequent insider threat analysis. The participants also knew that they observed one of 
several potential scenarios, so they would expect their ITA to differ from that of another 
participant. 
2. Threats to External Validity 
This experiment tested theories of attribution and process loss using ITA as a test 
case to make inferences about latent theoretical concepts; thus, the experiment is 
susceptible to three threats to external validity.  
The participant selection may interact with research bias to threaten the external 
validity of the results. According to former-president George W. Bush, “the best and 
brightest military officers from the United States and around the world come to the Naval 
Postgraduate School.” The cognitive capacity of NPS students is generally high and may 
not generalize to the broad insider threat analyst population. Furthermore, the teamwork 
skills that NPS students learn in military service may cause the teamwork condition to 
have a different effect on ITA performance than it would for teams comprised of insider 
threat analysts who do not have military training. 
The setting of an experiment interacting with the results may also threaten 
external validity. Laboratory tests in the social sciences have a novelty effect, and the 
online apparatus may not properly capture how insider threat analysts perform their 
duties (Mayo, 1933). The experiment controls for the interaction of setting by using 
training scenarios written specifically for use in a similar setting. The scenarios were 
presented in an online format that is the same across all groups. 
Recent high-profile insider threat attacks have increased awareness of risk within 
the military and general population, and the interaction of historical events on the 
experiment may pose a threat to external validity. To reduce the effects of historical 
interaction, the scenarios presented are obscure and non-sensational. 
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter distilled the main research question into eight primary research 
questions. The primary research questions quantify the relationship between each 
independent and dependent variable. This chapter reduced the primary research questions 
into 50 ancillary and supporting research questions that examine the effects of blocking 
variables and seek out experimentally fixed effects. This chapter detailed the analytical 
framework behind the research questions explored in this research. Each research 
question compelled a specific parametric test and non-parametric test, depending on the 
data type of the associated variables. The results and implications of the statistical tests 
are covered in Chapter V. 
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V. RESULTS 
Chapter IV discusses the analytical framework of the research design and data-
coding schema that support each primary and ancillary research question assessment. The 
descriptive statistics for each dependent variable are presented—namely, analyst 
performance, time, accuracy, confidence, information overload perception, and social 
impact perception. Chapter IV concludes with controls for identifiable threats to internal 
and external validity. 
This chapter reviews the main and interactive effects that manipulations to the 
predictor variables (teamwork and ignorance) have on the dependent variables of analyst 
time, accuracy, performance, confidence, information overload perception, and social 
impact perception. The research design includes assessments of blocking variables (age, 
gender, education, and experience) to determine whether demographics have a 
measurable impact that may explain variation in the dependent variables. This work 
addresses any possible experimental fixed effect produced by any stimulus scenario that 
could invalidate the experiment, including the effects of scenario outcomes; Table 14, in 
Chapter IV, lists 50 supporting research questions, which are answered in this chapter. 
The nature of each dependent variable, the statistical tests appropriate for each research 
question, and the effects of predictor variable manipulations are reviewed and effects are 
interpreted. A summary of the findings in Table 42 concludes the chapter.  
Kerlinger and Lee (2000, p. 279) assert that a meaningful way to test a hypothesis 
is to put it in statistical terms such as “mean A is greater than mean B” at a specified 
significance level. Following Kerlinger and Lee, this work tested directional hypotheses 
using one–tailed tests after assessing ancillary research questions with two–tailed tests. 
Field (2013, p. 539) provides that effect size should accompany significance level. 
Following Field and Kerlinger and Lee, this research presents statistically significant 
results along with effect size estimate. Effect size estimate are reported in adjusted R 
squared for parametric tests and r for nonparametric tests. Nonparametric tests are less 
powerful but are distribution free and do not require normality assumptions (Kerlinger & 
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Lee, 2000, p. 415). This research leverages several nonparametric tests to augment the 
results of parametric tests.  
A. ANALYST TIME 
Hypotheses 1 and 5 predict that teamwork and ignorance will directionally affect 
analyst time. Supporting research questions listed in Table 14 (Q4–Q6, Q17, Q18, Q27– 
Q30) address these hypotheses by investigating the main and interactive effects of 
ignorance and teamwork with respect to analyst time. Each supporting research question 
accounts for demographic effects by evaluating blocking variables such as age, gender, 
education, and experience. The research includes tests for fixed effect by determining 
whether a scenario or expected outcome had a measurable effect on analyst time. 
1. Main Effects 
The experimental apparatus recorded time data as number of seconds elapsed 
from the time the entrance survey was complete to the time the participant initiated a 
“create case” action. The relationship between the independent and dependent variable 
levels (categorical and continuous, respectively) indicates that regression and ANOVA 
are appropriate to determine the difference between means (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000).  
a. Ignorance Effects 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that a lower level of ignorance will cause higher analyst 
time. Research question Q6 seeks to determine whether ignorance level significantly 
affects analyst time. ANOVA (p < .01) and regression analysis (p < .01) concur that there 
is a statistically significant difference between analyst time in high- and low-ignorance 
test groups. The regression analysis in Table 18 reveals a negative relationship between 
ignorance and time, i.e., as ignorance increases, analyst time decreases.  
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Table 18.   Regression Analysis—Time vs. Ignorance. 
Dependent variable: Time 
Regression Statistics 
  R-Squared (coefficient of determination) 0.4105 
Adjusted R-squared 
  
0.3977 
Multiple R (multiple correlation coefficient) 0.6407 
Standard error of the estimates (SEy) 298.1038 
Number of observations 
 
480000 
Regression Results  
 
  
Intercept Ignorance   
Coefficients 1167.2500 -487.0833 
Standard Error 60.8502 86.0551 
t-Statistic 
 
19.1824 -5.6601 
p-Value 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
Lower 5% 
 
1044.7649 -660.3034 
Upper 95% 1289.7351 -313.8633 
 
The R
2
 statistic reveals that variability in ignorance explains 41% of the 
variability in analyst time. The nonparametric counterpart for the one-way ANOVA test 
with two levels is the Mann–Whitney U (1947). The Mann–Whitney U test compares 
medians rather than means to accommodate outliers in small datasets. The results of the 
Mann–Whitney U test (p < .01) concur with the results of the ANOVA and regression 
analysis. Table 19 presents the results of this test. 
Table 19.   Mann–Whitney U Analysis—Time vs. Ignorance. 
Test Statisticsa 
 Time 
Mann–Whitney U 60.000 
Z -4.701 
Asymptomatic 
Significance (2-tailed) 
.000 
a Grouping: Ignorance 
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Although ignorance demonstrates a statistically significant effect, the magnitude 
of that effect allows comparison with the effects of other variables. The effect magnitude, 
or size, represents the influence that predictor variable manipulations have on dependent 
variables. The effect size estimate in Equation 3, r, is calculated using Z score and sample 
size N (Field, 2013, p. 227). Given sample size N and Z score, effect size is calculated as: 
𝑟 =
𝑍
√𝑁
     
Equation 3.Effect Size Estimate 
Following Cohen (1988), Field (2013, p. 82) categorizes effect power as small (r 
= .1), medium (r = .3), or large (r = .5). In the present experimental manipulation (time 
vs. ignorance), r is .679 with a negative ignorance correlation coefficient, indicating a 
large negative effect (low ignorance is coded as 0 and high ignorance as 1). This 
interpretation subscribes to Field’s classification of effect size to provide an objective 
effect-magnitude elucidation.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, individuals under conditions of a higher level of 
ignorance, or lack of information, will complete an ITA task in less time than individuals 
under conditions of lower ignorance. This finding is intuitive, because those dealing with 
a greater information-processing demand clearly require more time to process a greater 
information load. The less intuitive question is how teamwork affects this increase in 
information-processing load. Theories of specialization and process loss disagree on the 
time effects of distributing the information-processing load among multiple individuals. 
The following section demonstrates how teamwork affects analyst time. 
b. Teamwork Effects 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that teamwork will increase analyst time. Research question 
Q5 seeks to determine the magnitude and direction of the analyst time effects. ANOVA 
(p < .01) and regression analysis (p < .01) concur that there is a statistically significant 
difference in ITA processing time for those organized into teams or as individuals. The 
regression analysis in Table 20 reveals a positive relationship between teamwork and 
time, i.e., as teamwork increases, analyst time increases.  
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Table 20.   Regression Analysis—Time vs. Teamwork. 
  Dependent variable: Time 
Regression Statistics 
  R-squared (coefficient of determination) 0.2483 
Adjusted R-squared 
  
0.2320 
Multiple R (multiple correlation coefficient) 0.4983 
Standard error of the estimates (SEy) 336.6283 
Number of observations 
 
48.0000              
 
Regression Results 
 
  
Intercept Teamwork 
Coefficients 734.2917 378.8333 
Standard Error 68.7140 97.1762 
t-Statistic 
 
10.6862 3.8984 
p-Value 
 
0.0000 0.0003 
Lower 5% 
 
595.9776 183.2278 
Upper 95% 872.6057 574.4389 
 
The R
2
 statistic reveals that variability in teamwork explains 24% of the 
variability in analyst time. As stated in the previous section, the nonparametric 
counterpart for the one-way ANOVA test with two levels is the Mann–Whitney U test. 
The results of the Mann–Whitney test (p < .01) concur with the results of the ANOVA 
and regression analysis. Table 21 gives the results of the Mann–Whitney U test. 
Table 21.   Mann–Whitney U Analysis—Time vs. Teamwork. 
Test Statisticsa 
 Time 
Mann–Whitney U 120.000 
Z -3.464 
Asymptomatic 
Significance (2-tailed) 
.001 
a Grouping Variable: Teamwork 
Teamwork demonstrated a statistically significant effect. As stated previously, the 
effect size estimate, r, power is categorized as small (r = .1), medium (r = .3), or large (r = 
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.5). Specific to manipulations of teamwork (time vs. teamwork), r is .500 with a positive 
teamwork correlation coefficient, indicating a large positive effect. This interpretation is 
consistent with Field’s (2013) interpretation of effect size.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 5, individuals organized into horizontally specialized 
teams took more time to complete an ITA task than those organized individually. This 
finding is counterintuitive, because those organized into teams had four times the 
information-processing capacity than those organized as individuals. Furthermore, no 
debate or group decision making took place, because complete information was restricted 
to one person on the team, the ITA analyst. References were distributed equally (two 
each) among participants under both conditions of teamwork. However, results indicate 
that splitting the work between specialists results in higher analyst time. How much each 
condition of ignorance affects each condition of teamwork is the focus of the following 
section. 
2. Interactive Effects 
Research question Q4 asks whether teamwork and ignorance interact to affect 
analyst time. ANOVA (p > .1) indicates that there is no statistically significant difference 
in analyst time for those organized into teams under high- or low-ignorance conditions. 
The lack of interaction between teamwork and ignorance implies that an equal 
distribution of references between team members has a consistent effect under both 
conditions of ignorance. The finding also implies that increased references and, 
consequently, equally distributed additional persons to accommodate the load, will not 
yield a beneficial effect on analyst time. That is to say, any information-processing 
benefit realized by distributing the information load incurred a corresponding process 
loss. This finding is consistent with predictions implied by process-loss theory. The 
ANOVA results are illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Interactive Time Effects—Teamwork vs. Ignorance. 
 
3. Blocking Variable Effects 
This research evaluates the possible effects of demographics using a blocking 
technique. Research questions Q27–Q30 investigate the effects of age, gender, education, 
and experience, respectively, on analyst time. It is possible that chance groupings of 
certain demographics within certain test groups may create illusory correlations among 
the independent and dependent variables. Regression analysis indicates no statistically 
significant relationship between any blocking variables (age, gender, education, or 
experience) and analyst time. Thus, no variation in analyst time is explicable by age, 
gender, education, or experience. Regression analysis for the blocking variables is in 
Appendix E, Section H. 
4. Fixed Effects 
Research question Q17 investigates the presence of an experimental fixed effect. 
Properties of an experimental stimulus may have unexpected fixed effects. For instance, 
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if one scenario generally takes more time to complete than other scenarios, it would be 
difficult to objectively compare individual performances if the scenario itself accounts for 
a significant portion of variability in analyst time.  
ANOVA is an appropriate test because the independent variable, Scenario, is 
categorical and the order, 1–4, has no significance other than as a label (Kerlinger & Lee, 
2000, p. 313). The ANOVA among scenario groups shown in Table 22 suggests that 
there is no statistically significant analyst time difference (p > .1) among each of the four 
experimental scenarios. The results indicate that no experimentally fixed effect 
contributed to variability in analyst time. 
Table 22.   ANOVA Results—Time vs. Scenario. 
Tests of Effects Among Subjects 
Dependent Variable: Time 
 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 548592.083a 3 182864.028 1.260 .300 
Intercept 40955380.080 1 40955380.080 282.175 .000 
Scenario 548592.083 3 182864.028 1.260 .300 
Error 6386239.833 44 145141.814   
Total 47890212.000 48    
Corrected Total 6934831.917 47    
a R squared = .079 (adjusted R squared = .016) 
Analyst time follows a normal distribution, according to the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov (p > .1) and Shapiro–Wilk (p > .1) tests, but fails the homoscedasticity 
assumption, according to Levene’s test of equality of variances (p < .05). This implies 
that a nonparametric test is more appropriate to compare analyst time among scenarios. 
The Kruskal–Wallis test is a nonparametric analog for ANOVA with more than two 
categories (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 418). The Kruskal–Wallis test results (p > .1) 
concur with the ANOVA results (p > .1), indicating that the scenarios are generally equal 
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with respect to analyst time. Table 23 presents the results from the Kruskal–Wallis test, 
confirming the results from the ANOVA. 
Table 23.   Kruskal–Wallis Test—Time vs. Scenario. 
Test Statisticsa,b 
 Time 
Chi-square 2.342 
df 3.......     
Asymptomatic 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.505 
a Kruskal–Wallis test 
bGrouping variable: Scenario 
Research question Q18 probes whether the expected scenario outcome 
(implication vs. exoneration) has a significant effect on analyst time. Two scenarios had 
an expected implicative outcome and the other two had an expected exonerative outcome. 
The expected outcomes are similar to suspected guilt vs. innocence, respective to 
implication vs. exoneration, regardless of intent. Outcome is categorical; thus ANOVA is 
appropriate for comparing experimental effects among groups. Table 24 reveals that there 
is no statistically significant difference between scenario outcome and analyst time (p > 
.1). The results suggest that there is no experimentally fixed effect that contributes to 
variability in analyst time.  
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Table 24.   ANOVA—Time vs. Scenario Outcome. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Time 
 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected model 206981.333a 1 206981.333 1.415 .240 
Intercept 40955380.080 1 40955380.080 280.022 .000 
Outcome 206981.333 1 206981.333 1.415 .240 
Error 6727850.583 46 146257.621   
Total 47890212.000 48    
Corrected total 6934831.917 47    
a R squared = .030 (adjusted R squared = .009) 
A nonparametric ANOVA equivalent is appropriate because of a 
homoscedasticity assumption violation revealed by Levene’s test of equality of variances 
(p < .05). This implies that a nonparametric test is more appropriate to compare analyst 
time among scenarios. As noted, the nonparametric counterpart for the one-way ANOVA 
test with two levels is the Mann–Whitney U test. The results from the Mann–Whitney U 
test (Table 25) concur with the ANOVA results in Table 24. 
Table 25.   Mann–Whitney U Analysis—Time vs. Scenario Outcome.  
Test Statisticsa 
 Time 
Mann–Whitney U 248.000 
Z -.825 
Asymptomatic 
Significance (2-tailed) 
.409 
a Grouping variable: Outcome 
This analysis strongly implies that the scenario and scenario outcome did not 
contribute to variability in analyst time. Variations in ignorance and teamwork did, 
however, account for 65.8% of variability in analyst time (.410 and .248, respectively). 
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This analysis does not account for any accuracy benefits that may manifest at the cost of 
time. The following section investigates how ignorance and teamwork affect analyst 
accuracy.  
B. ANALYST ACCURACY 
Hypotheses 2 and 4 predict that teamwork and ignorance will directionally affect 
analyst accuracy. The supporting research questions in Table 14 (Q7–Q9, Q21, Q22, 
Q31–Q34) address these hypotheses by investigating the main and interactive effects of 
ignorance and teamwork with respect to analyst accuracy. Supporting research questions 
accounted for any demographic effects by evaluating blocking variables such as age, 
gender, education, and experience. This work tests for fixed effect by determining 
whether any scenario or expected outcome had a statistically significant effect on analyst 
accuracy. 
1. Main Effects 
Each participant in the four test groups evaluated a single scenario to determine 
whether an insider was a threat or not. analyst accuracy is coded 0 for incorrect and 1 for 
correct. The relationship between the predictor and dependent variable levels (which 
were both categorical) indicates that use of logistic regression is appropriate to determine 
the difference between means (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 809).  
a. Ignorance Effects 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that a higher level of ignorance will cause lower analyst 
accuracy. Research question Q9 asks whether ignorance level significantly affects analyst 
accuracy. Regression analysis (p > .01) and chi-squared testing (p > .1) concur that there 
is no statistically significant difference in analyst accuracy among high- and low-
ignorance test groups. A chi-squared test was appropriate because of the categorical 
nature of both the predictor and dependent variables (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 230). The 
test and regression-analysis results are in Appendix E, Section H. They do not support 
Hypothesis 2. 
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b. Teamwork Effects 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that teamwork will increase analyst accuracy. Research 
question Q8 seeks to determine the magnitude and direction of analyst time effects. 
Logistic-regression analysis (p < .1) and chi-squared testing (p < .1) concur that there is a 
small but statistically significant difference in analyst accuracy for those organized into 
teams vs. individuals. The regression analysis in Table 26 reveals a small positive 
relationship between teamwork and accuracy, i.e., teams are slightly more accurate than 
individuals. 
Table 26.   Logistic Regression Analysis—Accuracy vs. Teamwork. 
Dependent Variable: Accuracy 
Regression Results           
Log Likelihood  Value 27.1141   Approach Logit   
              
  Variable   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Z-
Statistic p-Value 
      0.3367 0.4140 0.8133 0.4161 
  
Teamwork    1.2726 0.6866 1.8535 0.0638 
 
Consistent with other findings in this dissertation, I use nonparametric tests to 
confirm results from parametric tests. A parametric analog for logistic regression with 
categorical predictor and dependent variables is the chi-squared test. Table 27 presents 
the results of the chi-squared test. 
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Table 27.   Chi-Squared Test—Accuracy vs. Teamwork. 
 
The effect magnitude, or size, represents the influence that predictor variable 
manipulations have on dependent variables. Phi is a measure of the strength of 
association among variables in a chi-squared test. Phi (𝜑) is calculated using a chi-
squared (X
2
) score and sample size n (Field, 2013, p. 740). Given n and X
2
, effect size is 
calculated in Equation 4 as: 
𝜑 = √
𝑋2
𝑛
    
Equation 4.  Phi 
Following Cohen (1988), Field (2013, p. 82) categorizes effect power as small (𝜑 
= .1), medium (𝜑 = .3) and large (𝜑 = .5). In the present experimental manipulation 
(analyst time vs. ignorance), 𝜑 is .275, indicating a small effect. The crosstab in Table 28 
shows the relationship between teamwork and accuracy. 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact 
Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson chi-square 3.630a 1 .057   
Continuity correction 2.521 1 .112   
Likelihood ratio 3.721 1 .054   
Fisher’s exact test    .111 .055 
Linear-by-linear 
association 
3.555 1 .059 
  
N of valid cases 48     
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Table 28.   Cross Tabulation—Accuracy vs. Teamwork. 
 
Teamwork 
Total None Specialized 
Accuracy Incorrect 10 (41.6%) 4 (16.6%) 14 
Correct 14 (58.3%) 20 (83.3%) 34 
Total 24 24 48 
 
Individuals who performed ITA while organized into teams were more accurate 
than those organized as individuals—83% vs. 58% respectively, a difference of 25%. 
Supporting Hypothesis 4, the results indicate that ITA analysts organized into teams 
perform with greater accuracy than those organized individually.  
2. Interactive Effects 
Research question Q7 asks whether teamwork and ignorance interact to affect 
analyst accuracy. ANOVA (p > .1) indicates that there is no statistically significant 
interaction between ignorance and teamwork that affects analyst accuracy. The ANOVA 
results supporting Q7 are found in Appendix E. 
3. Blocking Variable Effects 
Research questions Q31–Q34 investigate the effects of age, gender, education, 
and experience on analyst accuracy. Owing to the low sample size, chance groupings of 
participants that have specific demographic characteristics may contribute to some 
variability in analyst accuracy, leading to illusory correlations. The regression analysis in 
Table 29 indicates a small relationship between gender and analyst accuracy (p < .1).  
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Table 29.   Logistic Regression Analysis—Accuracy vs. Age, Gender, Education, 
and Experience. 
Dependent Variable: Accuracy 
Regression Results           
Log Likelihood  Value -25.586   Approach Logit   
              
  Variable   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Z-
Statistic p-Value 
      0.4870 1.3146 0.3704 0.7111 
  Age   -0.0557 0.0358 -1.5542 0.1201 
  Gender   1.3960 0.7897 1.7678 0.0771 
  Education   1.0282 0.6753 1.5227 0.1278 
  
Experience   -0.0241 0.0679 -0.3551 0.7225 
 
Research question Q32 specifically addresses the relationship between analyst 
accuracy and gender by removing all noise variables to test the specific relationship. The 
logistic regression results in Table 30 suggest no statistically significant relationship 
between gender and analyst accuracy. As a result, the findings indicate that the selected 
demographics had no effect on analyst accuracy. 
Table 30.   Logistic Regression Analysis—Accuracy vs. Gender. 
Results             
Log Likelihood  Value -27.7332    Approach Logit   
              
  Variable   Coefficients Standard Error Z-Statistic p-Value 
      0.0018 0.6325 0.0029 0.9977 
  
Gender   1.1673 0.7386 1.5805 0.1140 
 
 
4. Fixed Effects 
This research produced some unexpected findings as to how scenario outcomes 
affect analyst accuracy. Research question Q21 investigates whether an experimental 
fixed effect is present. The experimental stimulus may explain some of the variability in 
analyst accuracy. For instance, if a specific scenario is more likely to result in a correct 
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answer, it would be difficult to compare individual performance objectively, because the 
scenario itself would explain a significant portion of variability in analyst accuracy.  
Logistic regression is an appropriate test because both the independent variable, 
Scenario, and the dependent variable, analyst accuracy, are categorical. The logistic 
regression suggests that there is no statistically significant analyst accuracy difference (p 
> .1) among the four experimental scenarios. The results from the logistic regression did 
not concur with results from a chi-square test under the same conditions of analyst 
accuracy and scenario. The chi-squared test indicated a small (p < .1) difference among 
groups; the results from the logistic regression and chi-squared tests are in Appendix E. 
There was a moderate effect (𝜑 .377) indicating that participants were not equally 
accurate across all scenarios. The crosstab in Table 31 shows that no participant 
submitted an incorrect insider threat assessment for Scenario 2.  
Table 31.   Cross Tabulation—Accuracy vs. Scenario. 
 
Scenario (Expected Outcome) 
Total 
1 
(Exonerate) 
2  
(Implicate) 
3 
(Exonerate) 
4 
(Implicate) 
Accuracy Incorrect 5 (41.6%) 0 (0%) 5 (41.6%) 4 (33.3%) 14 
(29.1%) 
Correct 7 (58.3%) 12 (100%) 7 (58.3%) 8 (66.6%) 34 
(70.9%) 
Total 12 12 12 12 48 
 
Scenario 2 was the only scenario describing a malicious insider threat. The 
remaining scenario accuracy scores were more evenly distributed. Those assigned to the 
four experimental groups evaluated Scenario 2 three times, and all twelve responded 
correctly each time—so the accuracy effect is equal across all experimental groups. Thus, 
there is no chance that experimental bias threatened the validity of the analyst accuracy 
score among experimental groups. 
Research question Q22 investigates the possible effects of scenario outcome. 
With exonerative outcomes coded 0 and implicative outcomes, 1, logistic regression 
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indicates that scenario outcome has an effect on analyst accuracy. According to the 
logistic regression in Table 32, there is a small, statistically significant scenario-outcome 
effect (p < .1).  
Table 32.   Regression Analysis—Scenario Outcome vs. Accuracy. 
Dependent Variable: Accuracy 
Results      
Log Likelihood  Value  -27.1141 Approach Logit   
              
  Variable 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error Z-Statistic p-Value 
  Scenario   0.3367 0.4140 0.8133 0.4161 
  Outcome   1.2726 0.6866 1.8535 0.0638 
 
A chi-squared test under the same conditions concurs that scenario outcome has a 
small significant effect (p < .1). The magnitude of the effect was also small (𝜑 = .275), 
indicating that scenario outcome (exoneration or implication) had a small effect on 
accuracy. The results from the chi-square test are in Appendix E, Section H. Participants 
were more likely to interpret implicative scenarios correctly over exonerative scenarios. 
However, this finding is affected by Scenario 2 fixed effects, in which participants 
correctly implicated the suspect in all twelve trials. Table 33 provides a cross tabulation 
of analyst accuracy vs. scenario outcome.   
Table 33.   Cross Tabulation—Accuracy vs. Scenario Outcome. 
 
Expected Outcome 
Total Exonerate Implicate 
Accuracy Incorrect 10 
(41.7%) 
4 
(16.7%) 
14 
(29.2%) 
Correct 14 
(58.3%) 
20 
(83.3%) 
34 
(70.8%) 
Total 24 24 48 
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Participants assessed exonerative scenarios with 58% accuracy, but implicative 
scenarios with 83% accuracy, a difference of 25%. This is interesting because 
participants were marginally better than chance when performing a threat assessment on 
an innocent person, but far better at identifying a true insider threat. Furthermore, all 
participants obtained express instructions that they were not to err on the side of caution, 
because an incorrect response would cost them the Silver Eagle prize. All participants 
were equipped with adjudicative guidelines and current on mandatory insider threat 
training, yet implicated an innocent person in 41.7% of trials. 
The experimental data suggests teamwork causes higher accuracy, but this boost 
comes at the cost of time. ITA teams require, on average, 65% more time assessing 
insider threats than individuals under the same conditions of ignorance. The following 
section combines analyst accuracy and time into a single performance measure for an 
objective comparison of the experimental groups. 
C. ANALYST PERFORMANCE 
Taken together, the experimental support for hypotheses 4 and 5 indicates that 
teamwork increases analyst accuracy, at the cost of time. Following Jaquith (2009), this 
dissertation defines performance as accuracy within a certain time. Supporting research 
questions listed in Table 14 (Q1–Q3, Q19, Q20, Q35–Q38) seek to inform which 
experimental condition provides the greatest analyst performance. Table 34 presents 
descriptive statistics for each experimental group. The data that informed Table 34 is in 
Appendix E (A). 
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Table 34.   Descriptive Statistics—Time, Accuracy, and Performance. 
 Ignorance 
T
e
a
m
w
o
rk
 
S
p
e
c
ia
liz
e
d
 
High Low 
Time 
     Mean: 842.83 
     Median: 805.5  
     Score:            58.3% 
Accuracy:               75% 
Performance:      66.6% 
Time 
     Mean: 1383.41 
     Median: 1277      
     Score:              31.5% 
Accuracy:                91% 
Performance:          61% 
N
o
n
e
 
Time 
     Mean: 517.5 
     Median: 501.5 
     Score:            74.4% 
Accuracy:               74% 
Performance:      62.2% 
Time 
     Mean: 951.08 
     Median: 842 
     Score:                 52% 
Accuracy:                66% 
Performance:        59.8% 
 
The chart indicates that analysts under conditions of no teamwork and high 
ignorance resulted in the best time, but analysts under conditions of teamwork and low 
ignorance resulted in highest accuracy. Analysts under conditions of both teamwork and 
high ignorance, however, resulted in the highest performance. The results combined into 
a single performance metric were not as significant, because there was little variability in 
analyst performance among the experimental groups.  
The research questions also address any interactive effects of ignorance and 
teamwork on analyst performance. The supporting research questions account for 
demographic effects by blocking variables that include age, gender, education, and 
experience. The research included tests for fixed effect by determining if any scenario or 
expected outcome had a measurable effect on analyst performance. 
1. Main Effects 
As discussed in Chapter IV, accuracy and the time required to perform ITA 
together define analyst performance. Analyst performance scores range along a 
continuum from 0 to 2; participants who take no time to get the correct answer receive a 
2 and he who takes the longest time to get an incorrect answer receives a 0. The nature of 
the predictor and dependent variables (categorical and ratio, respectively) indicate that 
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ANOVA and regression analysis are appropriate statistical analysis methods (Kerlinger & 
Lee, 2000).  
a. Ignorance Effects 
Research question Q3 investigates how ignorance affects performance. Ignorance 
had a large effect on analyst time, but no significant effect on accuracy. Regression 
analysis reveals no significant difference in performance between the conditions of 
ignorance (p > .1), while the Mann–Whitney U test reveals a slightly significant 
difference (p < .1). The effect magnitude (r = -.23) indicates a small negative effect 
between ignorance and performance. Low ignorance is coded 0 and high ignorance, 1. 
Note that accuracy was relatively unchanged by either condition of ignorance, so the 
relationship between performance and ignorance is best explained by the magnitude of 
the relationship between analyst time and ignorance, as discussed previously. 
Field (2013, p. 379) emphasizes the importance of error bars for visualizing 
differences among dependent variables under various experimental conditions. I 
transform both the analyst time and performance scores to a scale from 0 to 1. The 
transform presents lower analyst time as a higher time score and, similarly, higher 
performance results in a higher performance score. The error bar chart in Figure 2 
illustrates the 95% confidence intervals around the means of analyst time and 
performance transforms, relative to the two conditions of ignorance.  
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Figure 2.  Error Bar Chart—Time and Performance vs. Ignorance. 
 
The error bars in Figure 2 suggest that whatever time benefits (solid lines) that 
conditions of high ignorance produced came at a nearly equivalent cost of accuracy. 
Likewise, whatever accuracy benefit low ignorance produced came at a nearly equivalent 
cost of time. As a result, performance (dotted lines) under both conditions was relatively 
unchanged. 
b. Teamwork Effects 
Research question Q2 investigates how teamwork affects performance. 
Teamwork had a small effect on accuracy and a large effect on analyst time. However, 
regression analysis and Mann–Whitney U reveal no significant difference in analyst 
performance between the two conditions of teamwork (p > .1). The results of the analysis 
are given in Appendix B. Using the same time and performance transform discussed in 
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the previous section, Figure 3 presents the 95% confidence intervals around the means of 
analyst time and performance transforms, relative to the two conditions of teamwork.  
Figure 3.  Error Bar Chart—Time and Performance vs. Teamwork. 
 
The error bars in Figure 3 suggest that whatever time benefits (solid lines) that 
conditions of no teamwork produced came at a nearly equivalent cost of accuracy. 
Similarly, whatever accuracy benefit specialized teamwork produced came at a nearly 
equivalent cost of time. As a result, performance (dotted lines) under both conditions was 
relatively unchanged. 
2. Interactive Effects 
Research question Q1 seeks to determine whether teamwork and ignorance 
interact to affect analyst performance. ANOVA (p > .1) indicates that there is no 
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statistically significant interaction between ignorance and teamwork that affected analyst 
performance. The ANOVA results that support Q1 are in Appendix E. The results were 
as expected, since there were negligible analyst performance effects under either 
condition of teamwork and either condition of ignorance. 
3. Blocking Variable Effects 
Research questions Q35–Q38 investigate whether demographics affect analyst 
performance. Consistent with the findings from regressions in the previous two sections, 
demographics had no effect on analyst performance (p > .1). The results from the 
regression analysis are in Appendix B.  
4. Fixed Effects 
Research question Q19 investigates whether an experimental fixed effect is 
present in the scenario stimulus. According to regression analysis, scenario has no effect 
on performance (p > .1) However, a Kruskal–Wallis test revealed a statistically 
significant difference in analyst performance among scenarios (p < .1) and a medium 
effect size (𝜑 = .381). The previously noted fixed effect with Scenario 2 and the planned 
correlation between analyst accuracy and performance explains the small performance 
effect. As stated previously, the accuracy effect is equal across all experimental groups. 
Thus, no experimental bias threatened the validity of the analyst performance score 
among experimental groups. Table 35 presents the results of the Kruskal–Wallis test, 
showing a marginally significant difference among scenarios.  
Table 35.   Kruskal–Wallis Test—Scenario vs. Performance. 
Test Statisticsa,b 
 Performance 
Chi-square 6.975 
df 3 
Asymp. sig. .073 
a Kruskal Wallis Test 
b Grouping variable: Scenario 
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Research question Q20 tests the effect that expected outcome has on analyst 
performance. It is interesting to note that the scenario fixed effect was not present in a 
similar test of scenario outcome. ANOVA (p > .1), regression (p > .1), and Mann–
Whitney U (p > .1) analysis concur that performance is generally the same among 
implicative- and exonerative-outcome groups.  
D. INFORMATION OVERLOAD PERCEPTION 
Hypothesis 7 predicts that teamwork and ignorance will interact to affect the 
perception of information overload. Supporting research questions listed in Table 14 
(Q13–Q15, Q25, Q26, Q43–Q46) address this hypothesis by investigating the main and 
interactive effects of ignorance and teamwork with respect to the perception of 
information overload. The supporting research questions account for any demographic 
effects by evaluating blocking variables such as age, gender, education, and experience. 
This research tests for fixed effect by determining whether each scenario or expected 
outcome has a statistically significant effect on the perception of information overload. 
This work did not limit the time available for ITA, so if Shick et al. (1990) are 
correct, perceptions of information overload should remain unchanged when the 
information load increases, but is evenly distributed among additional people. Chewing 
and Harrell’s (1990) cuing theory posits that the cues within information processed 
simultaneously will affect information overload, regardless of time constraints. ANOVA 
is useful for evaluating interactive effects.  
1. Main Effects 
The experimental apparatus recorded the perception of information overload by 
means of a web survey presented to each participant at the conclusion of ITA. The survey 
is adapted from Soucek & Moser (2010). Survey items measure information overload on 
a nine-point scale with 1 representing no information overload and 9 representing high 
information overload. This research does not include main-effects hypotheses, because it 
is well documented and intuitive principle that more information will result in higher 
perceptions of information overload, all else being equal. Hypothesis 1 produced 
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convincing confirmatory evidence because of the analyst time increase that accompanied 
information increases.  
a. Ignorance Effects 
Research question Q15 asks whether information-overload perceptions increase as 
information increases under conditions of unlimited time. Schick’s (1990) temporal 
approach to information overload predicts it will not. Chewing and Harrell’s (1990) 
cueing approach, however, argues that the number of cues is an information-overload 
factor. If Chewing and Harrell are right, the results should demonstrate an increased 
perception of information overload under conditions of low ignorance. (Recall that low-
ignorance participants were required to process twice the number of references as high-
ignorance participants.) 
Results from both regression (p > .1) and Mann–Whitney U (p > .1) concur that 
there is no statistically significant difference in the perception of information overload 
between groups of high and low ignorance (see test results in Appendix E). The test 
results strongly indicate that a time constraint is a necessary component for the 
perception of information overload, supporting Schick’s temporal approach. 
b. Teamwork Effects 
Research question Q14 answers the question, “does coordination overhead 
contribute to perceptions of information overload?” Steiner’s (1972) work on process-
loss theory predicts that the “coordination links” between people in a communicating 
system will contribute to process loss. The present test seeks to determine whether the 
coordination overhead contributes to a perception of information overload.  
Results from both regression (p > .1) and Mann–Whitney U (p > .1) concur that 
there is no statistically significant difference in the perception of information overload 
between teamwork conditions.  
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2. Interactive Effects 
Research question Q13 investigates the interactive effects that teamwork and 
ignorance have on perceptions of information overload. ANOVA indicates a significant 
interaction (p < .1) between ignorance and teamwork affecting the perception of 
information overload. Table 36 presents the results of the test. 
Table 36.   ANOVA Results—Teamwork vs. Ignorance per Information 
Overload. 
Tests of Effects Among Subjects 
Dependent Variable: InfoOvld   
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power
b
 
Corrected 
Model 
6.563
a
 3 2.188 1.652 .191 .101 4.957 .403 
Intercept 180.188 1 180.188 136.107 .000 .756 136.107 1.000 
Teamwork .188 1 .188 .142 .708 .003 .142 .066 
Ignorance 1.688 1 1.688 1.275 .265 .028 1.275 .197 
Teamwork 
* Ignorance 
4.688 1 4.688 3.541 .067 .074 3.541 .453 
Error 58.250 44 1.324      
Total 245.000 48       
Corrected 
Total 
64.813 47 
      
a R squared = .101 (adjusted R squared = .040) 
b Computed using alpha = .05 
I leverage a bootstrap simulation technique to provide statistical sampling, 
exploiting the computational capacity of software (Law & Kelton, 1991). Nonparametric 
bootstrap simulation gives the data statistical power to use ANOVA to present interactive 
effects. Nonparametric bootstrap simulation is a nonparametric analog to Monte Carlo 
simulation (Mun, 2015, p. 94).  
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Using Risk Simulator (Mun, 2015), I performed a nonparametric bootstrap 
simulation with 100 trials per test condition (400 additional trials) with seed value set to 
1. The simulation results meet the normality assumption because “if the size of the 
sample, n, is sufficiently large (no less than thirty; preferably no less than 50), then the 
central limit theorem will apply, even if the population is not normally distributed along 
variable x” (Sirkin, 1999, p. 245). The central limit theorem states, “if samples are drawn 
from a population at random, the means of the samples will tend to be normally 
distributed” (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 286).  
The findings of an ANOVA on the simulated data concur with the results from the 
ANOVA performed on the original dataset. The ANOVA results using simulated data 
reveal a statistically significant interaction between ignorance and teamwork (f = 30.75, p 
< .01). The results of the ANOVA based on bootstrap simulation data are found in 
Appendix E, Section H. Field (2013, p. 473) stress that partial eta squared as shown in the 
SPSS ANOVA output is slightly biased and recommend omega squared (ω
2
) as the 
appropriate effect-size measure. Equation 5 is the omega-squared calculation formula, 
such that MS is mean square, df is degree of freedom, and SS is sum of squares.  
𝜔2 =
𝑑𝑓𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑀𝑆𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 − 𝑀𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 +  𝑀𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
         
Equation 5. Omega-Squared Calculation Formula 
 
According to Field (2013, p.474), the ω
2
 values of .01, .06, and .14 are small, 
medium, and large, respectively. The interaction between ignorance and teamwork 
demonstrated a small effect size (ω
2
 = .017) respective to Field’s interpretation. This 
finding supports Hypothesis 7. Figure 4 depicts the interaction between teamwork and 
ignorance. 
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Figure 4.  Interactive Information Overload Effects—Teamwork vs. 
Ignorance. 
 
 
The interaction between teamwork and ignorance is best explained by variation in 
the number of persons used to distribute the information load under each condition of 
teamwork. In an effort to create a fair test between conditions of teamwork, participants 
were limited to two references each. As a result, participants under conditions of low 
ignorance and no teamwork evaluated eight references each and participants under 
conditions of low ignorance and horizontally specialized teamwork evaluated two 
references each. Teammates processed the remaining references, at two per person. The 
decreased perception of information overload under these conditions is intuitive.  
Conditions of high ignorance, however, resulted in the opposite effect. 
Participants assigned high ignorance processed four references when not assigned 
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teamwork and two references when assigned teamwork. It is counterintuitive that 
perceptions of information overload should increase when information-processing 
demands are halved. Yet this perception increased above the perception of information 
overload for those who were assigned teamwork and collectively processed twice as 
many references. One possible explanation is the Ringlemann effect, which I measured as 
the perception of social impact. I test for variability in social impact in Section F. 
3. Blocking Variable Effects 
Research questions Q43–Q46 investigate whether demographics have an effect on 
the perception of information overload. Consistent with the findings from regressions in 
the previous three sections, demographics had no effect on analyst performance (p > .1). 
The results from the regression analysis are in Appendix B (E).  
4. Fixed Effects  
Research question Q25 asks whether an experimental fixed effect is present in the 
scenario stimulus. Regression analysis (p > .1) and the Kruskal–Wallis test (p > .1) 
concur that scenario had no effect on performance. Similarly, Q26 investigates whether 
scenario outcome has any effect on the perception of information overload, and 
regression analysis (p > .1) and the Mann–Whitney U test (p > .1) concur it has none. The 
following section investigates whether perceptions of social impact explain some of the 
interaction between teamwork and ignorance.  
E. SOCIAL-IMPACT PERCEPTION 
Hypothesis 8 predicts that a lower level of ignorance will cause higher 
perceptions of social impact. The supporting research questions in Table 14 (Q16, Q47–
Q50) seek to inform as to which experimental condition provides the greatest analyst 
performance. The experimental apparatus recorded the perception of social impact from 
those organized into teams via a web survey presented to each participant at the 
conclusion of ITA. The survey instrument for perception of social impact derives from 
Mulvey & Klein’s (1998) work on collective efficacy and group process and 
performance. The survey item measures the perception of a negative social impact on a 
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nine-point scale, with 1 representing no negative social impact and 9 representing high 
negative social impact.  
1. Main Effects 
The social impact survey item specifically states “I rushed through the task 
because I was considerate of my teammates’ time” and asks how much each participant 
agrees. I leveraged no additional survey items to measure how each participant evaluated 
his teammates’ social impact, because such an evaluation is subjective by nature and the 
participant cannot measure how a teammate truly feels. Instead, I focused on how the 
participant perceived social impacts relative to himself. 
Research question Q16 poses the question “does ignorance affect perceptions of 
social impact?” Results from both ANOVA (p > .1) and Mann–Whitney U (p > .1) 
concur that there is no statistically significant difference in the perception of social 
impact under either condition of ignorance. The statistical results are in Appendix B. 
Thus, there is no support for Hypothesis 8. This assessment did not include social-impact 
effects under conditions of no teamwork, because some participants performed ITA under 
conditions of no teamwork, as individuals; thus, no social impact was possible.  
2. Blocking Variable Effects 
Research questions Q47–Q50 probe the effects of demographics on perceived 
social impact. Regression analysis indicates that there is no relationship between 
demographics and social impact (p > .1). The results of the regression analysis are 
provided in Appendix B.  
F. CONFIDENCE 
Analyst confidence is a measure roughly analogous to the tendency to guess 
during ITA. The assumption is that the assessments of participants who are not confident 
in their ITA are no better than chance. Hypotheses 3 and 6 predict that teamwork and 
ignorance will directionally affect analyst confidence. Supporting research questions 
listed in Table 14 (Q10–Q12, Q23, Q24, Q39–Q42) address these hypotheses by 
investigating the main and interactive effects of ignorance and teamwork with respect to 
 129 
analyst confidence. Supporting research questions accounted for any demographic effects 
by evaluating blocking variables such as age, gender, education, and experience. The 
research includes tests for fixed effect by determining if each scenario or expected 
outcome affected analyst confidence. 
1. Main Effects 
The experimental apparatus recorded analyst confidence with a web survey 
presented to each participant at the conclusion of ITA. The confidence survey asks the 
participant how much he agrees with the statement “I feel confident that my threat 
assessment is correct.” The survey item measures the response on a nine-point scale, with 
1 representing low confidence and 9 representing high confidence. 
a. Ignorance Effects 
Research question Q12 investigates whether ignorance affects analyst confidence. 
Results from both regression (p > .1) and Mann–Whitney U (p > .1) concur that there is 
no statistically significant difference in analyst confidence based on condition of 
ignorance. The statistical results are in Appendix B, showing that Q12 does not support 
Hypothesis 3.  
b. Teamwork Effects 
Research question Q11 asks how teamwork affects analyst confidence. Results 
from both regression (p > .1) and Mann–Whitney U (p > .1) concur that there is no 
statistically significant difference in analyst confidence based on condition of teamwork. 
The statistical results are in Appendix B. Research question Q11 offers no support for 
Hypothesis 6.  
2. Interactive Effects 
Research question Q10 tests whether teamwork and ignorance interactively affect 
analyst confidence. ANOVA results suggest there is no evidence of interaction between 
teamwork and ignorance (p > .1). The statistical results are in Appendix E. 
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3. Blocking Variable Effects 
Research questions Q39–Q42 evaluate how demographics affect analyst 
confidence. analyst confidence is the only dependent variable for which the statistical 
tests provided evidence suggesting an effect. The regression analysis in Table 37 
indicates that education level has a moderately significant positive effect on analyst 
confidence (p < .5). The results from a regression analysis model specifically addressing 
the relationship between education and analyst confidence are in Appendix E, Section H. 
Table 37.   Regression Analysis—Analyst Confidence vs. Age, Gender, 
Education, and Experience. 
Dependent Variable: Confidence 
Regression Statistics     
R-squared (coefficient of determination) 0.1359 
Adjusted R-squared     0.0555 
Multiple R (multiple correlation coefficient) 0.3686 
Standard error of the estimates (SEy) 1.1575 
Number of observations   48 
  
Regression Results         
    Intercept Age Gender Education Experience 
Coefficients 6.5898 -0.0167 0.0153 0.7489 0.0322 
Standard Error 0.7211 0.0179 0.4216 0.3097 0.0306 
t-Statistic   9.1383 -0.9299 0.0362 2.4179 1.0492 
p-Value   0.0000 0.3576 0.9713 0.0199 0.3000 
Lower 5%   5.1355 -0.0528 -0.8349 0.1243 -0.0297 
Upper 95% 8.0441 0.0195 0.8654 1.3735 0.0940 
 
The correlation’s statistical significance may be partly explained by the 
disproportionate number of participants who held bachelor’s and master’s degrees, 
relative to those with doctorates and postdoctoral degrees. To account for this, I evaluate 
the effect size with Cohen’s f
2
 formula, presented in Equation 6. 
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𝑓2 =  
𝑅2
1 − 𝑅2
 
Equation 6. Cohen’s f
2
 Formula 
Following Cohen’s (1988, p. 74) guidelines, f
2
 effect sizes of .1, .25, and .5 are 
small to medium, medium to large, and very large, respectively. Regression analysis thus 
indicates that education has a small effect on analyst confidence (f
2
 = .1572). The 
Kruskal–Wallis test did not concur with the regression-analysis results and suggests that 
education had no effect on analyst confidence (p > .1). The results of the Kruskal–Wallis 
test are in Appendix E, Section H. 
4. Fixed Effects 
Recall the substantial effect that scenario had on accuracy, specifically, scenario 
outcome. Participants performing ITA were generally more accurate in implicative than 
exonerative scenarios. Research questions Q23 and Q24 evaluate how confident 
participants were in performing ITA on each scenario and assess differences in analyst 
confidence among scenario outcomes. The research questions seek to explain why analyst 
accuracy was not much better than chance when participants were presented scenarios 
with exoneration outcomes. Research question Q21 and Q22 provided evidence that an 
experimental fixed effect is present in exonerative scenarios. If accuracy was not much 
better than chance, owing to guesswork, then confidence should be significantly lower in 
exoneration-scenario outcomes than implicative scenario.  
Research question Q23 seeks to determine whether analyst confidence 
significantly differed between scenarios. Regression is an appropriate test because the 
independent variable, scenario, is categorical and the dependent variable, analyst 
confidence, is ordinal. The regression results suggest no statistically significant analyst 
accuracy difference (p > .1) among the four experimental scenarios. The results from the 
logistic regression did not concur with results from a Kruskal–Wallis test under the same 
conditions of analyst confidence and scenario. The Kruskal–Wallis test indicates a large 
(p < .01) difference between groups. The regression result is in Appendix E, Section H; 
Table 38 presents the Kruskal–Wallis test result.  
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Table 38.   Kruskal-Wallis Test—Confidence vs. Scenario. 
Test Statistics
a,b
 
 Confidence 
Chi-Square 12.123 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. .007 
a
Kruskal Wallis Test
  
b
Grouping Variable: Scenario 
 
The test results indicate that scenario had a large effect on analyst confidence (𝜑 
.502), implying that participants were not equally confident across all scenarios. As 
established previously, scenario outcome had a small effect on analyst accuracy, such that 
those performing ITA scenarios with an exonerative outcome were generally less 
accurate than those performing ITA on implicative scenarios.  
Research question Q24 investigates how scenario outcome affects analyst 
confidence. Regression analysis reveals a significant correlation between analyst 
confidence and scenario outcome (p < .01). Table 39 presents the results of the 
regression. 
Table 39.   Regression Analysis—Confidence vs. Scenario Outcome. 
Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.2813 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.2656 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.5303 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 1.0206 
Number of Observations   48 
 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Outcome 
Coefficients 6.5417 1.2500 
Standard error 0.2083 0.2946 
t-statistic   31.4000 4.2426 
p-value   0.0000 0.0001 
Lower 5%   6.1223 0.6569 
Upper 95% 6.9610 1.8431 
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The Mann–Whitney U results in Table 40 strongly suggest a positive relationship 
between scenario outcome and analyst confidence (p < .01). Recall that the exonerative 
scenario outcomes are coded 0 and implicative scenario outcomes are coded 1. Mann–
Whitney and regression analysis concur that participants are more likely to be confident 
with their assessment when evaluating implicative scenarios than exonerative scenarios. 
Following Cohen’s (1988) guidelines, the effect size was medium (𝜑 = .499). 
Table 40.   Mann–Whitney Test—Confidence vs. Scenario Outcome. 
Test Statisticsa 
 Confidence 
Mann–Whitney U 125.500 
Z -3.463 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
aGrouping Variable: Outcome 
 
The findings strongly suggest that participants were more likely to guess when 
presented an exonerative outcome than an implicative outcome. Recall that the analyst 
accuracy test results indicated that participants who performed ITA on exonerative 
scenarios achieved little better than chance. The scenario-outcome test results strongly 
suggest that participants were more likely to be little better than chance with exonerative 
scenarios because they were more likely to guess in such a case. 
Taken all together, participants did little better than chance when performing ITA 
on exonerative outcomes. Although it was not in the original research design, an 
evaluation of which conditions are best for analyst accuracy, specific to exonerations, is 
offered. Lacking sufficient sample size for predictive statistics, I use descriptive statistics 
to evaluate the relationship between teamwork and accuracy. Participants organized as 
individuals under high- and low-ignorance conditions were, on average, 33% and 50% 
accurate, respectively. Those organized in specialized teams under high- and low-
ignorance conditions were, on average, 66% and 83% accurate, respectively. Thus, 
individuals organized in specialized teams were better than chance at ITA when limited 
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to exonerative outcomes. In other words, higher ignorance resulted in greater likelihood 
of implicating an innocent than exonerating a genuinely threatening insider. 
G. DISCUSSION 
This chapter reviews the statistical evidence suggesting that the accuracy and 
promptitude  of insider threat analysts are controllable by varying the structure of 
teamwork to accommodate the level of ignorance specific to environmental constraints. 
In support of Hypothesis 4, participants organized in specialized teams were marginally 
more accurate than those organized as individuals (Z=1.853, p=.063, r=.267; X
2
 = 3.63, p 
= .057, φ = .275). This boost in accuracy however, came at a cost in time. Planned 
contrasts strongly support Hypothesis 5, indicating that organizing participants into 
specialized teams significantly increases the time of ITA compared to participants 
working individually (F(1,46)=15.198, p=.000, R
2
adj=.232; U = 67.5, p = .001, r = .679). 
The evidence strongly supports Steiner’s process-loss theory as it applies to insider threat 
analysis. 
I introduce a metric for ITA that evaluates performance as a function of accuracy 
within a given period of time. The performance score evaluated participants benchmarked 
off each other, but did not reveal a statistically significant difference between groups. The 
results concur with the NITTF conclusion that small ITA programs with minimal budget 
can perform as well as large, well-funded programs. This experiment demonstrates how 
that counterintuitive observation is possible. 
Recall that there was no group decision making because only one person, the 
insider threat analyst, had all the information needed to make a decision and could not 
discuss this information with the team. Furthermore, information was specific to each 
team member, so there was no information-processing redundancy. Regardless, 
individuals with the same information consistently outperformed teams in analyst time, at 
the expense of accuracy. Whereas participants performed ITA with no time limit, 
according to Simon’s theory of bounded rationality, people naturally operate within 
temporal constraints. Depending on environmental time constraints, information overload 
will increase (Schick et al., 1990) and become a problem for proper ITA (Cappelli, et al., 
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2012, p. 196; Garst & Gross, 1997), implying increased misattributions or lower analyst 
accuracy.  
Teamwork and ignorance interactively affected the perception of information 
overload, according to the participants. Planned contrasts using simulated data revealed 
an interaction between ignorance and teamwork (F(1,44)=3.541, p=.067, R
2
adj=.040; 
F(1,444)=30.752, p=.000, R
2
adj=.076) that affected perceptions of information overload. 
The results suggest that specialized teamwork decreases information overload perception 
in low-ignorance environments, but increases the information-overload perception in 
high-ignorance environments. The results are consistent with Tushman and Nadler’s 
(1979) theory of organizations as information processors and supports Hypothesis 7. This 
research indicates that varying conditions of information and organization can result in 
more optimal ITA, depending on the measure of interest, accuracy, or promptitude. 
Tests intended to validate the equality of the scenario stimulus produced some 
unexpected results with strong implications for ITA. The scenario outcome (i.e., 
exoneration or implication) strongly affect accuracy. The findings indicate that 
participants are fairly accurate when evaluating an implicative scenario but perform little 
better than chance in an exonerative scenario. Participants organized in teams under 
conditions of high and low ignorance resulted in considerably higher accuracy (.66 and 
.83, respectively) than participants organized as individuals (.33 and .5, respectfully) 
when performing ITA on an exonerative scenario. This boost in accuracy came at a time 
cost similar to that of implicative scenarios. I predict time from the regression equation in 
Equation 7 such that Y = ITA time prediction, a = intercept, bi is the beta coefficient of 
each predictor variable, and Xi is the value of each predictor variable. 
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 
Equation 7. Regression Equation 
 
The predictions per scenario outcome indicate that participants take less time to 
evaluate exonerative scenarios and participants organized as individuals are no better 
than chance at ITA with exonerative scenarios. However, specialized teams are better 
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than chance at exonerative scenarios. This is important because ITA is prone to false 
positives, owing to the reality most people in an organization are not threats (Cappelli et 
al., 2013). Table 41 presents time and accuracy results according to scenario outcome. 
Table 41.   Cross Tabulation—Time and Accuracy per Outcome. 
 Ignorance 
T
ea
m
w
o
rk
 S
p
ec
ia
li
ze
d
 
High Low 
Time 
     Implicate: 935s 
     Exonerate: 803s  
Accuracy 
     Implicate:  83% 
     Exonerate: 66% 
   
Time 
     Implicate: 1422s 
     Exonerate: 1291s     
Accuracy 
     Implicate:  100% 
     Exonerate: 83% 
      
N
o
n
e 
Time 
     Implicate: 556s 
     Exonerate: 425s 
Accuracy 
     Implicate:   66% 
     Exonerate: 33% 
      
Time 
     Implicate: 1043s 
     Exonerate: 912s  
Accuracy 
     Implicate: 83% 
     Exonerate: 50% 
      
 
The experimental evidence supports Hypothesis 2, because participants under 
conditions of a low level of ignorance required more time to perform ITA than those 
under a high level of ignorance (F(1,46)=32.037, p=.000, R
2
adj=.398; U = 60, p = .001, r 
= .679). Hypothesis 1 was not supported. There was no accuracy boost to match the cost 
in time. Recall that there was no statistically significant difference in accuracy under 
either condition of ignorance and no statistically significant difference in analyst 
confidence between either condition of ignorance. Harold Kelly’s (1973) concept of 
schema best explains the results: namely, participants organized in a specialized team had 
more than one perspective included in the information-integration process. The additional 
perspectives and experience afforded filled in the blanks of missing information and 
reduced the influence of confirmation bias. This conclusion is most evident in the 
 137 
exonerative scenarios, whereby individually organized analysis resulted in the lowest 
accuracy. 
Overall, the results indicate that insider threat analysts organized individually 
with access to all information are the best fit for analyst programs charged with 
processing a large quantity of information quickly. Similarly, the results indicate that 
insider threat analysts organized as specialized teams are the best fit for organizations 
chiefly concerned with achieving high accuracy, regardless of the higher time cost. 
Reducing information resources, or increasing ignorance, gives the best analyst time, but 
also results in the highest misattribution, when analysts are organized individually. 
Furthermore, there is an interaction between teamwork and ignorance whereby teamwork 
increases the perception of information overload under conditions of high ignorance, but 
reduces the perception of information overload under conditions of low ignorance. Table 
42 lists the supporting research questions, analysis methods, and results. 
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Table 42.   Supporting Research Questions, Analysis Method, and Results. 
Main Research Questions Variables Analysis Assessment (Statistic, Significance, Effect) 
1 Do teamwork and 
ignorance interactively 
affect analyst 
performance? 
INDEP: Team(0/1); 
Ign(0/1)  
DEP: performance(ratio) 
ANOVA No (F(1,44)=.038, p=.847) 
2 Does teamwork affect 
analyst  performance? 
INDEP: Team(0/1) 
DEP: performance(ratio) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
No (F(1,44)=.213, p=.647) 
No (t=.469, p=.640) 
No (U=265, p=.635) 
3 Does ignorance affect 
analyst performance? 
INDEP: Ign(0/1) 
DEP: performance(ratio) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U  
No (F(1,44)=.298, p=.588) 
No (t=.556, p=.583) 
Marginally (U= 208, p=.099, r=.238) 
4 Do teamwork and 
ignorance interactively 
affect analyst time? 
INDEP: Team(0/1); 
Ign(0/1) 
DEP: Time(# seconds) 
ANOVA 
 
No (F(1,44)=.648, p=.425) 
 
5 Does teamwork affect 
analyst time? 
INDEP: Team(0/1) 
DEP: Time(# seconds) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U  
Significantly (F(1,46)=15.198, p=.000, 
R
2
adj=.232) 
Significantly (t=3.898, p=.000, R
2
adj=.232) 
Significantly (U=120, p=.000, r=.499) 
6 Does ignorance affect 
analyst time? 
INDEP: Ign(0/1) 
DEP: Time (# seconds) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Significantly (F(1,46)=32.037, p=.000, 
R
2
adj=.398) 
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Mann Whitney U  Significantly (t=-5.660, p=.000, R
2
adj=.398) 
Significantly (U=60, p=.000, r=.678) 
7 Do teamwork and 
ignorance interactively 
affect analyst accuracy? 
INDEP: Team(0/1); 
Ign(0/1) 
DEP: Accuracy(0/1) 
ANOVA No (F(1,44)=.000, p=1) 
8 Does teamwork affect 
analyst accuracy? 
INDEP: Team(0/1) 
DEP: Accuracy(0/1) 
Logit Regression 
Chi-square test 
Marginally (Z=1.853, p=.063, r=.267) 
Marginally (X
2
=3.630, p=.057, φ=.275) 
9 Does ignorance affect 
analyst accuracy? 
INDEP: Ign(0/1) 
DEP: Accuracy (0/1) 
Logit Regression 
Chi-square test 
No (Z=1.853, p=.209) 
No (X
2
=3.63, p=.204) 
10 Do teamwork and 
ignorance interact with 
analyst confidence? 
INDEP: Team(0/1); 
Ign(0/1) 
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
ANOVA No (F(1,44)=.1.467, p=.232) 
11 Does teamwork affect 
analyst confidence? 
INDEP: Team(0/1) 
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U  
No (F(1,46)=.523, p=.473) 
No (t=-.723, p=.473) 
No (U=253, p=.456) 
12 Does ignorance affect 
analyst confidence? 
INDEP: Ign(0/1) 
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U  
No (F(1,46)=.939, p=.338) 
No (t=-.968, p=.337) 
No (U=247.5, p=.388) 
13 Do teamwork and 
ignorance interactively 
affect perceptions of 
information overload? 
INDEP: Team(0/1); 
Ign(0/1) 
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
ANOVA 
Nonparametric 
bootstrap 
simulation 
Marginally (F(1,44)=3.541, p=.067, R
2
adj=.040) 
Marginally (F(1,444)=30.752, p=.000, 
R
2
adj=.076) 
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14 Does teamwork affect 
perceptions of 
information overload? 
INDEP: Team(0/1)  
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
No (t=-.365, p=.716) 
No (U=284.5, p=.938) 
15 Does ignorance affect 
perceptions of 
information overload? 
INDEP: Ign(0/1) 
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
No (t=-1.108, p=.273) 
No (U=251, p=.413) 
 
16 Does ignorance affect 
perceptions of social 
impact? 
INDEP: Ign(0/1) 
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
ANOVA 
Mann Whitney U 
No (F(1,22)=2.588, p=.122) 
No (U=52, p=.210) 
Fixed effects questions: Variables Analysis Assessment (Statistic, Significance, Effect) 
17 Does any scenario 
affect analyst time? 
INDEP: Scenario(1–4) 
DEP: Time (# seconds) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Kruskal-Wallis 
No (F(3,44)=1.26, p=.300) 
Marginally (t=1.912, p=.062, R
2
adj=.053) 
No (X
2
=2.342, p=.505) 
18 Does scenario outcome 
affect analyst time? 
INDEP: Outcome(0/1) 
DEP: Time (# seconds)  
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
No (F(1,46)=1.415, p=.240) 
No (t=1.189, p=.240) 
No (U=248, p=.409) 
19 Does any scenario 
affect analyst 
performance? 
INDEP: Scenario(1–4)  
DEP: performance(ratio) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Marginally (F(3,44)=2.747, p=.054, R
2
adj=.100) 
No (t=-1.054, p=.297) 
Marginally (X
2
=6.975, p=.073, φ=.381) 
20 Does scenario outcome 
affect analyst 
performance? 
INDEP: Outcome(0/1)  
DEP: performance(ratio) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
No (F(1,46)=1.998, p=.164) 
No (t=1.413, p=.164) 
No (U=221, p=.167) 
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21 Does any scenario 
affect analyst accuracy? 
INDEP: Scenario(1–4) 
DEP: accuracy(0/1) 
Logit Regression 
Chi-square test 
No (Z=-.277, p=.781) 
Marginally (X
2
=6.857, p=.077, φ=.377) 
22 Does scenario outcome 
affect analyst accuracy? 
INDEP: Outcome(0/1) 
DEP: accuracy(0/1) 
Logit Regression 
Chi-square test 
Marginally (Z=1.853, p=.063, r=.267) 
Marginally (X
2
=3.63, p=.057, φ=.275) 
23 Does any scenario 
affect analyst decision 
confidence? 
INDEP: Scenario(1–4) 
DEP: confidence(1–9) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Significantly (F(3,44)=5.775, p=.002, 
R
2
adj=.234) 
No (t=1.655, p=.104) 
Significantly (X
2
=12.123, p=.007, φ=.502) 
24 Does scenario outcome 
affect analyst decision 
confidence? 
INDEP: Outcome(0/1) 
DEP: confidence(1–9) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
Significantly (F(1,46)=18, p=.000, R
2
adj=.266) 
Significantly (t=4.242, p=.000, R
2
adj=.266) 
Significantly (U=125, p=.001, r=.499) 
25 Does any scenario 
affect perceptions of 
information overload? 
INDEP: Scenario(1–4) 
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Kruskal-Wallis 
No (F(3,44)=.362, p=.781) 
No (t=.272, p=.786) 
No (X
2
=1.412, p=.703) 
26 Does scenario outcome 
affect perceptions of 
information overload? 
INDEP: Outcome(0/1) 
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann Whitney U 
No (F(1,46)=.373, p=.545) 
No (t=-.610, p=.544) 
No (U=257.5, p=.499) 
Blocking variable questions:    
27 Does age affect analyst 
time? 
INDEP: Age(#years) 
DEP: Time(# seconds) 
Regression No (t=.224, p=.823) 
28 Does gender affect INDEP: Gender(0/1)  Regression No (t=1.162, p=.251) 
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analyst time? DEP: Time(# seconds)   
29 Does education affect 
analyst time? 
INDEP: Education(1–4) 
DEP: Time(# seconds) 
Regression 
 
No (t=-.910, p=.367) 
 
30 Does experience affect 
analyst time? 
INDEP: 
Experience(#years) 
 DEP: Time(# seconds) 
Regression 
 
No (t=-.119, p=.905) 
 
31 Does age affect analyst 
accuracy? 
INDEP: Age(#years) 
DEP: Accuracy(0/1) 
Logistic 
regression 
No (Z=-1.554, p=.120) 
32 Does gender affect 
analyst accuracy? 
INDEP: Gender(0/1)  
DEP: Accuracy(0/1) 
Logistic 
regression 
 
No (Z=1.580, p=.114) 
 
33 Does education affect 
analyst accuracy? 
INDEP: Education(1–4) 
DEP: Accuracy(0/1) 
Logistic 
regression 
 
No (Z=1.522, p=.127) 
34 Does experience affect 
analyst accuracy? 
INDEP: 
Experience(#years) 
DEP: Accuracy(0/1) 
Logistic 
regression 
No (Z=-.355, p=.722) 
35 Does age affect analyst 
performance? 
INDEP: Age(#years) 
DEP: Performance(ratio) 
Regression No (t=-1.67, p=.102) 
36 Does gender affect 
analyst performance? 
INDEP: Gender(0/1)  
DEP: Performance(ratio) 
Regression No (t=1.287, p=.204) 
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37 Does education affect 
analyst performance? 
INDEP: Education(1–4) 
DEP: Performance(ratio) 
Regression No (t=1.101, p=.276) 
38 Does experience affect 
analyst performance? 
INDEP: 
Experience(#years) 
DEP: Performance(ratio) 
Regression No (t=-.418, p=.677) 
39 Does age affect analyst 
confidence? 
INDEP: Age(# years) 
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
Regression No (t=-.929, p=.357) 
40 Does gender affect 
analyst confidence? 
INDEP: Gender(0/1) 
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
Regression No (t=.036, p=.971) 
41 Does education affect 
analyst confidence? 
INDEP: Education(1–4) 
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
Regression 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Marginally (t=2.32, p=.024, R
2
adj=.085) 
No (X
2
=5.456, p=.141) 
42 Does experience affect 
analyst confidence? 
INDEP: 
Experience(#years)  
DEP: Confidence(1–9) 
Regression No (t=1.049, p=.300) 
43 Does age affect the 
perception of 
information overload? 
INDEP: Age(#years)  
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
Regression No (t=.107, p=.915) 
44 Does gender affect the 
perception of 
information overload? 
INDEP: Gender(0/1)  
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
Regression No (t=.985, p=.329) 
45 Does education affect INDEP: Education(1–4) Regression No (t=-1.293, p=.202) 
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the perception of 
information overload? 
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
46 Does experience affect 
the perception of 
information overload? 
INDEP: 
Experience(#years)  
DEP: InfoOvld(1-9) 
Regression No (t=.708, p=.482) 
47 Does age affect the 
perception of social 
impact? 
INDEP: Age(#years)  
DEP: SocImpact(1-9) 
Regression No (t=-5432, p=.593) 
48 Does gender affect the 
perception of social 
impact? 
INDEP: Gender(0/1) 
DEP: SocImpact(1-9) 
Regression No (t=.649, p=.523) 
49 Does education affect 
the perception of social 
impact? 
INDEP: Education(1–4) 
DEP: SocImpact(1-9) 
Regression No (t=-.136, p=.893) 
50 Does experience affect 
the perception of social 
impact? 
INDEP: 
Experience(#years) 
DEP: SocImpact(1-9) 
Regression 
 
No (t=-1.079, p=.293) 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents a summary of the dissertation. The summary includes the 
theoretical concepts that emerged from a literature review, a review of the constructs 
derived from the theoretical concepts, an overview of the experimental apparatus, and a 
synopsis of the experimental results. Theoretical contributions, recommendations, 
limitations, and suggestions for future work follow the experimental results. The chapter 
concludes with a restatement of each hypothesis, the statistical tests used for analysis, and 
the results of each hypothesis test. 
This research tested theories of attribution and process loss as they pertain to ITA 
performance. The lack of theory available explaining ITA performance engenders a 
perception that ITA is more an art form rather than a science (Utin, 2008, p. 168; Sellen, 
2016; Wittcop, 2017). This dissertation fills a part of that gap by controlling factors 
fundamental to ITA and quantitatively assessing the effects of variation in those factors. 
The ITA factors emerged from interviews, insider threat conferences, formal insider 
threat analysis training, and a detailed literature review. The literature review indicated 
that information overload is a problem for ITA analysts (Cappelli et al., 2012, p. 196; 
Garst & Gross, 1997). I interpreted this to mean that information overload reduces 
analyst accuracy and promptitude. This work offers two ways to overcome information 
overload: reduce information in the form of ignorance, and distribute information 
between more people in the form of teamwork. Ignorance and teamwork, in the light of 
attribution theory and process loss theory, are the main factors explored throughout this 
dissertation. 
This dissertation answers the question “is insider threat analyst performance 
controllable?” Theories of information overload and underload imply that suboptimal 
conditions, such as too little or too much information, will detrimentally affect people 
who perform ITA. New technology produced a large corpus of software applications that 
both reduce information overload and increase information usefulness, but the 
technologies are only as useful as the human analyst can benefit from their employment. 
This research is focused on the human analyst rather than any specific technology 
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because ITA remains a human intensive task (Goldberg, Young, Memory, & Senator, 
2016; Cappelli et al., 2012, p. 14).  
Due to the human intensive nature of ITA, organizations resort to increasing both 
the information references and number of people required to accommodate the demand 
for effective insider threat organizational programs (CNSS directive 504, NITTF-2014-
008, SPAWAR). This research does not dispute that more people and information 
references will result in better ITA, rather this research seeks to provide evidence that 
there are conditions under which people and information resources can provide more 
optimal ITA depending on informational and temporal constraints. 
Drawing heavily from Sweller’s (1988) theory of cognitive load and Galbraith’s 
(1977) contingency theory of organizations, I identified two ways to reduce information 
overload: reduce the information load and organize people to better accommodate the 
load. The lack of information was quantified as ignorance based on Denby and 
Gammack’s (1999) taxonomy. The experimental apparatus employed ITA references 
derived from Guido and Brooks (2013) and Brackney and Anderson (2004) and 
partitioned the references according to Kelley’s (1973) covariation model. This research 
focused on the individual level of analysis to better understand how various conditions of 
ignorance and teamwork affect individual ITA performance in terms of time and 
accuracy. In order to maintain an individual level of analysis between experimental 
groups, I organized groups into horizontally specialized teams following Daft (2007). 
The structure allowed only one person to perform ITA under any experimental condition 
and additional people in a team configuration processed available references to inform 
the analyst performing ITA.  
This research is important because ITA is a relatively new concept in the 
cybersecurity sector and in order to be effective, it is important to explore its strengths 
and weaknesses. Programmatic sensor information is generally stripped of context by 
virtue of its nature (Wang, 2013). Computers seek a pattern match in data symbols 
regardless of meaning and people must assign meaning to the data and integrate it with 
other forms of threat intelligence in order to perform effective ITA. This research is a rare 
test of ITA that uses externally valid top secret cleared GS-12 equivalent participants 
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who have all received insider threat training and were fully cognizant of the conduct 
expected of those who hold the same clearance. How the participants performed ITA 
under various conditions lends insight to how ITA programs are best organized under 
various informational and temporal constraints. This research uses laboratory 
experimentation to determine how varying conditions of ignorance and teamwork affect 
analyst performance in terms of time, accuracy, and confidence.  
A. METHOD 
This dissertation utilized a 2 x 2 factorial research design and experimental 
stimuli in a laboratory setting to empirically test externally valid participants. Participants 
were selected according to SPAWAR recommendations and experimental stimulus 
consisted of four scenarios (Appendix B) adapted from the National Insider Threat Task 
Force (NITTF) Insider Threat Analyst Training Course. Participants were incentivized 
with a Silver Eagle silver bullion coin for a correct ITA according to the NITTF scenario 
script. The four scenarios were organized within an online role based access controlled 
(RBAC) knowledge sharing environment (KSE) experimental apparatus. The apparatus 
KSE software is suitable due to its employment in several federal insider threat programs. 
Participants interfaced with the apparatus using PC laptops and Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer web browser to review scenario details and determine whether an insider was a 
threat or not according to the federal adjudicative guidelines for access to classified 
information. 
The research design measured performance in terms of time and accuracy. 
Analogous with triple constraint theory (Goldratt & Cox, 2016), the results indicate that 
speed and accuracy are exclusive under various conditions of ignorance and teamwork. 
Ancillary to time and accuracy, the apparatus survey module recorded the subject’s 
perception of information overload and confidence in their ITA decision. The research 
addressed the perception of social impact to capture any social loafing effect (Latane et 
al., 1979) and accounted for demographic blocks that could contribute to variability in the 
dependent measures. The experimental apparatus measured the ancillary constructs with 
Likert type survey items adapted from pre-validated research.  
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The experiment leveraged a web server to record analysis time and response data 
to an Excel spread sheet. The Excel data was imported into SPSS/Risk Simulator and 
tested eight hypotheses with regression analysis, a 2 x 2 ANOVA, bootstrap simulation, 
and non-parametric statistical analyses. Non-parametric tests were necessary to augment 
parametric tests due to the small sample size and categorical data. 
B. CONTRIBUTION 
This research contributes to the academic process of transitioning ITA from an art 
form to a science. This work does so by controlling ITA conditions within an explicitly 
documented laboratory experimental apparatus capable of scientifically replicable ITA 
performance effects. The results from this research show that ITA performance is 
predictable under various conditions of ignorance and teamwork. This new knowledge 
informs a contingency view of organizing analysts under various informational and 
temporal constraints. 
The theoretical contributions of this research include a test of process loss theory 
applied to the insider threat to cybersecurity. Cybersecurity theories exclusive of insider 
threats are well established, but the lack of theory for ITA is a clear gap in knowledge 
that this research attempted to bridge. This research juxtaposed conditions between two 
prevailing ITA teamwork conditions under two conditions of ignorance. Ignorance is a 
factor of specific interest because insider threat analysts need to make inferences under 
various conditions of ignorance by the nature of the job. The two ITA test case teamwork 
conditions are replications of two agencies identified in Kelly and Anderson’s (2014) 
descriptions of ITA organizations. This research operationalized the contingent ITA 
structures as horizontally specialized team and individual ITA. This research is the first 
quantitative assessment of ITA structural contingency and stands alone as an empirical 
test of ITA at the time of this writing.  
C. FINDINGS 
This research identified: a) how ignorance affects ITA time, b) how teamwork 
affects ITA accuracy, c) how teamwork affects ITA time, d) how teamwork and 
ignorance interact to affect perceptions of information overload, and e) how scenario 
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outcome affects ITA accuracy. Low ignorance compelled more information processing 
and consequently caused increased ITA time. The more interesting results of this 
dissertation are how teamwork affected time and accuracy under each condition of 
ignorance. 
The experimental data revealed that teamwork is more sensitive to the 
information overload conditions inherent to time constrained ITA. The median time that 
insider threat analysts took to perform ITA was considerably greater when organized in a 
team over those organized as individual. Roughly analogous to “the mythical man 
month” (Brooks, 1995), this finding strongly suggests that efforts to increase ITA 
promptitude by introducing teamwork will have the opposite effect. The finding was 
consistent under both high and low ignorance conditions reflected in the experiment 
results whereby team analysts consumed 60% and 51% greater ITA time, respectively. 
Pertinent to these findings I conclude that the increase in ITA time comes with an 
increase in accuracy under low ignorance conditions. The experimental data revealed that 
when information was split between a team of specialists who informed an analyst, the 
analyst’s accuracy increased by 37% over analysts who individually assessed the same 
information under low ignorance conditions. The experimental results suggest that given 
low ignorance, a reasonable ITA analyst should demonstrate near perfect accuracy. The 
lower perception of information overload for specialized teams under low ignorance 
conditions than individual ITA under the same low ignorance condition implied a lower 
“information pruning” (Savolainen, 2007) effect. It follows that since information 
pruning was less likely to occur, information extraction from the data (Meadow & Yuan, 
1997, p. 701) was better for specialized teams than with individuals under the same low 
ignorance conditions.  
The findings strongly suggest that the perception of information overload has 
effects independent of time constraints. Teamwork conditions interacted with ignorance 
conditions to cause various perceptions of information overload. The perception of 
information overload decreased by 30% when information references were split between 
specialists under low ignorance conditions. In contrast, the perception of information 
overload increased by 30% when information references were split between specialists 
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under high ignorance conditions. This finding reveals that in the absence of a time 
constraint, teamwork can cause variable perceptions of information overload depending 
on available information. This finding is consistent with Staats’s (2012) experiment that 
revealed teamwork interacts with task complexity. 
An unexpected finding that was not a part of the research question is how 
expected scenario outcome affected accuracy. Analysts are good at implicating a genuine 
insider threat as they correctly identified an insider threat in 83.3% of trials. However, 
analysts were only slightly better than chance at exoneration scenarios, as they 
incorrectly implicated an innocent individual in 41.7% of trials. This is perhaps the most 
interesting finding in this research because the participants were all TS-cleared, graduate 
level educated, who had all completed insider threat training and used the adjudicative 
guidelines to inform their ITA. Furthermore, individual analysts were no better than 
chance when evaluating only exoneration scenarios under either high and low ignorance 
conditions, 33% and 50% accuracy, respectively. 
In summary, experimentation results supported four out of eight hypotheses in 
this dissertation. The experiments demonstrated that analysts organized in horizontally 
specialized teams, under the same ignorance level, will be more accurate than those 
organized individually. Furthermore, experimentation demonstrated that teamwork can 
increase accuracy at the cost of time. I apply theories of attribution and process loss to 
explain the phenomenon. 
1. Attribution Theory Explanation 
Insider threat analysis proceeded from anomalous behavior presented as stimulus. 
People operate as naïve psychologists who search for a cause to attribute to anomalous 
behaviors (Heider, 1958). The cognitive process in which people make attributions is 
based on consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness (Kelley, 1973). Consensus is how 
much a behavior is in common with the societal norm and consistency/distinctiveness are 
person-within characteristics (Harvey, et al., 2014). According to Harvey, et al., low 
consensus behavior engenders internal attributions unless otherwise mitigated by high 
consistency and high distinctiveness. Similarly, from the perspective of ITA, an 
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anomalous behavior from societal norms may not be truly anomalous from the person-
within perspective. Rather, anomalous behavior, due to some mitigating personal 
circumstance, may be expected due to some external mitigating circumstance. This 
research revealed that when information was not available that could inform the within-
person perspective, analysts were more likely to draw on personal experience to infer 
consistency/distinctiveness options from which they form causal attributions. This is 
evident because teams were more accurate than individuals when under the same 
ignorance level. 
This experiment revealed that multiple analysts, with the all available references 
split exclusively between them, were more accurate than one person with all available 
references. This is best explained by schemata in attribution theory (Kelly & Michela, 
1980). Causal attribution is the subjective conceptualization of how multiple causes must 
combine to produce a certain effect. Schemata inform an assignment of multiple causes 
for specific events. Multiple people offer additional perspectives over individuals because 
schemata are informed by past experience. Group decision making is known to be better 
than that of an individual (Brodbeck, et al., 2007) but this experiment only allowed one 
individual, the analyst, all the information to perform an analysis. There was no group 
decision making yet accuracy increased with teamwork. It follows that the additional 
perspectives of the specialists on his team informed the analysts’ schemata. The enhanced 
schemata informed additional options to form causal attributions that ultimately resulted 
in higher accuracy. 
2. Process Loss Theory Explanation 
The increase in accuracy came at a significant cost of time. This result was 
unexpected because classic specialization theory posits that assigning parts to specialists 
“almost certainly speed[s] up the solution process” (March & Simon, 1958, p. 181). 
Thompson (1967) detailed types of interdependence that specialization compels in 
organization theory and Steiner (1972) described the effects of interdependence in 
Process Loss Theory. According to these theories, interdependent tasks are prone to 
process loss. The experiment organized analysts into Steiner’s complimentary model, 
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where no individual team member acting alone had the necessary resources to complete 
the ITA task. According to Process Loss Theory, process loss can occur any time 
someone on a team finishes a subtask before another in a complimentary model. This 
theory posits that whatever time was saved by distributing the work between specialists 
was less than the time used reintegrating the information for a single insider threat 
analyst. The time lost in reintegration is explained by the coordination overhead that 
emerges when interdependence increases (Katz-Navon, 2005). 
D. SUMMARY 
This dissertation provided evidence that ITA is controllable by varying conditions 
of teamwork and ignorance to produce measurable and independent performance effects. 
The research design identified ITA accuracy and ITA time as performance constructs and 
identified ITA confidence, perception of information overload, and perception of social 
impact as ancillary constructs. The research presented an apparatus to measure the 
constructs within a laboratory controlled experiment. The experiment varied the amount 
of information, or ignorance level, under two conditions of teamwork. The research 
produced eight testable hypotheses that were quantitatively assessed with both parametric 
and non-parametric statistical tests including a bootstrap simulation technique. Table 43 
presents the results of the hypothesis testing. 
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Table 43.   Hypothesis Test Results. 
Hypothesis 
Analysis 
Method 
Statistic, Significance, Effect Assessment  
1. A higher level of ignorance will 
cause lower ITA accuracy. 
Logistic 
regression 
Chi-square test 
Z=1.853, p=.104 
 
X
2
=3.63, p=.102 
Not supported. Ignorance did not cause 
lower accuracy likely due to 
experimentally fixed effect in implication 
scenarios indicated by Q21 – 24 results.  
2. A lower level of ignorance will 
cause higher ITA time.  
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann-Whitney 
U 
F(1,46)=32.037, p=.000, R
2
adj=.398 
t=-5.660, p=.000, R
2
adj=.398 
U=60, p=.000, r=.678 
Supported. Decreasing ignorance 
caused a corresponding increase in 
analysis time. Ignorance level 
variations explained 40% of the 
variability in analysis time. 
3. A higher level of ignorance will 
cause lower ITA confidence. 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann-Whitney 
U 
F(1,46)=.939, p=.169 
t=-.968, p=.168 
U=247.5, p=.194 
Not supported. Analysts were not less 
confident in their assessments when 
ignorance level was increased.  
4. Teamwork will cause higher Logistic Z=1.853, p=.063, r=.267 Supported. Horizontally specialized 
teamwork marginally increased ITA 
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Hypothesis 
Analysis 
Method 
Statistic, Significance, Effect Assessment  
ITA accuracy. regression 
Chi-square test 
 
X
2
=3.630, p=.057, φ=.275 
accuracy indicated by a marginal 
statistical significance and moderate 
effect size. 
5. Teamwork will cause higher 
ITA time than individual work. 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann-Whitney 
U 
F(1,46)=15.198, p=.000, R
2
adj=.232 
t=3.898, p=.000, R
2
adj=.232 
U=120, p=.000, r=.499 
Supported. Horizontally specialized 
teamwork caused analysts to take 
significantly more time to perform 
ITA. Teamwork explained 23% of the 
variability in ITA time. 
6. Teamwork will cause higher 
ITA confidence than individual 
work. 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Mann-Whitney 
U 
F(1,46)=.523, p=.236 
t=-.723, p=.236 
U=253, p=.228 
Not supported. Organizing participants in 
a horizontally specialized team did not 
increase ITA confidence over those 
organized as individuals. 
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Hypothesis 
Analysis 
Method 
Statistic, Significance, Effect Assessment  
7. Teamwork and ignorance will 
interact with perceptions of 
information overload. 
ANOVA 
Bootstrap 
Simulation 
F(1,44)=3.541, p=.067, R
2
adj=.040 
F(1,444)=30.752, p=.000, R
2
adj=.076 
Supported. Teamwork and ignorance 
marginally interacted with perceptions 
of information overload. Teamwork 
decreased information overload under 
low ignorance conditions, but 
increased overload perceptions under 
high ignorance conditions. 
8. A lower level of ignorance will 
cause higher perceptions of social 
impact. 
ANOVA 
Mann-Whitney 
U 
F(1,22)=2.588, p=.061, R
2
adj=.065 
U=52, p=.105, r=.180 
Not supported. Reducing ignorance did 
not increase perceptions of social impact.  
 156 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results show that introducing teamwork in the form of horizontal 
specialization may increase accuracy; however, the increase in accuracy comes at the cost 
of time. Teamwork is not an effective method of increasing the promptitude of ITA 
because the experimental results revealed a negative relationship between teamwork and 
analysis time even though no group decision making existed in the experiment. The 
implication is that individuals are better suited than teams for performing ITA under 
temporal constraints, but specialized teams are better when there are no temporal 
constraints. 
1. Enhance “Mitigating Factors” in the Federal Adjudicative Guidelines 
for Access to Classified Information 
A theoretical understanding of ITA is critical to protect organizational assets from 
hackers, cowards, and thieves. Threat assessment is not useful to assist with identifying a 
harmful person after a crime; rather it should be a method for identifying those with the 
propensity to harm before it happens. Continuous evaluation is a step in the right 
direction but is, by its nature, reactive. The other end of insider threat continuum is 
implicating innocent people as insider threats. The results of this experiment strongly 
suggest that current insider threat training is good at informing insider threat indicators, 
but is lousy at informing the factors that mitigate insider threat indicators. The “cyber 
awareness challenge” and other similar insider threat training programs may cast too 
wide a net, resulting in an unacceptably high false positive rate analogous to “the boy 
who cried wolf.” 
This research presented an equal number of insider threat implication and 
exoneration scenarios and found that analysts tend to implicate innocents even when 
using the “adjudicative guidelines for access to classified information” to perform insider 
threat assessments as are used by top intelligence agencies. According to Cappelli et al. 
(2012), most insiders are loyal hard working employees, and the insider threat is the 
exception. If this is true, false positives may have a disproportionate impact on legitimate 
insider threat implications. For example, assume 5 out of 100 employees are genuine 
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insider threats. If the findings of this experiment applied to that assumption, 42 innocents 
would be implicated for each genuine insider threat exonerated. Current insider threat 
training and adjudicative guidelines must put more focus on mitigating factors, 
specifically those that inform the “person-within” dimension, to supplement the current 
understanding of insider threat indicators. The adjudicative guidelines for access to 
classified information have changed very little over the past two decades and may need 
more specific language to be effective in the context of today’s high threat environment. 
Furthermore, mitigating factors should be integrated into ITA analytical tools to reduce 
the prevalence of false positives. 
2. Apply Attribution Theory to Computational Anomaly Detection 
There is a problem with how computers software seeks out insider threats. 
Currently, ITA software seeks out behavior patterns that indicate threatening behavior, 
but do not simultaneously evaluate mitigating factors. For instance, working odd after 
hours, but doing so after taking a four-day leave (perhaps catching up on work). This is 
an example of a relationship that an analyst would assess in order to mitigate an insider 
threat indicator.  
In the case of implication scenarios, this research demonstrated that analysts who 
received only organizational level information defaulted to implication without verifying 
behaviors warranted the response. This is because the anomaly, unless otherwise 
explained, was intuitively a threat to cybersecurity. Likewise, analysts who received 
personal information could find alternative explanations for anomalous behaviors such 
that they would expect the actions when given personal perspective. Analysts tended 
prune the information in physical and network activity logs unless they were specialized 
to the tedious task. Specializing people to do the work resulted in about 50% more time 
to perform the same analysis. Perhaps speculation, I doubt humans would stay as focused 
on the task over long periods of time as those in the experiment did for a short time.  
Software analytics capable of covariation modeling such as this are an appropriate 
direction toward computationally modeling ITA to reduce false positives. Current insider 
threat analytics identify behavior deviations, but require substantial human cognition to 
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assess the deviations relative to peer groups and the person-within circumstance. The 
reason covariation modeling is a difficult task is because specifying relationships 
between anomalous behaviors is a higher level of abstraction than identifying individual 
anomalous behaviors. Programmatically defining a relationship is a challenge for 
information science because a relationship is not traditionally understood as an object of 
analysis.  
Vector relational data modeling (VRDM) is a unique approach to implementing 
conceptual models. As with synapses in the human brain, VRDM gets power from 
connections defined as relationships. It does so with a “conceptual breakthrough by 
treating relationships as objects” (Dolk, Anderson, Busalacchi, and Tinsley, 2012, p. 
1476). Data models can extend traditional cyber-security modalities to include the insider 
threat perspective within a covariance model. VRDM models consist of data relationships 
that are, by definition, configurable, extensible, and reconfigurable and yet require no 
computer code programming (Anderson et al., 2014).  
The VRDM interoperability implication is a worthy recommendation to mention, 
but configurable semantic relationship mapping is more a means than an end. Semantic 
relationship mapping allows computer decision-making to be informed by relevant data 
rather than programmatically rigid computer code (Kelly, 2014; Baugess, et al., 2014; 
Kelly & Anderson, 2016). VRDM executable data models demonstrated the 
computational capacity to update the contextual relevance of data in a recursive manner 
by continuously updating threat models with new behavior relationships (Seng, 2016).  
3. Implement Horizontal Specialization in ITA Structure 
This research scientifically assessed two competing organizational structures for 
ITA: horizontally specialized team and individual. Horizontally specialized teams 
leveraged participants that focused on specific references to inform a single insider threat 
analyst. This structure allowed the analyst to spend cognitive resources performing ITA 
over making sense of the data used for ITA.  
Analysts organized individually viewed the same information as those in teams, 
but performed worse ITA in terms of accuracy, yet decisively better ITA in terms of time. 
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Recall that the two structures were similar at implicating the insider threat, but 
specialized teams were better at warranted exonerations. This implies that finding the 
insider threat is not as big a problem as filtering out the noise of false positives. 
Shannon’s theory of information provides that signal must overcome noise to be useful. I 
suggest that reducing the noise of false positives in ITA should have priority over 
decreasing analysis time. Logically, any time savings from individual ITA would be lost 
in investigative resources necessary to subsequently adjudicate false positives. 
F. LIMITATIONS 
The experiment relied on an assumption that Kelley’s (1973) covariation model 
explains how insider threat analysts reason through the ITA process. Video recorded ITA 
interactions between team members were consistent with the model, but individuals 
performed ITA silently. Individual participants were not asked to talk out their thoughts 
in subsequent ITA as to do so could invalidate the data. Future research should validate 
that individual ITA and team ITA are equally explainable by Kelley’s (1973) covariation 
model by requesting both individual and team ITA participants talk out their thought 
process. This is important because the experimental apparatus partitioned ITA references 
between each ignorance condition according to Kelley’s (1973) model. 
This dissertation assessed ITA in a single inference cycle, when in reality, ITA 
must accommodate a continuous flow of stimulus from a multitude of ITA references. 
The experiment did not leverage the full range of ITA software applications because it 
would be cost prohibitive and the training requirements on the participants would be too 
burdensome for the scope of this research. Replaying genuine network traffic in real time 
through a set of ITA software applications, while simultaneously injecting each scenario 
stimulus, would increase the external validity of the experiment and is a suggestion for 
future work.  
Participants were instructed to use the adjudicative guidelines to inform their ITA. 
As a result, ITA was only as good as the participants interpreted the adjudicative 
guidelines. Participants received training on insider threat but they received no training 
on how to interpret the adjudicative guidelines. Questions pertaining to interpretation of 
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the adjudicative guidelines did not arise until after some participants completed the 
experiment. No additional insight was provided to subsequent participants who requested 
clarification so not to invalidate the experiment. Future experimentation should provide 
clear interpretation of each adjudicative guideline prior ITA. 
G. FUTURE WORK 
According to Housel and Waldhard (1981, p. 376), “fruitful research often asks 
more questions than it answers.” A remaining question involves the time limit for ITA. If 
an additional group was added that was given a reasonable time limit to complete their 
task, what would be the outcome? The insider threat experiment did not include a time 
limit to ITA because a reasonable time limit for ITA under each test condition was 
unknown at the onset of the experiment. The next step would be to apply a moderate time 
constraint to the test groups and determine if the performance effects from this research 
are consistent when information overload is introduced as a factor due to time limitations.  
This research identified Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle, Kelley’s (1973) 
covariation model, Heuer’s (1999) analysis of competing hypotheses, and Fein and 
Vossekuil’s (1998) threat assessment principles as closely related crime prediction 
methods but did not assess the best method for ITA. This research also investigated the 
effects that certain conditions of teamwork and ignorance have on the general ITA 
method adapted from the adjudicative guidelines for determining access to classified 
information. I chose this ITA method because there is currently no known “best method” 
for ITA and federal programs generally defer to the adjudicative guidelines. As a result, a 
test under conditions of black box analysis was more externally valid and appropriate for 
this research. Future research that juxtaposes the different methods using real life 
scenarios may determine which method is best for predicting insider threats. 
 ITA reference selection may have a greater impact than either of the factors tested 
in this dissertation. This research used Kelley’s (1973) covariation model to partition 
references per either the organizational or personal perspectives that each reference 
informed. CNSS directive 504 requires a minimum of user activity monitoring and Guido 
and Brooks (2013) list several ITA references. Empirical research that assesses the 
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effectiveness of each ITA reference would provide valuable insight into which references 
can contribute to the most optimal ITA. By pruning all but the most useful ITA 
references, management may reduce information overload while limiting the associated 
negative impact on accuracy. 
Future research should consider how cognitive bias affects insider threat analysis. 
This work considered analyst predisposition with the question “Which generally 
describes your predisposition to the accused: innocent until proven guilty or guilty until 
proven innocent?” There was no statistically significant relationship between 
predisposition and accuracy or time. The question itself was not validated in prior 
research and likely did little to capture the true world view of the analyst. Subsequent 
experimentation should ask participants a similar question on a multipoint scale for 
greater specificity that may reveal some relationship between world view and analyst 
accuracy.  
This work reported the results of a cross sectional analysis of ITA analyst 
performance. Because each analyst assessed performed ITA only once, the experiment 
could not capture any learning effect. A repeated measures design could capture any 
latent learning effects and determine if a relationship with expertise exists. The 
expectation is that more experienced ITA analysts will demonstrate a smaller learning 
effect than novice ITA analysts. Repeated measures in this experiment would require 
either more participants or more scenarios to ensure no one sees the same scenario 
stimulus twice. If more scenarios are made available, future research should consider a 
repeated measures design. 
Perceived threat level could have biased the results because the suspicion of 
espionage may have appeared more serious than suspicion of adultery, unreported sexual 
encounters with foreign nationals, or mishandling classified information. Perhaps the 
perceived threat level and not the guilt of the subject in Scenario 2 was the more 
proximate cause of no participant getting the scenario incorrect. If that is the case, the 
effect is due to the participant’s cognitive bias and is not experimentally fixed. Future 
research should ensure that insider threat scenarios are equal in perceived threat level. 
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This would provide evidence for or against analysts being more inclined to escalate a 
case when no adjudicative guidelines are violated due to being overly cautious. 
In conclusion, this work tested only two factors of information overload. Future 
research can increase the external validity by testing additional factors that contribute to 
information overload; namely, information rate. Insider threat analysts must 
accommodate an endless flow of information from various software applications. Recent 
research at NPS found that analyzing large volumes of data is a challenge for ITA 
(Campbell, 2017). Irvine (2016) modeled information flow within an “Extend” 
simulation environment and demonstrated how analysts can become overloaded. Analysts 
will focus only on the highest perceived threat level alerts while overlooking lower 
perceived threats when overloaded. False positives may increase as analysts chose to err 
on the side of caution as this research demonstrated. Future research should include 
signals analysis to understand how ITA analysts best identify genuine insider threats out 
of the “noise” of false positives. Additional laboratory testing may verify Irvine’s (2016) 
Extend simulation results with laboratory experimental design using human analysts to 
better understand how information overload affects human ITA analysts. A better 
understanding of how additional factors for information overload affect ITA will 
empower managers to better design ITA processes to mitigate insider threats.  
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APPENDIX A. PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE 
Personal communications are listed below. First are emails from the NPS security 
office that I used to determine my sample size. Second is an email from the National 
Insider Threat Task Force who stated that both highly funded insider threat programs and 
minimally funded programs are successful, but no metrics are available to empirically 
test performance in a higher fidelity manner. The communication confirmed a lack of 
empirical studies that evaluate insider threat analysis performance, a gap in research this 
dissertation seeks to contribute. Figure 5 presents the student population with requisite 
training and clearance requirements to participate in the research. Figure 6 presents the 
communication from the NITTF. 
Figure 5.  TS-Cleared Students with Insider Threat Training at NPS. 
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Figure 6.  Personal Communication from National Insider Threat 
Task Force. 
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APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENT REPLICATION DOCUMENTS 
This appendix provides replication documents to perform the insider threat 
analysis experiment with the same experimental configuration and scenarios.  
A. PARTICIPANT ASSIGNMENTS 
The relationship between the subjects, stimulus, and research variables are 
presented as an overlay within the factorial analysis in Table 44. The reference load 
letters correspond to the references detailed in ignorance attributes.  
Table 44.   Participant, Scenario, Teamwork, and Ignorance Relationships. 
 
 
B. APPARATUS DESIGN 
The experiment apparatus was constructed entirely in cyberspace. The server is 
located in Root 103c Distributed Information Systems Experimentation (DISE) lab. Each 
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participant has a unique network account. Each network account has pre-specified 
network permissions to view only the scenarios and references that correspond to a 
specified quadrant. Figure 7 presents a screenshot from the KSE with a scenario stimulus 
and references. 
Figure 7.  KSE Screenshot—Scenario Stimulus. 
 
1. Physical Configuration 
The physical apparatus configuration was straight forward. A web server, 
presentation monitor, research observation desk and four participant workstations were 
networked together in the DISE lab at NPS.  
2. Server Configuration 
The following scripts should be put in individual batch files to automatically 
create the apparatus environment. Create files with the contents of each bulleted section 
below and run the batch files on the SharePoint server. These groups apply participant 
roles to the appropriate scenario, references, and case surveys. 
 Specify Reference Names—Groups.csv file contents 
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Scenario1 
Scenario2 
Scenario3 
Scenario4 
RefA 
RefB 
RefC 
RefD 
RefE 
RefF 
RefG 
RefH 
Case1 
Case2 
Case3 
Case4 
Professors 
 Specify Participant Logins—Users.csv file contents 
G1SHRHP1,Security1! 
G1SHRHP2,Security1! 
G1SHRHP3,Security1! 
G1SHRHP4,Security1! 
G1SHRLP1,Security1! 
G1SHRLP2,Security1! 
G1SHRLP3,Security1! 
G1SHRLP4,Security1! 
G1SLRHP1,Security1! 
G1SLRHP2,Security1! 
G1SLRHP3,Security1! 
G1SLRHP4,Security1! 
G1SLRLP1,Security1! 
G1SLRLP2,Security1! 
G1SLRLP3,Security1! 
G1SLRLP4,Security1! 
G2SHRHP1,Security1! 
G2SHRHP2,Security1! 
G2SHRHP3,Security1! 
G2SHRHP4,Security1! 
G2SHRLP1,Security1! 
G2SHRLP2,Security1! 
G2SHRLP3,Security1! 
G2SHRLP4,Security1! 
G2SLRHP1,Security1! 
G2SLRHP2,Security1! 
G2SLRHP3,Security1! 
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G2SLRHP4,Security1! 
G2SLRLP1,Security1! 
G2SLRLP2,Security1! 
G2SLRLP3,Security1! 
G2SLRLP4,Security1! 
G3SHRHP1,Security1! 
G3SHRHP2,Security1! 
G3SHRHP3,Security1! 
G3SHRHP4,Security1! 
G3SHRLP1,Security1! 
G3SHRLP2,Security1! 
G3SHRLP3,Security1! 
G3SHRLP4,Security1! 
G3SLRHP1,Security1! 
G3SLRHP2,Security1! 
G3SLRHP3,Security1! 
G3SLRHP4,Security1! 
G3SLRLP1,Security1! 
G3SLRLP2,Security1! 
G3SLRLP3,Security1! 
G3SLRLP4,Security1! 
Housel,Security1! 
Gallup,Security1! 
Munn,Security1! 
Boger,Security1! 
Rothstein,Security1! 
Editor,Security1! 
 Add Groups - AG.bat file contents 
FOR /f “tokens=1” %%a IN (c:\scripts\groups.csv) DO net localgroup %%a /add 
 
 Add Users - AU.bat file contents 
FOR /f “tokens=1-2 delims=,” %%a IN (c:\scripts\users.csv) DO net user %%a %%b 
/EXPIRES:NEVER /PASSWORDCHG:NO /ADD 
 
 Add users to groups—AddUsersToGroup.bat file contents 
net localgroup professors boger housel munn gallup rothstein /add 
 
net localgroup Scenario1 G1SHRHP1 G1SHRLP1 G1SLRHP1 G1SLRLP1 G2SHRHP1 
G2SHRLP1 G2SLRHP1 G2SLRLP1 G3SHRHP1 G3SHRLP1 G3SLRHP1 G3SLRLP1 
G1SHRLP2 G2SHRLP2 G3SHRLP2 G1SHRHP2 G1SHRHP3 G1SHRHP4 G2SHRHP2 
G2SHRHP3 G2SHRHP4 G3SHRHP2 G3SHRHP3 G3SHRHP4 /add 
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net localgroup Scenario2 G1SHRHP2 G1SHRLP2 G1SLRHP2 G1SLRLP2 G2SHRHP2 
G2SHRLP2 G2SLRHP2 G2SLRLP2 G3SHRHP2 G3SHRLP2 G3SLRHP2 G3SLRLP2 
G1SHRLP1 G2SHRLP1 G3SHRLP1 G1SHRHP1 G1SHRHP3 G1SHRHP4 G2SHRHP1 
G2SHRHP3 G2SHRHP4 G3SHRHP1 G3SHRHP3 G3SHRHP4 /add 
 
net localgroup Scenario3 G1SHRHP3 G1SHRLP3 G1SLRHP3 G1SLRLP3 G2SHRHP3 
G2SHRLP3 G2SLRHP3 G2SLRLP3 G3SHRHP3 G3SHRLP3 G3SLRHP3 G3SLRLP3 
G1SHRLP4 G2SHRLP4 G3SHRLP4 G1SHRHP1 G1SHRHP2 G1SHRHP4 G2SHRHP1 
G2SHRHP2 G2SHRHP4 G3SHRHP1 G3SHRHP2 G3SHRHP4 /add 
 
net localgroup Scenario4 G1SHRHP4 G1SHRLP4 G1SLRHP4 G1SLRLP4 G2SHRHP4 
G2SHRLP4 G2SLRHP4 G2SLRLP4 G3SHRHP4 G3SHRLP4 G3SLRHP4 G3SLRLP4 
G1SHRLP3 G2SHRLP3 G3SHRLP3 G1SHRHP1 G1SHRHP2 G1SHRHP3 G2SHRHP1 
G2SHRHP2 G2SHRHP3 G3SHRHP1 G3SHRHP2 G3SHRHP3 /add 
 
net localgroup Case1 G1SHRHP1 G1SHRLP1 G1SLRHP1 G1SLRLP1 G2SHRHP1 
G2SHRLP1 G2SLRHP1 G2SLRLP1 G3SHRHP1 G3SHRLP1 G3SLRHP1 G3SLRLP1 
/add 
 
net localgroup Case2 G1SHRHP2 G1SHRLP2 G1SLRHP2 G1SLRLP2 G2SHRHP2 
G2SHRLP2 G2SLRHP2 G2SLRLP2 G3SHRHP2 G3SHRLP2 G3SLRHP2 G3SLRLP2 
/add 
 
net localgroup Case3 G1SHRHP3 G1SHRLP3 G1SLRHP3 G1SLRLP3 G2SHRHP3 
G2SHRLP3 G2SLRHP3 G2SLRLP3 G3SHRHP3 G3SHRLP3 G3SLRHP3 G3SLRLP3 
/add 
 
net localgroup Case4 G1SHRHP4 G1SHRLP4 G1SLRHP4 G1SLRLP4 G2SHRHP4 
G2SHRLP4 G2SLRHP4 G2SLRLP4 G3SHRHP4 G3SHRLP4 G3SLRHP4 G3SLRLP4 
/add 
 
net localgroup RefA G1SLRLP1 G1SLRLP2 G1SLRLP3 G1SLRLP4 G1SLRHP1 
G1SLRHP2 G1SLRHP3 G1SLRHP4 G2SLRLP1 G2SLRLP2 G2SLRLP3 G2SLRLP4 
G2SLRHP1 G2SLRHP2 G2SLRHP3 G2SLRHP4 G3SLRLP1 G3SLRLP2 G3SLRLP3 
G3SLRLP4 G3SLRHP1 G3SLRHP2 G3SLRHP3 G3SLRHP4 G1SHRLP1 G2SHRLP1 
G3SHRLP1 G1SHRLP3 G2SHRLP3 G3SHRLP3 G1SHRHP1 G2SHRHP1 G3SHRHP1 
/add 
 
net localgroup RefB G1SLRLP1 G1SLRLP2 G1SLRLP3 G1SLRLP4 G1SLRHP1 
G1SLRHP2 G1SLRHP3 G1SLRHP4 G2SLRLP1 G2SLRLP2 G2SLRLP3 G2SLRLP4 
G2SLRHP1 G2SLRHP2 G2SLRHP3 G2SLRHP4 G3SLRLP1 G3SLRLP2 G3SLRLP3 
G3SLRLP4 G3SLRHP1 G3SLRHP2 G3SLRHP3 G3SLRHP4 G1SHRLP2 G2SHRLP2 
G3SHRLP2 G1SHRLP4 G2SHRLP4 G3SHRLP4 G1SHRHP2 G2SHRHP2 G3SHRHP2 
/add 
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net localgroup RefC G1SLRLP1 G1SLRLP2 G1SLRLP3 G1SLRLP4 G1SLRHP1 
G1SLRHP2 G1SLRHP3 G1SLRHP4 G2SLRLP1 G2SLRLP2 G2SLRLP3 G2SLRLP4 
G2SLRHP1 G2SLRHP2 G2SLRHP3 G2SLRHP4 G3SLRLP1 G3SLRLP2 G3SLRLP3 
G3SLRLP4 G3SLRHP1 G3SLRHP2 G3SLRHP3 G3SLRHP4 G1SHRLP1 G2SHRLP1 
G3SHRLP1 G1SHRLP3 G2SHRLP3 G3SHRLP3 G1SHRHP3 G2SHRHP3 G3SHRHP3 
/add 
 
net localgroup RefD G1SLRLP1 G1SLRLP2 G1SLRLP3 G1SLRLP4 G1SLRHP1 
G1SLRHP2 G1SLRHP3 G1SLRHP4 G2SLRLP1 G2SLRLP2 G2SLRLP3 G2SLRLP4 
G2SLRHP1 G2SLRHP2 G2SLRHP3 G2SLRHP4 G3SLRLP1 G3SLRLP2 G3SLRLP3 
G3SLRLP4 G3SLRHP1 G3SLRHP2 G3SLRHP3 G3SLRHP4 G1SHRLP2 G2SHRLP2 
G3SHRLP2 G1SHRLP4 G2SHRLP4 G3SHRLP4 G1SHRHP4 G2SHRHP4 G3SHRHP4 
/add 
 
net localgroup RefE G1SLRHP1 G1SLRHP2 G1SLRHP3 G1SLRHP4 G2SLRHP1 
G2SLRHP2 G2SLRHP3 G2SLRHP4 G3SLRHP1 G3SLRHP2 G3SLRHP3 G3SLRHP4 
G1SHRHP1 G2SHRHP1 G3SHRHP1 /add 
 
net localgroup RefF G1SLRHP1 G1SLRHP2 G1SLRHP3 G1SLRHP4 G2SLRHP1 
G2SLRHP2 G2SLRHP3 G2SLRHP4 G3SLRHP1 G3SLRHP2 G3SLRHP3 G3SLRHP4 
G1SHRHP2 G2SHRHP2 G3SHRHP2 /add 
 
net localgroup RefG G1SLRHP1 G1SLRHP2 G1SLRHP3 G1SLRHP4 G2SLRHP1 
G2SLRHP2 G2SLRHP3 G2SLRHP4 G3SLRHP1 G3SLRHP2 G3SLRHP3 G3SLRHP4 
G1SHRHP3 G2SHRHP3 G3SHRHP3 /add 
 
net localgroup RefH G1SLRHP1 G1SLRHP2 G1SLRHP3 G1SLRHP4 G2SLRHP1 
G2SLRHP2 G2SLRHP3 G2SLRHP4 G3SLRHP1 G3SLRHP2 G3SLRHP3 G3SLRHP4 
G1SHRHP4 G2SHRHP4 G3SHRHP4 /add 
3. Participant Scenario Reference Relationship Matrix 
Role based access control will limit and allow access based on permissions 
granted in each server group specified in section 1. Server configuration should associate 
each participant with access to specific scenarios, specific references and specific case 
management access that corresponds to the matrix in Table 45. 
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Table 45.   Participant Scenario and Reference Assignments. 
Participant Scenario1
G1SHRLP1 1 2 A C B D RefA = HR Personnel
G1SHRLP2 1 2 B D A C RefB = Security Review
G1SHRLP3 3 4 A C B D RefC = Continuous Eval
G1SHRLP4 3 4 B D A C RefD =  Peer Interview
G1SHRHP1 1 2 3 4 A E B F C G D H RefE = Supervisor Interview
G1SHRHP2 1 2 3 4 B F C G D H A E RefF = CyberSecurity
G1SHRHP3 1 2 3 4 C G D H A E B F RefG = Access Logs
G1SHRHP4 1 2 3 4 D H A E B F C G RefH = HR Evaluation
G1SLRLP1 1 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G1SLRLP2 2 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G1SLRLP3 3 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G1SLRLP4 4 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G1SLRHP1 1 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G1SLRHP2 2 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G1SLRHP3 3 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G1SLRHP4 4 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G2SHRLP1 1 2 A C B D
G2SHRLP2 1 2 B D A C
G2SHRLP3 3 4 A C B D
G2SHRLP4 3 4 B D A C
G2SHRHP1 1 2 3 4 A E B F C G D H
G2SHRHP2 1 2 3 4 B F C G D H A E
G2SHRHP3 1 2 3 4 C G D H A E B F
G2SHRHP4 1 2 3 4 D H A E B F C G
G2SLRLP1 1 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G2SLRLP2 2 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G2SLRLP3 3 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G2SLRLP4 4 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G2SLRHP1 1 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G2SLRHP2 2 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G2SLRHP3 3 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G2SLRHP4 4 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G3SHRLP1 1 2 A C B D
G3SHRLP2 1 2 B D A C
G3SHRLP3 3 4 A C B D
G3SHRLP4 3 4 B D A C
G3SHRHP1 1 2 3 4 A E B F C G D H
G3SHRHP2 1 2 3 4 B F C G D H A E
G3SHRHP3 1 2 3 4 C G D H A E B F
G3SHRHP4 1 2 3 4 D H A E B F C G
G3SLRLP1 1 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G3SLRLP2 2 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G3SLRLP3 3 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G3SLRLP4 4 A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D
G3SLRHP1 1 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G3SLRHP2 2 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G3SLRHP3 3 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
G3SLRHP4 4 A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H A B C D E F G H
*** For server access controls, users are assigned to groups that rotate instead of rotating user group memberships.
Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 Scenario4
RefA = HR Personnel RefB = HR Personnel RefC = HR Personnel RefD = HR Personnel
RefB = Security Review RefC = Security Review RefD = Security Review RefA = Security Review
RefC = Continuous Eval RefD = Continuous Eval RefA = Continuous Eval RefB = Continuous Eval
RefD =  Peer Interview RefA =  Peer Interview RefB =  Peer Interview RefC =  Peer Interview
RefE = Supervisor Interview RefF = Supervisor Interview RefG = Supervisor Interview RefH = Supervisor Interview
RefF = CyberSecurity RefG = CyberSecurity RefH = CyberSecurity RefE = CyberSecurity
RefG = Access Logs RefH = Access Logs RefE = Access Logs RefF = Access Logs
RefH = HR Evaluation RefE = Evaluation RefF = HR Evaluation RefG = HR Evaluation
Scenario Scenario 1 Refs Scenario 2 Refs Scenario 3 Refs Scenario 4 Refs
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C. INSIDER THREAT SCENARIO OUTCOMES 
The correspondence from the NITTF describes four scenario outcomes. Two 
scenarios should be elevated and two should not. Two scenarios were similar in that they 
both pointed to an extramarital affair. The similarity of the outcomes threatened the 
internal validity of the scenario so I modified the Scenario 2(b) outcome by changing the 
marital status of the insider from married to single and changed the nationality of the 
questionable female from Malaysian to Chinese. The change was to see if insider threat 
analysts assess unintentional (non-malicious) insider threats differently than intentional 
insider threats. The outcome is consistent with guidance from the Adjudicative 
Guidelines and the NITTF outcome guidance. The four scenario outcomes in the 
experiment apparatus are supported by the NITTF correspondence. The outcomes are 
consistent with guidance from the adjudicative guidelines. 
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D. SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
The experiment presented each participant with an entrance survey, a case 
management survey, and an exit survey. The entrance survey (Figure 8) collected 
demographic data that informed blocking variables. The case management survey (Figure 
9) collected information that informed the dependent variables accuracy and confidence. 
The exit survey (Figure 10) collected information that informed the dependent variables 
perception of information overload and perception of social impact.  
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Figure 8.  Entrance Survey. 
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Figure 9.  Case Management Survey. 
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Figure 10.  Exit Survey. 
 
E. SUPPLEMENTAL 
Scenario stimulus and references are located in a restricted copy of this dissertation.  
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APPENDIX C. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
Pursuant to SECNAVINST 3900.39, NPS requires Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) approval for human-subjects research, as employed in this research. This research 
leveraged monetary compensation as a performance incentive.  
A. PAYMENT SCHEDULE 
Payment of one American Eagle silver dollar (intrinsic value of $20) will only be made 
for a correct insider threat analysis. 
 
Individuals: 
Participants will not be told if analysis is correct until after exit survey is complete. 
 
Payment:  
Incorrect analysis = Nothing 
Correct analysis = American Eagle Silver Dollar (that has an intrinsic value of $20)  
 
Teams: 
Participants will not be told if analysis is correct until after exit survey is complete. 
 
Payment:  
Incorrect analysis = Nothing 
Correct analysis = American Eagle Silver Dollar (that has an intrinsic value of $20). Only 
the participant assigned the case gets the incentive. All others on the team receive no 
incentive regardless of the analysis outcome. Each person on the team gets the 
opportunity to solve one case but must relay information to his team mate for the 
remaining scenario(s). 
 
Grading Rubric: 
Correct insider threat analysis corresponds to the following criteria: 
 
Scenario 1: Exoneration - No foreign nexus, no verifiable threat data. Hearsay is 
insufficient evidence. Most likely explanation: Witherspoon is retaliating against 
supervisor’s bad evaluation with complaints to Human Resources office that he is 
privately compiling. 
 
Scenario 2: Insider Threat (Intentional) - Foreign nexus identified, two way 
communication suspected, subject has access to classified data, abnormal access times 
identified, mortgage payments delinquent & wife lost her job. Consensus among 
witnesses that Quinn was seen with a foreign woman in a foreign country. Most likely 
explanation: Quinn interacted with North Korean spy presumably to make his mortgage 
payments.  
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Applicable guidelines: A, B, E, F, L 
 
Scenario 3: Exoneration - No foreign nexus, foreign woman inference: daughter, child of 
wife with Vietnamese first and maiden name. Debt is sporadically missed credit card 
payments (unsecured debt of unknown sum) does not indicate financial hardship. GS-12 
Step 8 implies Payne is an older man. Most likely explanation: called in sick to visit with 
daughter who was in town.  
 
Scenario 4: Insider Threat (Unintentional) - Foreign nexus identified with clear evidence 
of romantic relationship with a foreign national including unreported foreign travel. 
Evidence of alcohol abuse and high risk lacking judgment sexual behavior. Has access to 
classified data. Most likely explanation: Reeves is a young sex and alcohol addict who 
engaged in a sexual relationship with a foreign national.  
Applicable guidelines: B, D, E, G, I, L 
 
B. ANONYMOUS SURVEY CONSENT 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Consent to Participate in Research 
 
Introduction. You are invited to participate in a research study entitled the effects of 
specialization and reference load on insider threat analysis performance. The purpose of this 
research is to test the relationship between specialization and reference load in terms of insider 
threat analysis performance. Your participation is important because an unwarranted escalation 
wastes investigative resources and could distract investigators from genuine insider threats. 
Likewise, not escalating a case that is warranted could allow a genuine insider threat to 
avoid detection.  
 
Procedures. 
You will be presented with a scenario provided by the National Insider Threat Task Force Insider 
Threat Training Course. You will use the information references provided to determine if 
suspicious activity warrants escalation to a formal investigation. All available information has 
already been collected prior to your analysis. Participation should take no longer than one 
hour for individuals, two hours for small groups, and four hours for large groups. 
 
You will be asked to complete an entry survey to determine eligibility and demographic 
data, review a scenario, create a case, escalate the case if necessary, and complete an exit 
survey. 
 
 Location. The experiment will take place at NPS. 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study. Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. You must 
hold or have held a Top Secret clearance, have at least a Bachelor’s degree, and have not attended 
the NITTF training course to be eligible to participate. If you choose to participate you can 
change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study. You will not be penalized in any way 
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or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled if you choose not to participate in 
this study or to withdraw. The alternative to participating in the study is to not participate.  
 
Potential Risks and Discomforts. There is a minimal risk of breach of confidentiality. We ask 
those that participate in a group to remain respectful of others by not discussing details of the 
experiment or other’s involvement to others outside the study.  
 
Anticipated Benefits. This assessment is beneficial for at least four reasons. First, this research 
assesses unbounded problem solving. Second, this experiment examines the effects of social 
impact on group dynamics when participants use unbounded systems thinking. Third, work will 
test the interactive effects on insider threat analysis performance under various conditions of 
specialization and reference load. Knowledge pertaining to these effects may help improve 
conditions for insider threat analysis so they can match insider threats. Lastly, this study will 
increase the understanding of the forces that govern the flow of information between machine and 
man. 
 
You will receive an American Eagle silver dollar (market value of around $20) if you correctly 
evaluate your scenario.  
Confidentiality & Privacy Act. Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept 
confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep 
your personal information in your research record confidential but total confidentiality cannot be 
guaranteed. There will be no personally identifiable information stored on the server and your 
survey responses will be recorded on a computerized spread sheet. The records will be stored on a 
server owned by the DISE group that is located in Root 103c 
 
Points of Contact. If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you experience 
an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you experience while taking part in this 
study please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Dan Boger, dboger@nps.edu. Questions about 
your rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the Navy 
Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831–656-2473, lgshattu@nps.edu. 
 
Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been given the 
opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have 
been provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to participate in this study. I 
understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and signing this form, I do not waive 
any of my legal rights. 
 
 
 
Signature _________________________________   Date ________________________ 
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C. PROTOCOL APPROVAL 
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 186 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 187 
APPENDIX D. ITA INFORMATION PROCESS 
This research initiated with a qualitative assessment of insider threat analysis 
organizational design. Field research informed the ITA cell organizational assignment in 
Figure 11 and task flow chart in Figure 12. The data from the field research informed the 
ITA apparatus design. 
A. ITA CELL ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT 
The ITA organization relationships I derived from site visits and interviews are 
presented in Figure 11 and formatted as an ITA process flowchart in Figure 12.  
Figure 11.  Analysis and Case Management Organizational 
Relationships. 
Initial Indicators
Internal Complaint
UAM
SEIM
DLP
Outside Agency
Continuous Eval
Analysis Process
Assess indicator
Examine relationships
Determine context
Create case
Elevate case to CM
Case Management
Access Case
Get additional information
Enhanced monitoring
Psychologist
Law enforcement 
Counter Intelligence
Escalate to supervisor
Escalate to Security Office
Escalate to Law Enforcement
Cyber Operations
Cyber Systems 
Rule creation
Queries and reports
Enhanced Monitoring
Develop evidence
Record usage
Archive host data
Archive network data
Law Enforcement
Criminal referral
Psychologist
Assess case
Security Office
Investigation
Adjudication
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Figure 12.  Insider Threat Analysis Organizational Flow Chart. 
Analysis Process
Analyst Psychologist Trend Case Management Security Office Human Resources Law EnforcementIT Branch
Ph
as
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Trigger criteria met
Mental Health?
Suitability Assessment
Suicide
Depression
Drugs / Alcohol
Medical
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Criminal?
No / Unsure
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documented in 
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checked every 30 
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Clearance 
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No
Close case in 
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Termination
32 USC 147 
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“Enhanced Bucket” 
Precision monitoring
(Same Triggers)
Yes
Credibility Assessment
Child Abuse
Domestic Abuse
Prostitution
Murder
Yes
Stop Assessment
No
Foreign 
Contacts?
No / Unsure
Suspicious?
Stop Assessment
No
Open case 
documented in 
SharePoint
Security 
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SEC 4
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Focused Bucket
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Evidence?
(Assessed every 
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Create custom 
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Unsure
No
Stop Assessment
Suspicious?
Prosecution
Yes
Stop Investigation
No
Clearance 
Revocation
Yes
Termination Guilty?
No
Yes
Evidence?
(Assessed every 
14 days)
Create custom 
ruleset
Unsure
No
Open case 
documented in 
SharePoint
Yes
By hand case 
accountability, 
checked every 30 
days  / Maintenance
Close case in 
Sharepoint
Security Programs 
Division
SEC1
Threat?
Clearance 
Revocation
Yes
Termination
Stop Investigation
No
Close case in 
Sharepoint
By hand case 
accountability, 
checked every 30 
days / Maintenance
No / Unsure
No
Stop Assessment Termination
Yes
Clearance 
Revocation
Security Programs 
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SEC1
Threat?
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NoStop Investigation
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B. ITA ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
ITA requires an interaction between analysts, case managers, and cyber operators. 
This section reports the findings from a series of qualitative interviews and observational 
studies. 
1. Analyst 
The analyst focuses on four types on insider threat activity: suitability, fraud, 
sabotage, and espionage.  
Suitability is a function of continuous evaluation that insider threat analysts use to 
determine if indicators that are not work related can give the work related 
indicators contextual relevance. Information sources for suitability include: 
a. Mental health (depression, adultery, sexual deviancy)—Learned from 
email traffic, website views, medical  
b. Criminal records -  Learned from federal, state, and local online reporting 
websites 
c. Civil court proceedings—Learned from state online reporting websites 
d.  Financial / credit history—Learned from Experian, Trans-union, Equifax 
e. Drug abuse (Alcoholism, Narcotics)—Learned from self / peer reporting, 
drug testing 
f. Domestic violence (includes child abuse)—Learned from peer reporting, 
police records 
When an indicator is presented in the AT—the analyst performs the following 
steps: 
Step 1: Review related information sources to gather all indicators not explicitly 
defined in the AT parameters. This process is generally a quick look at each of the 
information sources for irregularities. 
Step 2:  Determine if there are things a reasonable person would assume are 
extra-ordinary, i.e, high credit card debt, recent divorce, large purchases, police 
interventions at the residence that did not result in arrest. If none are found, stop 
analysis, otherwise continue to step 3. 
Step 3: Create a case: Assemble all relevant indicators into the case management 
software. Cases shall contain the following information: 
i. Name of subject (Last, First, M) 
ii. Status of subject (Military, Civilian, Contractor) 
iii. Demographics (pay grade, marital status, children, race, sex, 
claimed religion) 
iv. Date reported  (DD/MM/YYYY) 
v. Date discovered (DD/MM/YYYY) 
vi. Date processed (DD/MM/YYYY) LEAVE THIS FIELD 
BLANK 
vii. Type—(Special investigation / Counter intelligence / concurrent) 
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viii. Allegation—cite the contextually relevant indicator, i.e., financial 
problems 
ix. Predication—cite all relevant indicators (include indicator ID if in 
AT) 
x. Outside source—If indicators were received from an outside 
source, cite whom and contact information. 
xi. Classification (U, S, TS)—determined by the highest classification 
level of network from where indicator data was retrieved.  
xii. Name of referring analyst 
Step 4: Elevate case in case management system to a case manager. 
Step 5: Send a confirmation email to case manager to confirm that the case is 
received (if the case manager role is a different person) 
i. If case manager does not respond to the email stating that case is 
received within 24 hours, call the case manager and request 
confirmation via email. 
ii. If case manager does not answer phone, personally approach 
case manager and request confirmation via email. 
iii. If no case manager is available, repeat step five every 24 hours 
and CC the email to the hub supervisor. 
Step 6: Proceed to the next complaint or indicator in the AT 
 
Fraud is theft of resources. Fraud includes money embezzlement, clocking in 
when not present for hourly employees, coming in late / leaving early for salary 
employees, theft of property (government or personal), using government hours 
for personal gain (running a business from work, online gambling, excessive 
social media, time spent doing other things than work). Information sources for 
fraud include: 
a. Missing items reports 
b. Badge in / out logs (time and location) 
c. Network access logs—From security information and event management 
(SIEM) tool 
d. Browsing history—From user activity monitor (UAM) tool 
e. Civil court proceedings—Learned from state online reporting websites 
i. Leans on property 
ii. Divorce proceedings 
iii. Foreclosure 
f.  Financial / credit history—Learned from Experian, Trans-union, Equifax 
When a complaint is received—the analyst performs the following steps: 
Step 1: Review related information sources to gather all indicators not explicitly 
defined in the AT parameters. This process is generally a quick look at each of the 
information sources for irregularities. 
Step 2:  Determine if there are things a reasonable person would assume are 
extra-ordinary, i.e, high credit card debt, recent divorce, large purchases, police 
interventions at the residence that did not result in arrest. If none are found, stop 
analysis, otherwise continue to step 3. 
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Step 3: Create a case: Assemble all relevant indicators into the case management 
software. Cases shall contain the following information: 
i.  Name of subject (Last, First, M) 
ii. Status of subject (Military, Civilian, Contractor) 
iii. Demographics (pay grade, marital status, children, race, sex, claimed 
religion) 
iv. Date reported  (DD/MM/YYYY) 
v. Date discovered (DD/MM/YYYY) 
vi. Date processed (DD/MM/YYYY) LEAVE THIS FIELD BLANK 
vii. Type—(Special investigation / Counter intelligence / concurrent) 
viii. Allegation - cite the contextually relevant indicator, i.e., financial 
problems 
ix. Predication—cite all relevant indicators (include indicator ID if in AT) 
x. Outside source - If indicators were received from an outside source, 
cite whom and contact information. 
xi. Classification (U, S, TS)—determined by the highest classification 
level of network from where indicator data was retrieved.  
xii. Name of referring analyst 
Step 4: Elevate case in case management system to a case manager. 
Step 5: Send a confirmation email to case manager to confirm that the case is 
received (if the case manager role is a different person) 
i. If case manager does not respond to the email stating that case is 
received within 24 hours, call the case manager and request 
confirmation via email. 
ii. If case manager does not answer phone, personally approach 
case manager and request confirmation via email. 
iii. If no case manager is available, repeat step five every 24 hours 
and CC the email to the hub supervisor. 
Step 6: Proceed to the next complaint or indicator in the AT 
 
Sabotage is destruction of resources (includes deletion of files and rendering 
computer software / hardware inoperable) and “framing” other personnel. 
Saboteurs can be intentional or non-intentional. Information sources for sabotage 
include: 
a. Data / server access logs—from  security information and event 
monitoring (SIEM) tool 
b. Review of user activity—from user activity monitor (UAM) tool 
c. Badge in / out logs (time and location) 
d. Security camera recordings 
e. Performance reviews / evaluations / missed promotions—from HR 
When an indicator is presented in the AT - the analyst performs the following 
steps: 
Step 1: Review related information sources to gather all indicators not explicitly 
defined in the AT parameters. This process is generally a quick look at each of the 
information sources for irregularities. 
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Step 2:  Determine if there are things a reasonable person would assume are 
extra-ordinary, i.e, high credit card debt, recent divorce, large purchases, police 
interventions at the residence that did not result in arrest. If none are found, stop 
analysis, otherwise continue to step 3. 
Step 3. Create a case: Assemble all relevant indicators into the case management 
software. Cases shall contain the following information: 
i. Name of subject (Last, First, M) 
ii. Status of subject (Military, Civilian, Contractor) 
iii. Demographics (pay grade, marital status, children, race, sex, 
claimed religion) 
iv. Date reported  (DD/MM/YYYY) 
v. Date discovered (DD/MM/YYYY) 
vi. Date processed (DD/MM/YYYY) LEAVE THIS FIELD BLANK 
vii. Type—(Special investigation / Counter intelligence / concurrent) 
viii. Allegation - cite the contextually relevant indicator, i.e., financial 
problems 
ix. Predication—cite all relevant indicators (include indicator ID if in 
AT) 
x. Outside source - If indicators were received from an outside source, 
cite whom and contact information. 
xi. Classification (U, S, TS)—determined by the highest classification 
level of network from where indicator data was retrieved.  
xii. Name of referring analyst 
Step 4: Elevate case in case management system to a case manager. 
Step 5. Send a confirmation email to case manager to confirm that the case is 
received (if the case manager role is a different person) 
i. If case manager does not respond to the email stating that case is 
received within 24 hours, call the case manager and request 
confirmation via email. 
ii. If case manager does not answer phone, personally approach 
case manager and request confirmation via email. 
iii. If no case manager is available, repeat step five every 24 hours 
and CC the email to the hub supervisor. 
Step 6: Proceed to the next complaint or indicator in the AT 
 
Espionage deals with spies working for a nation state and social activists that 
disclose information to an unauthorized party. Espionage can be unintentional 
when the valid authorized access of a trusted party is compromised without 
knowledge. Information sources for espionage include: 
a. Data movement records—from data loss prevention (DLP) software 
b. Printing records—from print server records and user activity monitor 
(UAM) 
c. Data / server access logs—from  security information and event 
monitoring (SIEM) tool 
d. Review of user activity—from user activity monitor (UAM) tool 
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e. Badge in / out logs (time and location) 
When an indicator is received - the analyst performs the following steps: 
Step 1: Review related information sources to gather all indicators not explicitly 
defined in the AT parameters. This process is generally a quick look at each of the 
information sources for irregularities. 
Step 2:  Determine if there are things a reasonable person would assume are 
extra-ordinary, i.e, foreign travel, high credit card debt, large printing volume, 
high network traffic volume. If none are found, stop analysis, otherwise 
continue to step 3. 
Step 3: Create a case: Assemble all relevant indicators into the case management 
software. Cases shall contain the following information: 
i. Name of subject (Last, First, M) 
ii. Status of subject (Military, Civilian, Contractor) 
iii. Demographics (pay grade, marital status, children, race, sex, claimed 
religion) 
iv. Date reported  (DD/MM/YYYY) 
v. Date discovered (DD/MM/YYYY) 
vi. Date processed (DD/MM/YYYY) LEAVE THIS FIELD BLANK 
vii. Type—(Special investigation / Counter intelligence / concurrent) 
viii. Allegation - cite the contextually relevant indicator, i.e., financial 
problems 
ix. Predication—cite all relevant indicators (include indicator ID if in AT) 
x. Outside source - If indicators were received from an outside source, 
cite whom and contact information. 
xi. Classification (U, S, TS)—determined by the highest classification 
level of network from where indicator data was retrieved.  
xii. Name of referring analyst 
Step 4: Elevate case in case management system to a case manager. 
Step 5: Send a confirmation email to case manager asking them to confirm that 
the case is received (if the case manager role is a different person) 
i. If case manager does not respond to the email stating that case is 
received within 5 minutes, call the case manager and request 
confirmation via email. 
ii. If case manager does not answer phone, personally approach the 
case manager and request the confirmation email. 
iii. If there is no case manager available, call the security office and 
report what you have seen. Report that you could not get in touch 
with the case manager. 
iv. Send an email to the case manager and inform them that due to 
the severity of the incident, you have alerted security about a 
possible espionage case because the case manager was 
unavailable at the time of the incident. 
Step 6: Proceed to the next complaint or indicator in the AT 
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2. Case Manager  
The case manager evaluates cases for severity, maintains the continuity of the 
cases in the case management software, gathers additional information, and forwards 
cases to the appropriate authority. 
Step 1: Open case in case management software and ensure all analyst fields were 
correctly populated by the referring analyst. 
a. Name of subject (Last, First, M) 
b. Status of subject (Military, Civilian, Contractor) 
c. Demographics (pay grade, marital status, children, race, sex, claimed 
religion) 
d. Date reported  (DD/MM/YYYY) 
e. Date discovered (DD/MM/YYYY) 
f. Date processed (DD/MM/YYYY)  
g. Type—(Special investigation / Counter intelligence / concurrent) 
h. Allegation - cite the contextually relevant indicator, i.e., financial 
problems 
i. Predication—cite all relevant indicators (include indicator ID if in AT) 
j. Outside source - If indicators were received from an outside source, cite 
whom and contact information. 
k. Classification (U, S, TS)—determined by the highest classification level 
of network from where indicator data was retrieved.  
l. Name of referring analyst 
Step 2: Complete case information in case management software 
a. HR data: Include job description, attach performance reviews 
b. Focus depth: (Enhanced monitoring / routine)  
c. Access level per network classification access: (Privileged / Elevated / 
Standard)  
d. Administrative remarks: A narrative record of what has been done and 
when. 
Step 3: Determine if case is warranted for escalation or if additional information 
is required 
a. Does the behavior indicate a psychological problem? Jump to step 4 
b. Is there a minor violation of policy or minor behavior concern? Jump to 
step 5 
c. Is there a clear major violation of policy? Jump to step 6 
d. Is there a clear violation of criminal law? Jump to step 7 
e. Is the behavior questionable, but insufficient to access? Send to enhanced 
monitoring with email confirmation 
i. If enhanced monitoring does not respond to the email stating that 
the case is received within 24 hours, call the enhanced monitor and 
request confirmation via email. 
ii. If the enhanced monitor does not answer the phone, personally 
approach the enhanced monitor and request confirmation via 
email. 
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iii. If no enhanced monitor is available, repeat Step 3 part d every 24 
hours and CC the email to the hub supervisor. 
iv. Update “case current owner” as “enhanced monitoring” in case 
management. 
f. Jump to step 1. 
Step 4: Psychological problems 
a. Refer case to staff psychologist 
b. Request email receipt of referral, CC the insider threat analysis cell 
supervisor 
c. Request an update every 14 days, enter the information in the 
“administrative remarks” section of the case management software. 
d. Update “case current owner” as “psychologist” in case management. 
e. When psychologist clears the insider threat, close the case, Jump to step 1 
Step 5: Minor threat remediation 
a. Inform supervisor and request remedial training 
b. Document the supervisor’s name, time/date, and course of action in case 
management “administrative remarks” record. 
c. Close case, Jump to step 1 
Step 6: Security office referral 
a. Inform security office of the insider threat immediately by telephone 
b. Send an email with the case ID to the security office and request an email 
confirmation 
i. If the security office does not respond to the email stating that the 
case is received within one hour, call the security office and 
request confirmation via email. 
ii. If the enhanced monitor does not answer the phone, personally 
approach the enhanced monitor and request confirmation via 
email. 
iii. If no security officer is available, repeat Step 6 part b every 24 
hours and CC the email to the cell supervisor. 
c. Update case status every 14 days in the case management “administrative 
remarks.” 
d. Update “case current owner” as “security manager” in case management. 
e. After the security office clears or terminates the insider threat, close the 
case, Jump to step 1. 
Step 7: Law enforcement referral 
a. Call 911 on your telephone and notify law enforcement of the crime. 
b. Record this action in the case management “administrative remarks.” 
c. Inform security office of the insider threat immediately by telephone 
d. Send an email with the case ID to the security office and request an email 
confirmation 
iv. If the security office does not respond to the email stating that the 
case is received within one hour, call the security office and 
request confirmation via email. 
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v. If the enhanced monitor does not answer the phone, personally 
approach the enhanced monitor and request confirmation via 
email. 
vi. If no security officer is available, repeat Step 7 part d every 24 
hours and CC the email to the cell supervisor. 
e. Update case status every 14 days in the case management “administrative 
remarks.” 
f. Update “case current owner” as “security manager” in case management. 
g. After the security office clears or terminates the insider threat, close the 
case, Jump to step 1. 
 
3. Enhanced Monitor 
Enhanced monitoring is the same as analysis, but with greater focus on creating a 
chain of evidence for a case manager to determine appropriate courses of action. The 
enhanced monitoring process starts with a request for enhanced monitoring from a case 
manager. 
Step 1: Archive all user activity in the user activity monitoring software. 
Step 2: Archive all network activity in the SIEM software 
Step 3: Archive all physical access (times in / out) by visual inspection if 
necessary 
Step 4: Review emails, browsing history, keystrokes—From user activity monitor 
(UAM) 
Step 5: Conduct full background investigation 
Step 6: Annotate foreign travel (contact TSA) 
Step 7: Determine if there has been any police activity (call local police) 
Step 8: Civil court proceedings - Learned from state online reporting websites 
a. Leans on property 
b. Divorce proceedings—Read the details of the case / allegations 
c. Foreclosures 
Step 9: Review financial / credit history - Learned from Experian, Trans-union, 
Equifax 
Step 10: Peer appraisals—Learned from 360 evaluation 
Step 11: Maintain interactive case management 
a. Report all major policy violations, criminal activity, and espionage indicators 
to Case Management immediately 
i. If the case manager does not respond to the email stating that case is 
received, call the case manager and request confirmation via email. 
ii. If the case manager does not answer phone, personally approach case 
manager and request confirmation via email. 
iii. If no case manager is available, repeat Step 11 part a every 24 hours 
and CC the email to the cell supervisor. 
b. Continuously update case “predication” in case management for 14 days 
c. After 14 transfer case back to case management and update “case current 
owner” as “case management” in case management software. 
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4. Cyber Operator 
Cyber operators maintain the security information and event management (SIEM) 
software, user activity monitoring (UAM) software, and data loss prevention software. 
Task 1: Build rule sets by interpreting requests from Analysts and Case Managers 
Task 2: Test requested rule sets for impact. 
a. New rules should not profoundly impact the number of alerts that are 
presented to analysts.  
b. Alerts should have a reasonable sensitivity and designed to detect a very 
specific behavior. 
c. Test results shall be submitted to a change control review board prior to 
production implementation. The change control review board should include 
at least one case manager role and one analyst role. 
d. Implement new rules upon approval from the change control review board. 
Task 3: Review standard rule set updates to SIEM and UAM software 
a. New rules should not profoundly impact the number of alerts that are 
presented to analysts.  
b. Alerts should have a reasonable sensitivity and designed to detect a very 
specific behavior. 
c. Test results shall be submitted to a change control review board prior to 
production implementation. The change control review board should include 
at least one case manager role and one analyst role. 
d. Implement new rules upon approval from the change control review board. 
Task 4: Maintain software patches for information assurance vulnerability alert 
(IAVA) compliance. 
Task 5: Maintain access control for all insider threat mitigation cell members on 
information systems. 
Task 6: Audit analyst and case manager access logs and report suspicious activity 
from analysts and case managers to the cell supervisor. 
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APPENDIX E. RESEARCH QUESTION STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
This section provides the experimental data set and supporting statistical analysis 
outputs taken verbatim from Risk Simulator and SPSS. 
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A. EXPERIMENTAL DATASET 
Table 46.   Experiment Dataset. 
Participant Time Accy Perform Conf 
Info 
Ovld 
Social 
Impact 
Team 
Work Ignor Dispos Scenario Age Gender Edu Exp 
G1SHRLP1 753 1 1.6276 6 2 1 1 1 0 1 46 1 2 2 
G1SHRLP2 873 1 1.5682 7 2 2 1 1 0 2 31 1 2 0 
G1SHRLP3 666 1 1.6706 7 2 2 1 1 1 3 34 1 2 0 
G1SHRLP4 853 1 1.5781 8 1 1 1 1 1 4 40 1 2 16 
G1SHRHP1 1255 0 0.3793 6 2 1 1 0 0 1 79 1 2 0 
G1SHRHP2 1110 1 1.4510 8 3 4 1 0 0 2 34 1 2 0 
G1SHRHP3 1130 1 1.4411 6 1 4 1 0 0 3 34 1 1 0 
G1SHRHP4 1209 1 1.4021 9 1 1 1 0 0 4 32 1 2 6 
G1SLRLP1 635 0 0.6860 7 1 
 
0 1 0 1 60 1 2 0 
G1SLRLP2 588 1 1.7092 9 1 
 
0 1 0 2 58 0 4 0 
G1SLRLP3 578 0 0.7141 6 2 
 
0 1 1 3 38 0 2 1 
G1SLRLP4 390 1 1.8071 7 1 
 
0 1 0 4 47 0 2 0 
G1SLRHP1 846 1 1.5816 7 5 
 
0 0 0 1 36 1 2 0 
G1SLRHP2 838 1 1.5856 9 1 
 
0 0 0 2 63 0 3 0 
G1SLRHP3 894 0 0.5579 7 4 
 
0 0 0 3 65 1 1 36 
G1SLRHP4 795 1 1.6068 8 1 
 
0 0 0 4 34 1 2 0 
G2SHRLP1 628 0 0.6894 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 26 0 1 0 
G2SHRLP2 758 1 1.6251 6 2 1 1 1 0 2 22 1 1 0 
G2SHRLP3 1126 1 1.4431 7 2 2 1 1 0 3 34 1 1 1 
G2SHRLP4 1235 0 0.3892 6 2 2 1 1 0 4 31 1 1 0 
G2SHRHP1 1053 1 1.4792 8 2 2 1 0 1 1 33 1 2 7 
G2SHRHP2 1626 1 1.1958 6 1 1 1 0 1 2 35 1 1 0 
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G2SHRHP3 1368 1 1.3234 7 2 2 1 0 0 3 27 1 1 0 
G2SHRHP4 2022 1 1.0000 9 1 3 1 0 0 4 32 0 1 0 
G2SLRLP1 600 0 0.7033 5 1 
 
0 1 1 1 28 1 1 0 
G2SLRLP2 480 1 1.7626 7 2 
 
0 1 0 2 60 1 2 0 
G2SLRLP3 564 1 1.7211 7 1 
 
0 1 0 3 45 0 1 0 
G2SLRLP4 468 0 0.7685 9 1 
 
0 1 1 4 36 1 2 0 
G2SLRHP1 730 1 1.6390 7 2 
 
0 0 0 1 33 1 1 2 
G2SLRHP2 810 1 1.5994 9 1 
 
0 0 0 2 34 1 1 0 
G2SLRHP3 931 0 0.5396 7 3 
 
0 0 0 3 29 0 1 0 
G2SLRHP4 1420 0 0.2977 6 1 
 
0 0 0 4 52 1 2 2 
G3SHRLP1 518 1 1.7438 5 3 3 1 1 0 1 29 1 1 0 
G3SHRLP2 1004 1 1.5035 9 1 1 1 1 0 2 34 1 2 12 
G3SHRLP3 757 0 0.6256 5 1 1 1 1 0 3 27 0 1 0 
G3SHRLP4 943 1 1.5336 7 5 1 1 1 0 4 25 1 1 0 
G3SHRHP1 1299 1 1.3576 6 1 1 1 0 0 1 37 1 2 0 
G3SHRHP2 1312 1 1.3511 9 4 4 1 0 0 2 35 1 1 0 
G3SHRHP3 1228 1 1.3927 7 1 2 1 0 1 3 27 1 1 0 
G3SHRHP4 1989 1 1.0163 8 2 1 1 0 0 4 39 1 1 0 
G3SLRLP1 434 1 1.7854 8 1 
 
0 1 0 1 34 1 1 0 
G3SLRLP2 470 1 1.7676 8 1 
 
0 1 0 2 37 1 1 0 
G3SLRLP3 513 0 0.7463 6 3 
 
0 1 0 3 35 0 1 0 
G3SLRLP4 490 0 0.7577 9 3 
 
0 1 0 4 35 1 1 0 
G3SLRHP1 767 0 0.6207 7 1 
 
0 0 0 1 35 1 2 0 
G3SLRHP2 802 1 1.6034 6 3 
 
0 0 0 2 29 1 1 0 
G3SLRHP3 1320 1 1.3472 6 5 
 
0 0 0 3 36 1 1 1 
G3SLRHP4 1260 1 1.3769 8 3 
 
0 0 0 4 39 1 2 0 
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Table 47.   Insider Threat Analysis Case Summaries. 
 
Participant Case Comments 
G1SHRLP1 Tom Witherspoon was spotted in Building B on Saturday afternoon for the period of 1 hour. Logged in to a TS/SCI 
system and printed off a document from personal drive space. Individual was carrying backpack and was seen near the 
shredders during before exiting the building. Individual is assigned to building A. CCTV confirmed individual matched 
the description of Tom Witherspoon. 
Member does not get along with supervisor and feels supervisor is incompetent.  
Would not escalate at this time without further evidence. Individual has in the past proven an excellent employee, but 
does not get along well with current supervisor. This may have attributed to the member coming in on weekend to 
complete some office tasks. If members are not supposed to be in specific buildings after hours, request review of access 
security policy. 
G1SHRLP2 Curtis Quinn while on a trip to South Korea from 8–13 September 2016. Failed to report contact with local during trip 
debrief. Claimed he was ill one evening and was seen later that evening by coworkers. Initiated a potential insider threat.  
At this time I feel that this case should be elevated. This is due to several issues. First financial (failure to make loan 
payments, loss of spouse income). Second extended/abnormal computer usage outside of normal work hours in additional 
to unauthorized use of private email on government computer with suspicious individual (Angelina Em). Third The 
meeting with the local included paperwork and Quinn asked coworker (Leo Bryant) to keep it quite. Fourth change in 
behavior becoming introvert and quiet. 
G1SHRLP3 Payne is suspected of violating adjudicative guidelines of foreign influence and personal conduct. What Chapman 
reported was Payne was seen with a foreign woman out at a restaurant after calling in sick. When questioned, Payne 
responded “who, Tiffany?.”  Tiffany is the name of Payne’s daughter...Payne is married to an oriental woman, so it is fair 
to say his daughter would have an exotic/foreign look to her. Payne has requested access to three different SCI programs 
in the last 7 weeks, however, a background investigation of him revealed nothing out of sorts. He has filed two IG 
complaints that haven’t been resolved. I don’t believe an investigation should be escalated on Payne at this time, 
however, continued monitoring should persist. 
G1SHRLP4 Herbert Reeves was reported for suspicious activity. the suspicious activity reported is common security practices to 
ensure janitors do not view classified material. Herbert appears to be a below average performer according to his 
performance reports and peer interview. he is single and apparently looking for a female companion. he frequents dating 
sites and his online activity appears to coincide with the janitors visit. Additionally, the reports of him smelling of alcohol 
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appear that he had too good of a time over the holiday weekend and ended up having to work extra hours resulting in his 
lack of personal hygiene. Finally, the email address to the domain in China is likely a result of his attempts at online 
dating. Herbert appears to be gullible as his peer stated and probably needs to be counseled. 
G1SHRHP1 I believe Witherspoon’s activity on the Saturday afternoon, outside working hours, making copies, putting them in his 
backpack and not entering the adjacent building constitute suspicious behavior. 
Also, his rapid downward trend in evaluations by his supervisor cast doubt on his suitability for a TS clearance 
G1SHRHP2 Curtis Q Quinn (R&D) went with a group of 6 employees on an official trip to South Korea from 8–13 September. While 
on the trip, Curtis had an undisclosed meeting alone with a suspected foreign national while on the trip. Previously, 
Curtis told his companions he was sick and unable to go to dinner with the group.  2 hours later, he was spotted by his 
companions in a restaurant with a female suspected foreign national with paperwork spread all over the table. 
Additionally, Curtis has been requesting access to classified projects of which he has no need to know. Specifically, he 
was given access to a COI sharepoint on missile technology. He downloaded missile technology and related information. 
He also had at least 3 emails from a South Korean contact, and he reportedly asked a friend to keep quiet about his South 
Korean contact. Curtis has also been accessing classified material well outside of normal duty hours.   
G1SHRHP3 Activity and logs were consistent over long time period. Data downloaded was consistent with his data analytics job.  
People don’t know what his wife looks like and could be the woman he had lunch with.   
No flags for dishonesty.   
Don Chapman, who reported, thought it was not really of immediate concern. 
Always polite and courteous with high evaluations. 
While I am worried about the search for “other” read-ins, I don’t know if that is beyond the normal.   
G1SHRHP4 Herbert Reeves has been reported for activities which may indicate he is an insider threat. Although member has not 
reported any foreign travel, it appears the member has frequent correspondence with a contact that may be located in 
China. 
G1SLRLP1 Worker observed in TS/SCI workspace during period not normally authorized. No adverse indicators except recent work 
performance issues with supervisor. No clear evidence of wrongdoing, but anecdotal evidence warrants questioning of 
worker at a minimum about what he was doing on the off-work day. 
G1SLRLP2 Individual was not sufficiently forthcoming about what he was doing with the woman he was seen with; the fact there 
was paperwork on the table remains unexplained; money is clearly a matter of concern for him; there appears to have 
been follow-up, cryptic email contact between an Asian woman and Quinn. 
G1SLRLP3 Hector Payne 
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-has 7 reports on dishonest and inappropriate conduct toward women 
-tried to access 3 different spaces requiring a clearance, need to know 
-has been delinquent with his credit card 2 times in the past 5 months 
-called in sick but was out with a female, not his wife 
G1SLRLP4 Reeves was reported as acting suspiciously by janitorial staff. It is reported that this is a change in behavior. The data and 
reviews reveal that he has corresponded to a foreign national with an IP address associated with China. He is delinquent 
on a student loan for the past few month and has been accessing dating sites from work however on his lunch break. 
These reports raise flags of financial problems, he has reported to co-workers that he is working weekends, but does not 
want credit and has connection with a foreign entity. He has access to several SCI programs and may be vulnerable to 
share information for money. 
G1SLRHP1 The main flag is that he printed 276 pages of something from a classified terminal in a building that was not his on a 
weekend. It is very possible that he took some of the papers in his backpack. There are not really other indicators in his 
personal files that would flag him as insider threat. Not liking his boss is not unusual. Probably worth looking into to find 
out what the document was and where he took it. May want to wait to see if it happens again. 
G1SLRHP2 A little torn on whether to refer but decided in favor of referring for following reasons: 
1. Actions on trip where he ended up at dinner with unknown Korean female and papers on table. Note that he did not 
admit to this until confronted about it. Initially denied saying he was sick. 
2. Only member of group with e mail contacts in South Korea. 
3. Financial issues (late mortgage payments) possibly due to wife having lost her job. 
4. Several attempts to gain access to programs for which he had no need to know, among them Fireball. 
5. Attempt to access info on Fireball sideways through speaking with coworker. 
G1SLRHP3 Reports of Payne associating with possible foreign nationals at Bellismio restaurant. Times unaccounted for on numerous 
occasions - Long times badging between office and outer door. Dissatisfaction with agency and policies 
G1SLRHP4 Mr. Reeve’s initiated an online relationship via a dating website with a foreign citizen and maintained regular 
communication. Digital records of this communication indicate that he regularly discussed sensitive (possible classified) 
portions of his job with this person. Passport records and digital communication indicate that Mr. Reeves made an 
undisclosed trip to Malaysia to visit the foreign citizen. Mr.s Reeve’s low performance, financial issues, general naivety, 
and disclosure that he was breaking company policy to make the trip make him a great target for blackmail. 
G2SHRLP1 Tom Witherspoon reportedly seen by CCTV cameras as well as eye witness Sam Clemens (worked in building B for 
more than 4 years) entering building B (when he works in building A) with a black backpack. Sam Clemens reportedly 
witness Tom Witherspoon, acting nervous at a TS/SCI computer printing a document. The document was found out to be 
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a 276 document labeled S//NF.tomswork located in the S drive in tom’s stuff folder and it is password protected. Sam 
Clemens witnessed Tom putting documents in his backpack and shredding documents with the classified shredder. Sam 
Clemens did not see Tom Witherspoon leave. In the HR personnel data review his recent review went from a 4.5 last year 
to a 2.5 due to insubordination and untruthfulness protocol. In the continuous evaluation, no suspicious behavior was 
found. A peer interview stated that his friend was not aware of any new projects or weekend work hours. He did state that 
Tom liked printing documents, rather than looking at it on a computer for review in policy and guidelines. He said he has 
never seen Tom carry a backpack. Recently he has stated that Tom has had issues with the supervisor, feeling that the 
supervisor is incompetent and felt he was being singled out all the time. His behavior on the weekend is very suspicious. 
G2SHRLP2 I suspect that Curtis Quinn is involved in selling information or technologies from his workplace to an outside entity 
without permission for financial gain to help support his family after his wife lost her job last summer. He is badging in at 
odd hours and requesting access to new programs to find something of interest to the talent agency he is trying to sell to. 
He has communicated with them over email and now with an in person meeting during the South Korea trip. 
G2SHRLP3 Coworker who does not like Hector Payne has submitted reports of Hector meeting with a foreign contact who as it turns 
out is most likely his wife. The only areas that appear questionable would be his two financial late payments on his credit 
card accounts. This easily can be explained by his wife needing a lot of medical assistance. 
G2SHRLP4 According to co-workers, Herbert Reeves has been acting differently for the last two weeks. A co-worker, C. McCarthy, 
Reeves has developed an attitude and has smelled of alcohol. Additionally, the custodian has reported strange behavior 
regarding computer usage, all incidents occurring at work. Based on reported activity, it is likely the custodian walked in 
on Mr. Reeves while he was on an adult dating website. He has contact with a foreign national through online dating 
sites; however, it is likely unknowingly as he has been reported as a smart but gullible guy. Based on his profile and the 
information, it appears as though he likes to drink and have a good time and may be subject to additional investigation in 
relation to Guideline G and E, but he is unlikely to be willfully engaged in illicit or damaging activities. I recommend 
counseling; training; and further monitoring, but not further escalation at this time. 
G2SHRHP1 Tom Witherspoon was seen printing 278 pages of documents in a BLDG (BLDG A) that he did not work in on 
September 18, 2016 @ approximately 1330. Building access reports indicate that he entered the BLDG from 1300 - 
1400. The documents were determined to have originated from a secret server and the document was named, 
“Secret//NOFORN_Tom’s Work doc.”  This file was in subfolder “Policy, Oversight, and Management.”  Witherspoon 
has an ambivalent relationship with his supervisor and is currently in the process of appealing a bad review. Witherspoon 
has previously had a excellent reports and his co-workers do not report behavior that is consistent with someone 
attempting to deceive the U.S. Government or commit espionage.   
 206 
G2SHRHP2 Who, Quinn 
What, possible foreign contacts, disclosing files and papers to foreign national, financial troubles, requesting access to 
governments 
Where, at work and during an official trip to S. Korea 
Why, he is asking for areas outside of his specialty, he met with a female foreign national, suspicious behavior and 
introverted.   
How:  Foreign influence, Financial considerations, and emotional/mental/personality disorders. 
G2SHRHP3 Hector Payne is a high performer that is consistently late and has created some inter-personal issues within the office. His 
wife has been ill for a prolonged period of time, which may be a factor in his consistent tardiness to work. Recently, a 
suspicious incident occurred and was reported by his co-workers. It appears he called in sick to work, but was observed 
outside of work with a foreign-looking female. When questioned about this female, he responded, “Who Tiffany?” and 
laughed. He has a daughter named Tiffany, and a wife with a name that stands out as distinctly Asian. This could be a 
simple father-daughter date. 
 
He has had two delinquencies on credit card bills, but does not seem to be enough of a pattern to be of concern. He was 
denied access to three compartments, but he is a part of a high-priority project and could be seeking out ways to enhance 
it.  
 
Altogether, these factors do not seem to warrant escalation. 
G2SHRHP4 Mr.Herbert Reeves has been reported to have changes in behavior by multiple people, all of which have been 
substantiated by unreported travel to Malaysia, failure to pay bills, unreported foreign contact, possible misuse of alcohol, 
and overall questionable judgement. All of this has been occurring over the past 3 months. His intentions are unclear, but 
it is obvious that Mr. Reeves is demonstrating a pattern of suspicious behavior. 
G2SLRLP1 Tom Witherspoon has been observed printing a 276 page document titled S//NF_Tom’s Work.doc in the copy room of 
building B at XYZ agency. This took place during a non-work day (Saturday) from roughly 13–1400.  
 
Factors of consideration: 
-Has a copy room in his own building, though it’s not as large. 
-Nervous, so knowingly breaking the rules, but it could be personal use that has him nervous, i.e., missing dog flier.  
-Good salary, but has 4 dependents, which could create a financial burden.  
-Recent drop in performance compared with historical yearly reviews. Possibly connected to conflict with supervisor and 
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not actual performance.  
-Cited for non-compliance in the past, adds to the possible personal use of the copy facilities. 
-The document that was printed had been classified by the individual as Secret NF, indicating that he knew that his 
document was sensitive. 
G2SLRLP2 Wife lost job. 
Experiencing money problems 
Late on last several months mortgage 
Lied to coworkers to avoid going out with them 
met an unknown female at a restaurant 
Did not report the meeting of female, possibly foreign national 
asked about programs he did not have clearance for and had been denied access to 
demeanor at work has changed recently 
G2SLRLP3 I do not believe this should be elevated for the following reasons: 
-Employee performance has been steading increasing (3.5, 4, 4.5) 
-No CI flags 
-No Passport Flags 
-2 late credit card payments not highly unusual 
-The Badging in/out outside normal office hours could be explained (Payne assigned or taking on additional work for 
colleagues, or escape mechanism to deal with his wife’s illness) 
-No unusual system activity 
-2 IG complaints not overly suspicious 
-Multiple requests for access to compartmented programs (SKYEYE, OBSERVER & ROSETTA) is mildly concerning 
because he clearly doesn’t have a demonstrable “need to know” - if he had a legitimate need to know to perform 
additional tasks, Mr. Payne’s supervisor should have initiated the request for access.  
-Banking records do not show any recent/unexplained affluence (he’s late on his credit cards payments as recent as three 
months ago) -but could also be an indication of increasing financial problems. Wife is ill, so medical bills could be 
mounting. Keep an eye on this. 
G2SLRLP4 I do not believe that Mr Reeves requires further investigation due to the fact that his behavior and further information 
from the XYZ agency revealed that he is most likely involved in some Internet dating. While his most recent 
communication seems to with a Chinese national, I do not believe that he should be considered an insider threat. Mr 
Reeves also has had some previous incidents with tardiness and accusations of alcohol use however, these incidents do 
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not point toward an insider threat. Furthermore, his work relationship with the janitor seems to be rocky due to previous 
conflicts and I believe his report might be somewhat biased because of this. 
G2SLRHP1 The suspect had lawful access to the facility and worked regularly with TS SCI material.   
G2SLRHP2 Quinn was on a business trip to South Korea recently for a period of about five days. One night during the trip, Quinn 
claimed to be sick and declined going to dinner with his colleagues. Later that night, his colleagues saw him at a nearby 
restaurant eating dinner with a Korean woman with papers in between them on the table. Quinn did not mention this 
interaction on his travel debrief and told his colleagues the meeting was nothing. However, Quinn has been acting strange 
recently. At various times over the past three months he has been accessing the SCIF at odd hours, requesting to access 
compartmented programs for which he does not have a “need to know” and has been in intermittent contact with 
someone from South Korea via email. Additionally, he received an email from a contact that asked for an item of “mutual 
interest.” Of note, Quinn has also been behind on his mortgage for the past three months. While Quinn is an exceptional 
performer for agency XYZ, there appears to be too many indicators of suspicious behavior not to look into this further. 
G2SLRHP3 I feel that there is an issue to be investigated further due to the recent financial issues Payne has had which coincide with 
recent denied requests for read in on TS/SCI information and observed behavior not consistent with known personality. 
His appearance at a party with an unknown female who brushed off association with when asked, should be considered a 
behavioral flag. 
G2SLRHP4 Below average, new, low level Network Systems Administrator, with new TS/SCI clearance has made undisclosed foreign 
travel to Malaysia. Subject is single and actively dating. Foreign travel appears to be benign... a trip to visit a woman.  
 
Employee is habitually late:  Recommend further counseling from HR and Supervisor. 
Employee has apparent personality conflicts with coworkers:  Recommend team building exercises. 
Employee executed foreign travel without disclosure:  Recommend Counseling from Security Manager. 
Employee has access to numerous security compartments:  Recommend limiting access to just a few projects.   
G3SHRLP1 Who: Thomas Witherspoon  
What: Seen by fellow employee printing off TS-SCI documents and placing them in a backpack.  
Where: Building B (Witherspoon only works in Building A) 
Why: CCTV showed entering and leaving building B with a black backpack; he did not enter building A. The parking lot 
is not monitored.  
How: No other indicators outside this one incident. 
Appears to be due to improper training or inadequate training and was isolated/infrequent in nature 
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G3SHRLP2 Who: Quinn 
What: Undisclosed meeting with foreign personnel 
Where: S. Korea 
Why: Quinn did not attend a team dinner but instead stated he was sick and returned to his hotel room. He was later 
located at a restaurant with an unnamed Asian Female with unknown papers on the table. He stated that he took 
medicine, felt better, went to dinner and was paired with the Asian Female at the same table. He further stated that he did 
not mention this during the debrief because he did not want to upset his wife. Prior to the trip he received an email from 
Talent Agency International Models, Inc, on Aug 19, 2016, stating “I trust that your search for our item of mutual interest 
is going well. Very much look forward to connecting soon.”  It was signed “Angie.”  The country code in the phone 
number was from Singapore. This contact was also not disclosed to the SSO. 
 
When combining Quinn’s 4x missed mortgage payments, foreign email contact, undisclosed foreign meeting in Korea, 
his attempting to access 2x programs for which he didn’t have a need to know, and his preference to lie to family rather 
than explain why he had dinner with a female, he meets the requirements for further investigation. 
G3SHRLP3 Hector Payne is a good worker but is very outspoken about his disagreement with his organization’s mission. His filing 
two IG complaints and requesting access to special programs are red flags in terms of insider threat. Additionally, his 
request for access to additional programs came shortly following two delinquent credit card payments, which brings some 
questions as well. Payne is being reported for contact with a possible female foreign national, which may/may not be his 
wife. While there are no direct indications that he is an active insider threat, it may be necessary to conduct an 
investigation into Mr. Payne. 
G3SHRLP4 Possible security risk due to personal behavior changes, financial difficulty, poor performance scores, and unreported 
foreign contact. 
 
Low performance and personality changes do not, by themselves, constitute a security risk, but changes in personal 
conduct, recent student loan payments, potential alcohol abuse, and foreign contact that was unreported leave subject 
open to blackmail. 
G3SHRHP1 Tom Witherspoon accessed BLDG B at 1302 on 18 SEP (weekend), logged into terminal sci00037 with own login ID at 
1348, printed 276 pages. Departed at 1410 with backpack and did not go to BLDG A (his normal workspace). File 
printed appeared to be Tom’s, located on a share drive, and cannot be determined to actually be classified. Normally 
works M-F, normal hours, prefers printouts. Decline in performance evaluation and abrasive attitude towards co-workers 
and supervisor is cause for concern. 
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G3SHRHP2 Quinn, Curtis is suspected of questionable behavior that suggest insider threat. 
Quinn failed to report foreign contact while attending a trip to South Korea, this is of concern due to describing the 
encounter to his co-workers as being coincidental, however, his pre-trip work behavior show him corresponding with 
South Korean IP addresses. Quinn also shows a pattern of behavior to include financial irresponsibility, and consistent 
attempt to access classified material which is outside the purview of his need to know.   
G3SHRHP3 Hector Payne was observed with at a restaurant with a woman (possibly foreign) who was not his wife and acting in a 
very familiar manner with said woman. Review of all available records regarding Payne returned the following finding: 
When confronted about the incident with the woman, Payne did not deny the incident and only laughed off the details of 
his specific relationship.  
There is no definitive information which points to the woman being a foreign national.  
His IP records do not indicate any correspondence with foreign IP addresses.  
Payne is a solid performer. 
Payne, though outspoken has demonstrated a willingness to work inside agency channels to resolve any concerns.  
Has been delinquent on two credit card payments but no egregious concerns regarding finances. 
He did request access to thee compartments and was denied access due to lack of need to know. This is of concern but 
not a definitive flag for insider threat behavior. 
G3SHRHP4 Mr. Herbert Reeves was recently reported to have displayed increasingly odd behavior. 
There is evidence showing that he has been making contact with a certain leimei  on a Chinese-hosted website (China 
UNICOM: 218.60.56.105). This contact started via online dating.   There is also evidence of unreported travel to 
Malaysia to see this foreign agent over Labor Day weekend (1-5 SEP). Furthermore, their emails indicate they have 
discussed his work. 
There is also a flag on his finances that shows he is now three months delinquent on his student loan payments. 
 
These are significant indicators to suggest Mr. Reeves has violated guidelines for maintaining his clearance. 
G3SLRLP1 Tom Witherspoon was suspected of improperly accessing or handling TS/SCI material on a weekend in a building in 
which he does not normally work. I am not escalating because, in the peer interview, his friend stated that Tom’s 
supervisor was singling him out for additional work. This may account for the poor mark on his last performance review 
as well as the weekend work. Additionally, printing a large volume of paper is not unusual, especially given the comment 
by Tom’s friend, and appearing nervous is not necessarily grounds for escalation. Working in a different building on a 
weekend is enough to make most people uncomfortable and may account for the change in behavioral patterns. Finally, 
the background review did not indicate any red flags such as financial trouble or domestic problems. 
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G3SLRLP2 Who:  Curtis Quinn 
What:  Foreign Influence 
Where:  South Korea 
Why:  Issues with delinquent payments 
How:  Email from personal email on a government computer to an foreign “talent agency.”  The information in the email 
was vague. 
          Last minute change of plans due to sickness and then immediately feeling better. Did not try and meet up with own 
group. 
          Did not disclose foreign contact to associates or to SSO. This contact was not a part of his official travel. Wanted to 
keep meeting secret because of his wife. 
          Had requested information on several programs recently that he did not have a need to know and also was trying to 
get more information out of associates on programs they were read into. 
G3SLRLP3 Based on the strange office hours as identified by badge tracking, coupled with requests for clearance/access to programs 
(all three of which were denied) and the dishonesty IRT skipping work all lead me to believe that an investigation should 
take place. The only piece of evidence that would make me believe that all events are merely circumstancial and more 
related to his wife’s illness is the coincidence of the conversation with his employee who referenced “Tiffany” who 
coincidentally is his daughter as well. Nonetheless, there are too many instances that appear suspect, which outweigh the 
single instance of possible coincidence. 
G3SLRLP4 M. Reeves is suspected of activities that raised security concerns from the sanitation worker (Aubrey?)and hos co-worker 
(McCarthy)? 
 
I believe there should not be an investigation on Reeves. He is acting “squirrely” because he is going on websites that are 
inappropriate for the workspace (his actions are against the IA and computer user agreement form he signed to get access 
to network resources). 
He will be more on-guard specially since going to websites “like adult friend finders and Ashley Madison” are 
embarrassing . His interaction with a foreign woman “MeiLei” is not unexpected since this could be a person looking for 
love in another country or part of a scam. 
 
His suspected smell of alcohol after a holiday raises questions about alcohol dependency or abuse but this seems to be his 
only reported incident in two years. Also only his co-worker (who does not get along with Reese) is the only person that 
reported it. 
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His delinquency on his student debt raises concerns about his financial state and should be addressed. These are fairly 
recent and the SSO is aware of the missed student loan payments. My recommendation is to have Reese go to the 
financial counselor for counseling. 
 
Mr. Reese is just looking for love using the wrong resources (work computer), possibly partied too much one weekend, 
and is delinquent on just three student loan payments. The fact that he does not have the best personality makes him 
unpopular in the office. He does not warrant an investigation. 
G3SLRHP1 Who: Tom Witherspoon 
What: Possible Insider Threat 
Where: Buildilng B 
How and Why: Tom Witherspoon was seen on the weekend printing large amounts of material and placing them in a 
black backpack. He then departed the building. He does not normally work in Building B or on the weekends. He is not 
known to carry a black backpack to work, although he is known to prefer printing over reading on the computer. His 
performance has declined and his most recent evaluation marks were at 2.5 when all others were above a 4. His behavior 
has changed and his supervisor has noted that he has become defiant and confrontational. He has also started coming to 
work late and leaving early in addition to his unexcused absences.   
G3SLRHP2 Curtis Quinn appears to possibly be involved in stealing and sharing or selling sensitive information to a foreign national. 
Mr. Quinn has a recent history of requesting access to programs without a need to know, is delinquent of financial 
obligations, accessing work buildings outside of normal business hours, and was observed interacting with a foreign 
national on a business trip. Mr. Quinn lied about the contact. Mr. Quinn is a top performer at work, but is recent behavior 
suggests there may be a security concern. 
G3SLRHP3 Mr. Payne has a TS/SCI clearance and has had access to CI for work. General characterization of his demeanor is 
reclusive and occasionally grumpy. Payne seems to take pride in his work but reluctant to socialize or involve peers with 
group work. 
 
The incident in question is the result of a colleague seen with an attractive female that appears to be foreign. Additional 
aggravating factors that raise concern for security is that Payne has been delinquent on two credit card payments, and 
recently denied CI access to three programs although dates denied to access are difficult to corroborate with other events. 
Additionally, Payne spent an extra hour in BLDG A, but not in room 222 which is where he normally works. Typical 
days have Payne entering BLDG A, then taking about 3–5 minutes transit time to reach the location in room 222. On 2 
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Sep, Payne spent an extra hour in the building that appears to be unaccounted for. This may be explainable but warrants 
further explanation. The day prior to the extra hour, Payne received an email from an South Korea, and previous emails 
from same person exist. Again, may not be a factor, but worth looking into to determine if further investigation is 
required. 
 
Mitigating factors include that Payne and woman in question were dining at a public restaurant, in Payne’s hometown. 
Neither party seemed to hide that they were dining together.Payne did not volunteer information about the event but this 
matches his general non-social behavior. Colleagues description about female in question were that she looked like a 
foreign national. The female may not be a foreign national, and because of Payne’s wife’s background, and activity 
occurring publicly and in his hometown, the activity does not seem suspicious. 
 
Considering the information available, I would like to ask a few questions to clarify information available, but do net feel 
further investigation is warranted. 
G3SLRHP4 In this case Mr. Herbert Reeves was reported by a Ms. Aubrey McBride for “suspicious activity.”  
 
After reviewing the provided information I believe a formal investigation on Mr. Reeves is warranted.  
 
He has be hiding a romantic relationship with a foreign national (woman) that claims that she is from Malaysia, but her 
IP address is registered to China Unicom Laioning. Additionally, he recently made a trip to Malaysia to meet up with this 
woman and did not report his travel. 
 
Mr. Reeves co-workers reported him to be gullible, which the foreign national woman may be using to get closer to him 
and eventually phish for more information regarding Mr. Reeves job. It seems like he already provide some details of 
what he does on the job during their recent encounter in Malaysia.  
 
Lastly, Mr. Reeves has been late making payments on his student loans, which could be used as leverage if his debt is 
large. This could establish a pattern of not meeting financial obligations 
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B. DISTRIBUTIONAL FITTING 
Table 48.   Distributional Fitting. 
 
 
1. Tests of Normality 
This research assessed six dependent variables for normality—performance, time, 
accuracy, confidence, information overload, and social impact—using Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests. The data from all but one dependent variable was not 
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normally distributed, which indicates that non-parametric tests are required to assess 
differences between groups (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). General consensus holds statistical 
significance when p < .05, but tests of normality are opposite. The null hypothesis for the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test states that the data fits a normal distribution. Thus, a high p 
value indicates the data follows a normal distribution. Results from the normality tests are 
listed in Table 49.  
Table 49.   Tests of Data Distribution Normality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Performance .249 24 .000 .835 24 .001 
Time .136 24 .200
*
 .933 24 .111 
Accuracy .503 24 .000 .454 24 .000 
Confidence .180 24 .043 .909 24 .034 
InfoOvld .285 24 .000 .770 24 .000 
SocImpact .286 24 .000 .759 24 .000 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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ITA performance is comprised of a rank-transformed time component and a 
binary accuracy component. Performance values follow a bimodal distribution when the 
accuracy data reflects both correct and incorrect analyses. Performance was distributed 
between .298 and 1.807, a range of 1.509 (µ = 1.25, σ = .458). According to both the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality, performance is not normally 
distributed (p < .05). Figure 13 is a visual representation of the bimodal performance data 
distribution. 
Figure 13.  Performance Data Distribution. 
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ITA time data was distributed between 390 and 2022 seconds, a range of 1632 
seconds (µ = 923.71, σ = 384.12). ITA time data was normally distributed according to 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test for normality (p < .05). Figure 14 is a 
visual representation of the time data distribution. 
Figure 14.  Time Data Distribution. 
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ITA accuracy was distributed between two values: 0 and 1 (µ = .71, σ = .459). 34 
participants performed a correct insider threat analysis and 14 performed an incorrect 
analysis. Figure 15 is a visual representation of the accuracy data distribution. 
Figure 15.  Accuracy Data Distribution. 
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Confidence was distributed between 5 and 9 (µ = 7.17, σ = 1.191). According to 
both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality, the confidence data 
does not fit a normal distribution (p < .05). Figure 16 is a visual representation of the 
confidence data distribution.  
Figure 16.  Confidence Data Distribution. 
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Information overload ranges from 1 to 5 (µ = 1.94, σ = 1.174). According to both 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality, the information overload 
data does not fit a normal distribution (p < .05). Figure 17 is a visual representation of the 
information overload data distribution.  
Figure 17.  Information Overload Data Distribution. 
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Social impact ranges from 1 to 4 (µ = 1.83, σ = 1.049). According to both the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality, the social impact data does 
not fit a normal distribution (p < .05). Figure 18 is a visual representation of the 
information overload data distribution.  
Figure 18.  Social Impact Data Distribution. 
 
2. Tests of Homoscedasticity  
Heteroscedasticity is common in cross-sectional data (Long and Ervin, 2000). 
This research does not evaluate time-series data; thus, homoscedasticity is not applicable 
for ITA performance, accuracy, confidence, and perception of information overload. This 
research used Levene’s test for Equality of Error Variances to determine that the time 
data is not homoscedastic (p < .05). The results from Levene’s test are in Table 50.  
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Table 50.   Levene’s Test for Equality of Error Variances. 
Dependent Variable: Time 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
3.998 3 44 .013 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal 
across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Team + Ign + Team * Ign 
C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Almost all distributions can be described within 4 moments (some distributions require 
one moment, while others require two moments, and so forth). Descriptive statistics 
quantitatively capture these moments. The first moment describes the location of a 
distribution (i.e., mean, median, and mode) and is interpreted as the expected value, 
expected returns, or the average value of occurrences. 
 
The Arithmetic Mean calculates the average of all occurrences by summing up all of the 
data points and dividing them by the number of points. The Geometric Mean is calculated 
by taking the power root of the products of all the data points and requires them to all be 
positive. The Geometric Mean is more accurate for percentages or rates that fluctuate 
significantly. For example, you can use Geometric Mean to calculate average growth rate 
given compound interest with variable rates. The Trimmed Mean calculates the 
arithmetic average of the data set after the extreme outliers have been trimmed. As 
averages are prone to significant bias when outliers exist, the Trimmed Mean reduces 
such bias in skewed distributions. 
 
The Standard Error of the Mean calculates the error surrounding the sample mean. The 
larger the sample size, the smaller the error such that for an infinitely large sample size, 
the error approaches zero, indicating that the population parameter has been estimated. 
Due to sampling errors, the 95% Confidence Interval for the Mean is provided. Based on 
an analysis of the sample data points, the actual population mean should fall between 
these Lower and Upper Intervals for the Mean. 
 
Median is the data point where 50% of all data points fall above this value and 50% 
below this value. Among the three first moment statistics, the median is least susceptible 
to outliers. A symmetrical distribution has the Median equal to the Arithmetic Mean. A 
skewed distribution exists when the Median is far away from the Mean. The Mode 
measures the most frequently occurring data point. 
 
Minimum is the smallest value in the data set while Maximum is the largest value. Range 
is the difference between the Maximum and Minimum values. 
 
The second moment measures a distribution’s spread or width, and is frequently 
described using measures such as Standard Deviations, Variances, Quartiles, and Inter-
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Quartile Ranges. Standard Deviation indicates the average deviation of all data points 
from their mean. It is a popular measure as is associated with risk (higher standard 
deviations mean a wider distribution, higher risk, or wider dispersion of data points 
around the mean) and its units are identical to original data set’s. The Sample Standard 
Deviation differs from the Population Standard Deviation in that the former uses a degree 
of freedom correction to account for small sample sizes. Also, Lower and Upper 
Confidence Intervals are provided for the Standard Deviation and the true population 
standard deviation falls within this interval. If your data set covers every element of the 
population, use the Population Standard Deviation instead. The two Variance measures 
are simply the squared values of the standard deviations.  
 
The Coefficient of Variability is the standard deviation of the sample divided by the 
sample mean, proving a unit-free measure of dispersion that can be compared across 
different distributions (you can now compare distributions of values denominated in 
millions of dollars with one in billions of dollars, or meters and kilograms, etc.). The First 
Quartile measures the 25th percentile of the data points when arranged from its smallest 
to largest value. The Third Quartile is the value of the 75th percentile data point. 
Sometimes quartiles are used as the upper and lower ranges of a distribution as it 
truncates the data set to ignore outliers. The Inter-Quartile Range is the difference 
between the third and first quartiles, and is often used to measure the width of the center 
of a distribution. 
 
Skewness is the third moment in a distribution. Skewness characterizes the degree of 
asymmetry of a distribution around its mean. Positive skewness indicates a distribution 
with an asymmetric tail extending toward more positive values. Negative skewness 
indicates a distribution with an asymmetric tail extending toward more negative values. 
 
Kurtosis characterizes the relative peakedness or flatness of a distribution compared to 
the normal distribution. It is the fourth moment in a distribution. A positive Kurtosis 
value indicates a relatively peaked distribution. A negative kurtosis indicates a relatively 
flat distribution. The Kurtosis measured here has been centered to zero (certain other 
kurtosis measures are centered around 3.0). While both are equally valid, centering across 
zero makes the interpretation simpler. A high positive Kurtosis indicates a peaked 
distribution around its center and leptokurtic or fat tails. This indicates a higher 
probability of extreme events (e.g., catastrophic events, terrorist attacks, stock market 
crashes) than is predicted in a normal distribution. Table 51 presents summary statistics.  
 
Table 51.   Summary Statistics. 
Statistics Time   
Observations 48.0000 Standard Deviation (Sample) 384.1219 
Arithmetic Mean 923.7083 Standard Deviation (Population) 380.0995 
Geometric Mean 851.8832 
Lower Confidence Interval for Standard 
Deviation 329.1730 
Trimmed Mean 897.7955 
Upper Confidence Interval for Standard 
Deviation 463.5905 
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Standard Error of Arithmetic 
Mean 55.4432 Variance (Sample) 147549.6152 
Lower Confidence Interval for 
Mean 812.8219 Variance (Population) 144475.6649 
Upper Confidence Interval for 
Mean 1034.5948 Coefficient of Variability 0.4158 
Median 842.0000 First Quartile (Q1) 600.0000 
Minimum 390.0000 Third Quartile (Q3) 1209.0000 
Maximum 2022.0000 Inter-Quartile Range 609.0000 
Range 1632.0000 Skewness 0.9497 
  Kurtosis 0.8407 
 
Statistics Accuracy   
Observations 48.0000 Standard Deviation (Sample) 0.4593 
Arithmetic Mean 0.7083 Standard Deviation (Population) 0.4545 
Geometric Mean 0.0000 
Lower Confidence Interval for Standard 
Deviation 0.3936 
Trimmed Mean 0.7273 
Upper Confidence Interval for Standard 
Deviation 0.5544 
Standard Error of Arithmetic 
Mean 0.0663 Variance (Sample) 0.2110 
Lower Confidence Interval for 
Mean 0.5757 Variance (Population) 0.2066 
Upper Confidence Interval for 
Mean 0.8409 Coefficient of Variability 0.6485 
Median 1.0000 First Quartile (Q1) 0.0000 
Minimum 0.0000 Third Quartile (Q3) 1.0000 
Maximum 1.0000 Inter-Quartile Range 1.0000 
Range 1.0000 Skewness -0.9465 
  Kurtosis -1.1540 
    
Statistics Performance   
Observations 48.0000 Standard Deviation (Sample) 0.4583 
Arithmetic Mean 1.2515 Standard Deviation (Population) 0.4535 
Geometric Mean 1.1408 
Lower Confidence Interval for Standard 
Deviation 0.3927 
Trimmed Mean 1.2682 
Upper Confidence Interval for Standard 
Deviation 0.5531 
Standard Error of Arithmetic 
Mean 0.0661 Variance (Sample) 0.2100 
Lower Confidence Interval for 
Mean 1.1192 Variance (Population) 0.2056 
Upper Confidence Interval for 
Mean 1.3838 Coefficient of Variability 0.3662 
Median 1.4216 First Quartile (Q1) 0.7463 
Minimum 0.2977 Third Quartile (Q3) 1.6034 
Maximum 1.8071 Inter-Quartile Range 0.8571 
Range 1.5094 Skewness -0.6754 
  Kurtosis -1.0138 
 
Statistics Confidence   
Observations 48.0000 Standard Deviation (Sample) 1.1910 
Arithmetic Mean 7.1667 Standard Deviation (Population) 1.1785 
Geometric Mean 7.0690 
Lower Confidence Interval for Standard 
Deviation 1.0206 
Trimmed Mean 7.1818 
Upper Confidence Interval for Standard 
Deviation 1.4374 
Standard Error of Arithmetic 
Mean 0.1719 Variance (Sample) 1.4184 
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Lower Confidence Interval for 
Mean 6.8229 Variance (Population) 1.3889 
Upper Confidence Interval for 
Mean 7.5105 Coefficient of Variability 0.1662 
Median 7.0000 First Quartile (Q1) 6.0000 
Minimum 5.0000 Third Quartile (Q3) 8.0000 
Maximum 9.0000 Inter-Quartile Range 2.0000 
Range 4.0000 Skewness 0.1373 
  Kurtosis -0.8717 
 
Statistics InfoOvld   
Observations 48.0000 Standard Deviation (Sample) 1.1743 
Arithmetic Mean 1.9375 Standard Deviation (Population) 1.1620 
Geometric Mean 1.6591 
Lower Confidence Interval for Standard 
Deviation 1.0063 
Trimmed Mean 1.8409 
Upper Confidence Interval for Standard 
Deviation 1.4172 
Standard Error of Arithmetic 
Mean 0.1695 Variance (Sample) 1.3790 
Lower Confidence Interval for 
Mean 1.5985 Variance (Population) 1.3503 
Upper Confidence Interval for 
Mean 2.2765 Coefficient of Variability 0.6061 
Median 2.0000 First Quartile (Q1) 1.0000 
Minimum 1.0000 Third Quartile (Q3) 2.0000 
Maximum 5.0000 Inter-Quartile Range 1.0000 
Range 4.0000 Skewness 1.2773 
  Kurtosis 0.9528 
 
D. HETEROSKEDASTICITY, MICRONUMEROSITY, OUTLIERS AND 
NONLINEARITY 
A common violation in forecasting and regression analysis is heteroskedasticity, that is, 
the variance of the errors increases over time. Visually, the width of the vertical data 
fluctuations increases or fans out over time, and typically, the coefficient of 
determination (R-squared coefficient) drops significantly when heteroskedasticity exists. 
If the variance of the dependent variable is not constant, then the error’s variance will not 
be constant. Unless the heteroskedasticity of the dependent variable is pronounced, its 
effect will not be severe: the least-squares estimates will still be unbiased, and the 
estimates of the slope and intercept will either be normally distributed if the errors are 
normally distributed, or at least normally distributed asymptotically (as the number of 
data points becomes large) if the errors are not normally distributed. The estimate for the 
variance of the slope and overall variance will be inaccurate, but the inaccuracy is not 
likely to be substantial if the independent-variable values are symmetric about their 
mean. 
 
If the number of data points is small (micronumerosity), it may be difficult to detect 
assumption violations. With small samples, assumption violations such as non-normality 
or heteroskedasticity of variances are difficult to detect even when they are present. With 
a small number of data points, linear regression offers less protection against violation of 
assumptions. With few data points, it may be hard to determine how well the fitted line 
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matches the data, or whether a nonlinear function would be more appropriate. Even if 
none of the test assumptions are violated, a linear regression on a small number of data 
points may not have sufficient power to detect a significant difference between the slope 
and zero, even if the slope is nonzero. The power depends on the residual error, the 
observed variation in the independent variable, the selected significance alpha level of the 
test, and the number of data points. Power decreases as the residual variance increases, 
decreases as the significance level is decreased (i.e., as the test is made more stringent), 
increases as the variation in observed independent variable increases, and increases as the 
number of data points increases. 
 
Values may not be identically distributed because of the presence of outliers. Outliers are 
anomalous values in the data. Outliers may have a strong influence over the fitted slope 
and intercept, giving a poor fit to the bulk of the data points. Outliers tend to increase the 
estimate of residual variance, lowering the chance of rejecting the null hypothesis, i.e., 
creating higher prediction errors. They may be due to recording errors, which may be 
correctable, or they may be due to the dependent-variable values not all being sampled 
from the same population. Apparent outliers may also be due to the dependent-variable 
values being from the same, but non-normal, population. However, a point may be an 
unusual value in either an independent or dependent variable without necessarily being an 
outlier in the scatter plot. In regression analysis, the fitted line can be highly sensitive to 
outliers. In other words, least squares regression is not resistant to outliers, thus, neither is 
the fitted-slope estimate. A point vertically removed from the other points can cause the 
fitted line to pass close to it, instead of following the general linear trend of the rest of the 
data, especially if the point is relatively far horizontally from the center of the data.  
 
 
Diagnostic Results             
                  
 
Heteroskedasticity Micronumerosity Outliers Nonlinearity 
 
W-Test Hypothesis Test Approximation Natural Natural 
Number 
of  
Nonlinear 
Test 
Hypothesis 
Test 
Variable p-value result result 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Potential 
Outliers p-value result 
Y 
  
no problems 168.91 1678.51 2 
  Age 0.6898 Homoskedastic no problems 14.86 61.01 3 0.6560 linear 
         
E. AUTOCORRELATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND 
DISTRIBUTIVE LAGS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
A typical issue when forecasting time-series data is whether the independent-variable 
values are truly independent of each other or are they dependent. Dependent variable 
values collected over a time-series may be autocorrelated. For serially correlated 
dependent-variable values, the estimates of the slope and intercept will be unbiased, but 
the estimates of their forecast and variances will not be reliable and hence the validity of 
certain statistical goodness-of-fit tests will be flawed. For instance, interest rates, inflation 
rates, sales, revenues, and many other time-series data are typically autocorrelated, where 
 227 
the value in the current period is related to the value in a previous period, and so forth 
(clearly, the inflation rate in March is related to February’s level, which in turn, is related 
to January’s level, and so forth). Ignoring such blatant relationships will yield biased and 
less accurate forecasts. In such events, an autocorrelated regression model or an ARIMA 
model may be better suited (Risk Simulator l Forecasting l ARIMA). Finally, the 
autocorrelation functions of a series that is nonstationary tend to decay slowly (see 
Nonstationary report). 
 
If autocorrelation AC(1) is nonzero, it means that the series is first order serially 
correlated. If AC(k) dies off more or less geometrically with increasing lag, it implies that 
the series follows a low-order autoregressive process. If AC(k) drops to zero after a small 
number of lags, it implies that the series follows a low-order moving-average process. 
Partial correlation PAC(k) measures the correlation of  values that are k periods apart 
after removing the correlation from the intervening lags. If the pattern of autocorrelation 
can be captured by an autoregression of order less than k, then the partial autocorrelation 
at lag k will be close to zero. Ljung-Box Q-statistics and their p-values at lag k has the 
null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to order k. The dotted lines in the plots 
of the autocorrelations are the approximate two standard error bounds. If the 
autocorrelation is within these bounds, it is not significantly different from zero at the 5% 
significance level. 
 
Autocorrelation measures the relationship to the past of the dependent Y variable to itself. 
Distributive Lags, in contrast, are time-lag relationships between the dependent Y 
variable and different independent X variables. For instance, the movement and direction 
of mortgage rates tend to follow the Federal Funds Rate but at a time lag (typically 1 to 3 
months). Sometimes, time lags follow cycles and seasonality (e.g., ice cream sales tend to 
peak during the summer months and are hence related to last summer’s sales, 12 months 
in the past). The distributive lag analysis below show how the dependent variable is 
related to each of the independent variables at various time lags, when all lags are 
considered simultaneously, to determine which time lags are statistically significant and 
should be considered.  
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F. TEST FOR NORMALITY AND SPHERICITY OF ERRORS 
Another requirement in running a regression model is the assumption of normality and 
sphericity of the error term. If the assumption of normality is violated or outliers are 
present, then the linear regression goodness-of-fit test may not be the most powerful or 
informative test available, and this could mean the difference between detecting a linear 
fit or not. If the errors are not independent and not normally distributed, it may indicate 
that the data might be autocorrelated or suffer from nonlinearities or other more 
destructive errors. Independence of the errors can also be detected in the 
heteroskedasticity tests (see Diagnostics report). 
 
The Normality test on the errors performed is a nonparametric test, which makes no 
assumptions about the specific shape of the population from which the sample is drawn, 
allowing for smaller sample data sets to be analyzed. This test evaluates the null 
hypothesis of whether the sample errors were drawn from a normally distributed 
population, versus an alternate hypothesis that the data sample is not normally 
distributed. If the calculated D-Statistic is greater than or equal to the D-Critical values at 
various significance values then reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternate 
hypothesis (the errors are not normally distributed). Otherwise, if the D-Statistic is less 
than the D-Critical value, do not reject the null hypothesis (the errors are normally 
distributed). This test relies on two cumulative frequencies: one derived from the sample 
data set, the second from a theoretical distribution based on the mean and standard 
deviation of the sample data.  
 
Test Result 
           
 
Regression Error Average 0.00 
  
Errors 
Relative 
Frequency 
Observed Expected O-E 
 
 
Standard Deviation of 
Errors 383.32 
  
-514.60 0.02 0.02 0.0897 -0.0689 
 
 
D Statistic 0.1125 
  
-498.01 0.02 0.04 0.0969 -0.0553 
 
 
D Critical at 1% 0.1162 
  
-459.79 0.02 0.06 0.1152 -0.0527 
 
 
D Critical at 5% 0.1250 
  
-455.68 0.02 0.08 0.1173 -0.0339 
 
 
D Critical at 10% 0.1488 
  
-439.90 0.02 0.10 0.1256 -0.0214 
 Null Hypothesis: The errors are normally 
distributed. 
 
-424.55 0.02 0.13 0.1340 -0.0090 
 
     
-416.90 0.02 0.15 0.1384 0.0074 
 Conclusion: The errors are normally 
distributed at the 1% alpha level.  
-397.20 0.02 0.17 0.1501 0.0166 
 
 
-345.58 0.02 0.19 0.1837 0.0038 
 
 
 
  
-344.82 0.02 0.21 0.1842 0.0242 
 
   
-344.66 0.02 0.23 0.1843 0.0449 
 
   
-320.87 0.02 0.25 0.2013 0.0487 
 
   
-293.42 0.02 0.27 0.2220 0.0488 
 
     
-266.01 0.02 0.29 0.2439 0.0478 
 
     
-242.20 0.02 0.31 0.2637 0.0488 
 
     
-204.12 0.02 0.33 0.2972 0.0361 
 
     
-199.31 0.02 0.35 0.3016 0.0526 
 
     
-189.77 0.02 0.38 0.3103 0.0647 
 
     
-162.90 0.02 0.40 0.3354 0.0604 
 
 229 
     
-153.71 0.02 0.42 0.3442 0.0725 
 
     
-140.55 0.02 0.44 0.3569 0.0806 
 
     
-137.01 0.02 0.46 0.3604 0.0979 
 
     
-122.01 0.02 0.48 0.3751 0.1040 
 
     
-81.79 0.02 0.50 0.4155 0.0845 
 
     
-66.36 0.02 0.52 0.4313 0.0896 
 
     
-65.33 0.02 0.54 0.4323 0.1093 
 
     
-32.88 0.02 0.56 0.4658 0.0967 
 
     
-11.55 0.02 0.58 0.4880 0.0954 
 
     
-7.98 0.02 0.60 0.4917 0.1125 
 
     
27.34 0.02 0.63 0.5284 0.0966 
 
     
71.99 0.02 0.65 0.5745 0.0713 
 
     
118.88 0.02 0.67 0.6218 0.0449 
 
     
177.99 0.02 0.69 0.6788 0.0087 
 
     
193.99 0.02 0.71 0.6936 0.0147 
 
     
197.99 0.02 0.73 0.6973 0.0319 
 
     
272.78 0.02 0.75 0.7616 -0.0116 
 
     
281.23 0.02 0.77 0.7684 0.0024 
 
     
296.67 0.02 0.79 0.7805 0.0112 
 
     
338.53 0.02 0.81 0.8114 0.0011 
 
     
373.32 0.02 0.83 0.8349 -0.0016 
 
     
382.10 0.02 0.85 0.8406 0.0136 
 
     
392.21 0.02 0.88 0.8469 0.0281 
 
     
417.85 0.02 0.90 0.8622 0.0337 
 
     
421.23 0.02 0.92 0.8641 0.0526 
 
     
525.94 0.02 0.94 0.9150 0.0225 
 
     
696.10 0.02 0.96 0.9653 -0.0070 
 
     
1067.53 0.02 0.98 0.9973 -0.0182 
 
     
1085.78 0.02 1.00 0.9977 0.0023 
  
G. NONSTATIONARY ANALYSIS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Sometimes, certain types of time-series data cannot be modeled using any other methods 
except for a stochastic process, because the underlying events are stochastic in nature. 
For instance, you cannot adequately model and forecast stock prices, interest rates, price 
of oil, and other commodity prices using a simple regression model, because these 
variables are highly uncertain and volatile, and does not follow a predefined static rule of 
behavior, in other words, the process is not stationary. Stationarity is checked here using 
the Runs Test while another visual clue is found in the Autocorrelation report (the ACF 
tends to decay slowly). A stochastic process is a sequence of events or paths generated by 
probabilistic laws. That is, random events can occur over time but are governed by 
specific statistical and probabilistic rules. The main stochastic processes include Random 
Walk or Brownian Motion, Mean-Reversion, and Jump-Diffusion. These processes can 
be used to forecast a multitude of variables that seemingly follow random trends but 
restricted by probabilistic laws. The process-generating equation is known in advance but 
the actual results generated is unknown. 
 
The Random Walk Brownian Motion process can be used to forecast stock prices, prices 
of commodities, and other stochastic time-series data given a drift or growth rate and a 
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volatility around the drift path. The Mean-Reversion process can be used to reduce the 
fluctuations of the Random Walk process by allowing the path to target a long-term 
value, making it useful for forecasting time-series variables that have a long-term rate 
such as interest rates and inflation rates (these are long-term target rates by regulatory 
authorities or the market). The Jump-Diffusion process is useful for forecasting time-
series data when the variable can occasionally exhibit random jumps, such as oil prices or 
price of electricity (discrete exogenous event shocks can make prices jump up or down). 
These processes can also be mixed and matched as required. 
 
Statistical Summary 
             The following are the estimated parameters for a stochastic process given the data provided. It is 
up to you to determine if the probability of fit (similar to a goodness-of-fit computation) is sufficient 
to warrant the use of a stochastic process forecast, and if so, whether it is a random walk, mean-
reversion, or a jump-diffusion model, or combinations thereof. In choosing the right stochastic 
process model, you will have to rely on past experiences and a priori economic and financial 
expectations of what the underlying data set is best represented by. These parameters can be 
entered into a stochastic process forecast (Risk Simulator l Forecasting l Stochastic 
Processes). 
Periodic 
         Drift 
Rate 1.10% 
 
  
Reversion 
Rate 104.41% 
 
Jump 
Rate 14.89% 
 
Volatility 43.91% 
 
  
Long-Term 
Value 933.20 
 
Jump 
Size 440.44 
 
     
      
     Probability of stochastic model 
fit: 
A high fit means a stochastic 
model is better than 
conventional models. 
30.58%     
 
        
  
 
Runs 18 
  
Standard Normal -2.1106 
  
 
Positive 24 
  
P-Value (1-tail) 0.0174 
  
 
Negative 24 
  
P-Value (2-tail) 0.0348 
  
 
Expected 
Run 25 
  
  
   A low p-value (below 0.10, 0.05, 0.01) means that the sequence is not random and hence suffers from 
stationarity problems, and an ARIMA model might be more appropriate. Conversely, higher p-values indicate 
randomness and stochastic process models might be appropriate. 
 
  
 231 
H. RESEARCH QUESTION ANALYSES  
Q1: Does teamwork and ignorance interactively affect ITA performance? 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Performance   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .122
a
 3 .041 .183 .907 
Intercept 75.181 1 75.181 339.294 .000 
Teamwork .047 1 .047 .213 .647 
Ignorance .066 1 .066 .298 .588 
Teamwork * Ignorance .008 1 .008 .038 .847 
Error 9.749 44 .222   
Total 85.052 48    
Corrected Total 9.871 47    
a. R Squared = .012 (Adjusted R Squared = -.055) 
 
Q2: Does teamwork affect ITA  performance? 
 
Independent variable: Time 
Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.0048 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.0000 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.0691 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 0.4621 
Number of Observations   48 
 
The R-Squared or Coefficient of Determination indicates that 0.00 of the variation in the 
dependent variable can be explained and accounted for by the independent variables in 
this regression analysis. However, in a multiple regression, the Adjusted R-Squared takes 
into account the existence of additional independent variables or regressors and adjusts 
this R-Squared value to a more accurate view of the regression’s explanatory power. 
Hence, only 0.00 of the variation in the dependent variable can be explained by the 
regressors. 
 
The Multiple Correlation Coefficient (Multiple R) measures the correlation between the 
actual dependent variable (Y) and the estimated or fitted (Y) based on the regression 
equation. This is also the square root of the Coefficient of Determination (R-Squared). 
 
The Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) describes the dispersion of data points above 
and below the regression line or plane. This value is used as part of the calculation to 
obtain the confidence interval of the estimates later. 
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Regression Results   
    Intercept Teamwork  
Coefficients 1.2202 0.0626 
Standard Error 0.0943 0.1334 
t-Statistic   12.9350 0.4696 
p-Value   0.0000 0.6409 
Lower 5%   1.0303 -0.2059 
Upper 95% 1.4101 0.3312 
 
Degrees of 
Freedom       Hypothesis Test       
  Degrees of Freedom for Regression 1 Critical t-Statistic (99% confidence with df of 46) 2.6870 
  Degrees of Freedom for Residual   46 Critical t-Statistic (95% confidence with df of 46) 2.0129 
  Total Degrees of Freedom   47 Critical t-Statistic (90% confidence with df of 46) 1.6787 
 
The Coefficients provide the estimated regression intercept and slopes. For instance, the 
coefficients are estimates of the true; population b values in the following regression 
equation Y = b0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + ... + bnXn. The Standard Error measures how accurate 
the predicted Coefficients are, and the t-Statistics are the ratios of each predicted 
Coefficient to its Standard Error. 
The t-Statistic is used in hypothesis testing, where we set the null hypothesis (Ho) such 
that the real mean of the Coefficient = 0, and the alternate hypothesis (Ha) such that the 
real mean of the Coefficient is not equal to 0. A t-test is performed and the calculated t-
Statistic is compared to the critical values at the relevant Degrees of Freedom for 
Residual. The t-test is very important as it calculates if each of the coefficients is 
statistically significant in the presence of the other regressors. This means that the t-test 
statistically verifies whether a regressor or independent variable should remain in the 
regression or it should be dropped. 
 
The Coefficient is statistically significant if its calculated t-Statistic exceeds the Critical t-
Statistic at the relevant degrees of freedom (df). The three main confidence levels used to 
test for significance are 90%, 95% and 99%. If a Coefficient’s t-Statistic exceeds the 
Critical level, it is considered statistically significant. Alternatively, the p-Value 
calculates each t-Statistic’s probability of occurrence, which means that the smaller the p-
Value, the more significant the Coefficient. The usual significant levels for the p-Value 
are 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, corresponding to the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels. 
 
The Coefficients with their p-Values highlighted in blue indicate that they are statistically 
significant at the 90% confidence or 0.10 alpha level, while those highlighted in red 
indicate that they are not statistically significant at any other alpha levels. 
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Test Statisticsa 
 Performance 
Mann-Whitney U 265.000 
Wilcoxon W 565.000 
Z -.474 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .635 
a. Grouping Variable: Teamwork 
 
Q3: Does ignorance affect ITA performance? 
  
Test Statisticsa 
 Performance 
Mann-Whitney U 208.000 
Wilcoxon W 508.000 
Z -1.650 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .099 
a. Grouping Variable: Ignorance 
 
Dependent variable: Performance 
Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.0067 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.0000 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.0818 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 0.4617 
Number of Observations   48 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Ignorance 
Coefficients 1.2144 0.0742 
Standard Error 0.0942 0.1333 
t-Statistic   12.8861 0.5569 
p-Value   0.0000 0.5803 
Lower 5%   1.0247 -0.1940 
Upper 95% 1.4041 0.3425 
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Q4: Does teamwork and ignorance interactively affect ITA time? 
 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 4603525.417
a
 3 1534508.472 28.962 .000 .664 
Intercept 40955380.080 1 40955380.080 772.973 .000 .946 
Teamwork 1722176.333 1 1722176.333 32.504 .000 .425 
Ignorance 2847002.083 1 2847002.083 53.733 .000 .550 
Teamwork * Ignorance 34347.000 1 34347.000 .648 .425 .015 
Error 2331306.500 44 52984.239    
Total 47890212.000 48     
Corrected Total 6934831.917 47     
 
Q5: Does teamwork affect ITA time? 
 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 1722176.333
a
 1 1722176.333 15.198 .000 .248 
Intercept 40955380.080 1 40955380.080 361.418 .000 .887 
Teamwork 1722176.333 1 1722176.333 15.198 .000 .248 
Error 5212655.583 46 113318.600    
Total 47890212.000 48     
Corrected Total 6934831.917 47     
 
 
Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.2483 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.2320 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.4983 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 336.6283 
Number of Observations   48 
 
Dependent variable: Time 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Teamwork  
Coefficients 734.2917 378.8333 
Standard Error 68.7140 97.1762 
t-Statistic   10.6862 3.8984 
p-Value   0.0000 0.0003 
Lower 5%   595.9776 183.2278 
Upper 95% 872.6057 574.4389 
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Test Statisticsa 
 Time 
Mann-Whitney U 120.000 
Wilcoxon W 420.000 
Z -3.464 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
a. Grouping Variable: Teamwork 
 
Q6: Does ignorance affect ITA time? 
 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 2847002.083
a
 1 2847002.083 32.037 .000 .411 
Intercept 40955380.080 1 40955380.080 460.867 .000 .909 
Ignorance 2847002.083 1 2847002.083 32.037 .000 .411 
Error 4087829.833 46 88865.866    
Total 47890212.000 48     
Corrected Total 6934831.917 47     
 
Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.4105 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.3977 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.6407 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 298.1038 
Number of Observations   48 
 
Dependent variable: Time 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Ignorance 
Coefficients 1167.2500 -487.0833 
Standard Error 60.8502 86.0551 
t-Statistic   19.1824 -5.6601 
p-Value   0.0000 0.0000 
Lower 5%   1044.7649 -660.3034 
Upper 95% 1289.7351 -313.8633 
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Test Statisticsa 
 Time 
Mann-Whitney U 60.000 
Wilcoxon W 360.000 
Z -4.701 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
a. Grouping Variable: Ignorance 
 
Q7: Does teamwork and ignorance interactively affect ITA accuracy? 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Accuracy   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 1.083
a
 3 .361 1.799 .161 
Intercept 24.083 1 24.083 119.962 .000 
Teamwork .750 1 .750 3.736 .060 
Ignorance .333 1 .333 1.660 .204 
Teamwork * Ignorance .000 1 .000 .000 1.000 
Error 8.833 44 .201   
Total 34.000 48    
Corrected Total 9.917 47    
a. R Squared = .109 (Adjusted R Squared = .049) 
Q8: Does teamwork affect ITA accuracy? 
Dependent variable: Accuracy 
Regression Results           
              
Log Likelihood  Value -27.1141   Approach Logit   
              
  Variable   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Z-
Statistic p-Value 
      0.3367 0.4140 0.8133 0.4161 
  Teamwork    1.2726 0.6866 1.8535 0.0638 
 
Limited Dependent Variables describe the situation where the dependent variable 
contains data that are limited in scope and range, such as binary responses (0 or 1), 
truncated, ordered, or censored data. For instance, given a set of independent variables 
(e.g., age, income, education level of credit card or mortgage loan holders), we can model 
the probability of default using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The response or 
dependent variable Y is binary, that is, it can have only two possible outcomes which we 
will denote as 1 and 0 (e.g., Y may represent presence/absence of a certain condition, 
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defaulted/not defaulted on previous loans, success/failure of some device, answer yes/no 
on a survey, etc.) and we also have a vector of independent variable regressors X, which 
are assumed to influence the outcome Y. A typical ordinary least squares regression 
approach is invalid because the regression errors are heteroskedastic and non-normal, and 
the resulting estimated probability estimates will return nonsensical values of above 1 or 
below 0. MLE analysis handles these problems using an iterative optimization routine to 
maximize a log likelihood function when the dependent variables are limited.  
 
A Logit or Logistic regression is used for predicting the probability of occurrence of an 
event by fitting data to a logistic curve. It is a generalized linear model used for binomial 
regression, and like many forms of regression analysis, it makes use of several predictor 
variables that may be either numerical or categorical. MLE applied in a binary 
multivariate logistic analysis is used to model dependent variables to determine the 
expected probability of success of belonging to a certain group. The estimated 
coefficients for the Logit model are the logarithmic odds ratios, and cannot be interpreted 
directly as probabilities. A quick computation is first required and the approach is simple. 
 
Specifically, the Logit model is specified as Estimated Y = LN[Pi/(1–Pi)] or conversely, 
Pi = EXP(Estimated Y)/(1+EXP(Estimated Y)), and the coefficients βi are the log odds 
ratios, so taking the antilog or EXP(βi) we obtain the odds ratio of Pi/(1–Pi). This means 
that with an increase in a unit of βi the log odds ratio increases by this amount. Finally, 
the rate of change in the probability dP/dX = βiPi(1–Pi). The Standard Error measures 
how accurate the predicted Coefficients are, and the t-Statistics are the ratios of each 
predicted Coefficient to its Standard Error and are used in the typical regression 
hypothesis test of the significance of each estimated parameter. To estimate the 
probability of success of belonging to a certain group (e.g., predicting if a smoker will 
develop chest complications given the amount smoked per year), simply compute the 
Estimated Y value using the MLE coefficients. For example, if the model is Y = 1.1 + 
0.005 (Cigarrettes) then for someone smoking 100 packs per year has an Estimated Y of 
1.1 + 0.005(100) = 1.6. Next, compute the inverse antilog of the odds ratio by doing: 
EXP(Estimated Y)/[1 + EXP(Estimated Y)] = EXP(1.6)/(1+ EXP(1.6)) = 0.8320. So, 
such a person has an 83.20% chance of developing some chest complications in his 
lifetime. 
 
A Probit model (sometimes also known as a Normit model) is a popular alternative 
specification for a binary response model which employs a probit function estimated 
using maximum likelihood estimation and the approach is called probit regression. The 
Probit and Logistic regression models tend to produce very similar predictions where the 
parameter estimates in a logistic regression tend to be 1.6 to 1.8 times higher than they 
are in a corresponding Probit model. The choice of using a Probit or Logit is entirely up 
to convenience, and the main distinction is that the logistic distribution has a higher 
kurtosis (fatter tails) to account for extreme values. For example, suppose that house 
ownership is the decision to be modeled, and this response variable is binary (home 
purchase or no home purchase) and depends on a series of independent variables Xi such 
as income, age, and so forth, such that Ii = β0 + β1X1 +...+ βnXn, where the larger the 
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value of Ii, the higher the probability of home ownership. For each family, a critical I* 
threshold exists, where if exceeded, the house is purchased, otherwise, no home is 
purchased, and the outcome probability (P) is assumed to be normally distributed, such 
that Pi = CDF(I) using a standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF). 
Therefore, use the estimated coefficients exactly like that of a regression model and using 
the Estimated Y value, apply a standard normal distribution (you can use Excel’s 
NORMSDIST function or Risk Simulator’s Distributional Analysis tool by selecting 
Normal distribution and setting the mean to be 0 and standard deviation to be 1). Finally, 
to obtain a Probit or probability unit measure, set Ii + 5 (this is because whenever the 
probability Pi < 0.5, the estimated Ii is negative, due to the fact that the normal 
distribution is symmetrical around a mean of zero). 
 
The Tobit Model (Censored Tobit) is an econometric and biometric modeling method 
used to describe the relationship between a non-negative dependent variable Yi and one 
or more independent variables Xi. A Tobit model is an econometric model in which the 
dependent variable is censored; that is, the dependent variable is censored because values 
below zero are not observed. The Tobit model assumes that there is a latent unobservable 
variable Y*. This variable is linearly dependent on the Xi variables via a vector of βi 
coefficients that determine their inter-relationships. In addition, there is a normally 
distributed error term Ui to capture random influences on this relationship. The 
observable variable Yi is defined to be equal to the latent variables whenever the latent 
variables are above zero and Yi is assumed to be zero otherwise. That is, Yi = Y* if Y* > 
0 and Yi = 0 if Y* = 0. If the relationship parameter βi is estimated by using ordinary 
least squares regression of the observed Yi on Xi, the resulting regression estimators are 
inconsistent and yield downward biased slope coefficients and an upward biased 
intercept. Only MLE would be consistent for a Tobit model. In the Tobit model, there is 
an ancillary statistic called sigma, which is equivalent to the standard error of estimate in 
a standard ordinary least squares regression and the estimated coefficients are used the 
same way as a regression analysis. 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.630
a
 1 .057   
Continuity Correction
b
 2.521 1 .112   
Likelihood Ratio 3.721 1 .054   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .111 .055 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.555 1 .059   
N of Valid Cases 48     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .275 .057 
Cramer’s V .275 .057 
N of Valid Cases 48  
 
Q9: Does ignorance affect ITA accuracy? 
 
Dependent variable: Accuracy 
Results             
              
Log Likelihood  Value -28.1593   Approach Logit   
              
  Variable   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Z-
Statistic p-Value 
      1.3325 0.5023 2.6530 0.0080 
  Ignorance   -0.8222 0.6558 -1.2538 0.2099 
 
Variables: Accuracy * Ignorance 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.613
a
 1 .204   
Continuity Correction
b
 .908 1 .341   
Likelihood Ratio 1.631 1 .202   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .341 .171 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.580 1 .209   
N of Valid Cases 48     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Q10: Does teamwork and ignorance interact with ITA confidence? 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Confidence   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 4.167
a
 3 1.389 .978 .412 
Intercept 2465.333 1 2465.333 1735.595 .000 
Teamwork .750 1 .750 .528 .471 
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Ignorance 1.333 1 1.333 .939 .338 
Teamwork * Ignorance 2.083 1 2.083 1.467 .232 
Error 62.500 44 1.420   
Total 2532.000 48    
Corrected Total 66.667 47    
a. R Squared = .063 (Adjusted R Squared = -.001) 
 
Q11: Does teamwork affect ITA confidence? 
 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .750
a
 1 .750 .523 .473 .011 
Intercept 2465.333 1 2465.333 1720.435 .000 .974 
Teamwork .750 1 .750 .523 .473 .011 
Error 65.917 46 1.433    
Total 2532.000 48     
Corrected Total 66.667 47     
a. R Squared = .011 (Adjusted R Squared = -.010) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Dependent variable: Confidence 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Teamwork  
Coefficients 7.2917 -0.2500 
Standard Error 0.2444 0.3456 
t-Statistic   29.8410 -0.7235 
p-Value   0.0000 0.4731 
Lower 5%   6.7998 -0.9456 
Upper 95% 7.7835 0.4456 
 
Test Statisticsa 
 Confidence 
Mann-Whitney U 253.000 
Wilcoxon W 553.000 
Z -.746 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .456 
a. Grouping Variable: Teamwork 
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Q12: Does ignorance affect ITA confidence? 
 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 1.333
a
 1 1.333 .939 .338 .020 
Intercept 2465.333 1 2465.333 1735.796 .000 .974 
Ignorance 1.333 1 1.333 .939 .338 .020 
Error 65.333 46 1.420    
Total 2532.000 48     
Corrected Total 66.667 47     
a. R Squared = .020 (Adjusted R Squared = -.001) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Dependent Variable: Confidence 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Ignorance 
Coefficients 7.3333 -0.3333 
Standard Error 0.2433 0.3440 
t-Statistic   30.1452 -0.9689 
p-Value   0.0000 0.3377 
Lower 5%   6.8437 -1.0258 
Upper 95% 7.8230 0.3592 
 
Test Statisticsa 
 Confidence 
Mann-Whitney U 247.500 
Wilcoxon W 547.500 
Z -.863 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .388 
a. Grouping Variable: Ignorance 
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Q13: Does teamwork and ignorance interactively affect perceptions of information 
overload? 
 
ANOVA without simulated data:  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   InfoOvld   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power
b
 
Corrected Model 6.563
a
 3 2.188 1.652 .191 .101 4.957 .403 
Intercept 180.188 1 180.188 136.107 .000 .756 136.107 1.000 
Teamwork .188 1 .188 .142 .708 .003 .142 .066 
Ignorance 1.688 1 1.688 1.275 .265 .028 1.275 .197 
Teamwork * Ignorance 4.688 1 4.688 3.541 .067 .074 3.541 .453 
Error 58.250 44 1.324      
Total 245.000 48       
Corrected Total 64.813 47       
a. R Squared = .101 (Adjusted R Squared = .040) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
ANOVA with simulated data: 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   InfoOvld   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power
b
 
Corrected Model 52.098
a
 3 17.366 13.324 .000 .083 39.973 1.000 
Intercept 1643.223 1 1643.223 1260.788 .000 .740 1260.788 1.000 
Teamwork 1.080 1 1.080 .829 .363 .002 .829 .149 
Ignorance 10.938 1 10.938 8.392 .004 .019 8.392 .824 
Teamwork * 
Ignorance 
40.080 1 40.080 30.752 .000 .065 30.752 1.000 
Error 578.679 444 1.303      
Total 2274.000 448       
Corrected Total 630.777 447       
a. R Squared = .083 (Adjusted R Squared = .076) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
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Q14: Does teamwork affect perceptions of information overload? 
 
Dependent variable: InfoOvld 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Teamwork  
Coefficients 2.0000 -0.1250 
Standard Error 0.2419 0.3422 
t-Statistic   8.2664 -0.3653 
p-Value   0.0000 0.7165 
Lower 5%   1.5130 -0.8137 
Upper 95% 2.4870 0.5637 
 
Test Statisticsa 
 InfoOvld 
Mann-Whitney U 284.500 
Wilcoxon W 584.500 
Z -.078 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .938 
a. Grouping Variable: Teamwork 
 
Q15: Does ignorance affect perceptions of information overload? 
 
Dependent Variable: InfoOvld 
Regression Results     
    Intercept Ignorance   
Coefficients 2.1250 -0.3750   
Standard Error 0.2391 0.3382   
t-Statistic   8.8867 -1.1089   
p-Value   0.0000 0.2732   
Lower 5%   1.6437 -1.0557   
Upper 95% 2.6063 0.3057   
 
Test Statisticsa 
 InfoOvld 
Mann-Whitney U 251.000 
Wilcoxon W 551.000 
Z -.819 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .413 
a. Grouping Variable: Ignorance 
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Q16: Does ignorance affect perceptions of social impact? 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   SocImpact   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 2.667
a
 1 2.667 2.588 .122 
Intercept 80.667 1 80.667 78.294 .000 
Ignorance 2.667 1 2.667 2.588 .122 
Error 22.667 22 1.030   
Total 106.000 24    
Corrected Total 25.333 23    
a. R Squared = .105 (Adjusted R Squared = .065) 
 
Test Statisticsa 
 SocImpact 
Mann-Whitney U 52.000 
Wilcoxon W 130.000 
Z -1.253 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .210 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .266
b
 
a. Grouping Variable: Ignorance 
b. Not corrected for ties. 
 
Q17: Does any scenario affect ITA time? 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Time   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 548592.083
a
 3 182864.028 1.260 .300 
Intercept 40955380.080 1 40955380.080 282.175 .000 
Scenario 548592.083 3 182864.028 1.260 .300 
Error 6386239.833 44 145141.814   
Total 47890212.000 48    
Corrected Total 6934831.917 47    
a. R Squared = .079 (Adjusted R Squared = .016) 
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Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.0737 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.0535 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.2714 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 373.7019 
Number of Observations   48 
 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Scenario 
Coefficients 693.0417 92.2667 
Standard Error 132.1236 48.2447 
t-Statistic   5.2454 1.9125 
p-Value   0.0000 0.0621 
Lower 5%   427.0907 -4.8449 
Upper 95% 958.9926 189.3782 
 
Test Statisticsa,b 
 Time 
Chi-Square 2.342 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. .505 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: 
Scenario 
 
Q18: Does scenario outcome affect ITA time? 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Time   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 206981.333
a
 1 206981.333 1.415 .240 
Intercept 40955380.080 1 40955380.080 280.022 .000 
Outcome 206981.333 1 206981.333 1.415 .240 
Error 6727850.583 46 146257.621   
Total 47890212.000 48    
Corrected Total 6934831.917 47    
a. R Squared = .030 (Adjusted R Squared = .009) 
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Dependent variable: Time 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Outcome 
Coefficients 858.0417 131.3333 
Standard Error 78.0645 110.3999 
t-Statistic   10.9914 1.1896 
p-Value   0.0000 0.2403 
Lower 5%   700.9060 -90.8901 
Upper 95% 1015.1774 353.5568 
 
Test Statisticsa 
 Time 
Mann-Whitney U 248.000 
Wilcoxon W 548.000 
Z -.825 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .409 
a. Grouping Variable: Outcome 
 
Q19: Does any scenario affect ITA performance? 
  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Performance   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 1.557
a
 3 .519 2.747 .054 
Intercept 75.181 1 75.181 397.885 .000 
Scenario 1.557 3 .519 2.747 .054 
Error 8.314 44 .189   
Total 85.052 48    
Corrected Total 9.871 47    
a. R Squared = .158 (Adjusted R Squared = .100) 
 
Test Statisticsa,b 
 Performance 
Chi-Square 6.975 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. .073 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Scenario 
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Dependent variable: Performance 
Regression Results     
    Intercept Scenario   
Coefficients 1.4072 -0.0623   
Standard Error 0.1618 0.0591   
t-Statistic   8.6955 -1.0542   
p-Value   0.0000 0.2973   
Lower 5%   1.0815 -0.1812   
Upper 95% 1.7330 0.0567   
          
 
Q20: Does scenario outcome affect ITA performance?  
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Performance   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .411
a
 1 .411 1.998 .164 
Intercept 75.181 1 75.181 365.565 .000 
Outcome .411 1 .411 1.998 .164 
Error 9.460 46 .206   
Total 85.052 48    
Corrected Total 9.871 47    
a. R Squared = .042 (Adjusted R Squared = .021) 
 
Regression Results   
    Intercept 
Scenario 
Type 
Coefficients 1.1590 0.1850 
Standard Error 0.0926 0.1309 
t-Statistic   12.5202 1.4135 
p-Value   0.0000 0.1642 
Lower 5%   0.9726 -0.0785 
Upper 95% 1.3453 0.4486 
 
Test Statisticsa 
 Performance 
Mann-Whitney U 221.000 
Wilcoxon W 521.000 
Z -1.382 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .167 
a. Grouping Variable: Outcome 
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Q21: Does any scenario affect ITA accuracy? 
 
Dependent variable: Accuracy 
Results             
        
Log Likelihood  Value -28.9343   Approach Logit   
              
  Variable   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Z-
Statistic p-Value 
      1.0854 0.7896 1.3746 0.1692 
  Scenario   -0.0791 0.2845 -0.2779 0.7811 
 
Variables: Scenario * Accuracy 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.857
a
 3 .077 
Likelihood Ratio 10.072 3 .018 
Linear-by-Linear Association .079 1 .779 
N of Valid Cases 48   
a. 4 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 3.50. 
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Q22: Does scenario outcome affect ITA accuracy? 
 
Dependent variable: Accuracy 
Results             
              
Log Likelihood  Value -27.1141   Approach Logit   
              
  Variable   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Z-
Statistic p-Value 
      0.3367 0.4140 0.8133 0.4161 
  Scenario Type   1.2726 0.6866 1.8535 0.0638 
 
Variables: Outcome * Accuracy 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.630
a
 1 .057   
Continuity Correction
b
 2.521 1 .112   
Likelihood Ratio 3.721 1 .054   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .111 .055 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.555 1 .059   
N of Valid Cases 48     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Q23: Does any scenario affect ITA decision confidence? 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Confidence   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 18.833
a
 3 6.278 5.775 .002 
Intercept 2465.333 1 2465.333 2267.763 .000 
Scenario 18.833 3 6.278 5.775 .002 
Error 47.833 44 1.087   
Total 2532.000 48    
Corrected Total 66.667 47    
a. R Squared = .283 (Adjusted R Squared = .234) 
 
Dependent variable: Confidence 
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Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.0563 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.0357 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.2372 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 1.1695 
Number of Observations   48 
Regression Results     
    Intercept Scenario   
Coefficients 6.5417 0.2500   
Standard Error 0.4135 0.1510   
t-Statistic   15.8208 1.6558   
p-Value   0.0000 0.1046   
Lower 5%   5.7094 -0.0539   
Upper 95% 7.3740 0.5539   
 
Test Statisticsa,b 
 Confidence 
Chi-Square 12.123 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. .007 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: 
Scenario 
 
Q24: Does scenario outcome affect ITA decision confidence? 
 
 
Dependent variable: Confidence 
Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.2813 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.2656 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.5303 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 1.0206 
Number of Observations   48 
 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Outcome 
Coefficients 6.5417 1.2500 
Standard Error 0.2083 0.2946 
t-Statistic   31.4000 4.2426 
p-Value   0.0000 0.0001 
Lower 5%   6.1223 0.6569 
Upper 95% 6.9610 1.8431 
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Test Statisticsa 
 Confidence 
Mann-Whitney U 125.500 
Wilcoxon W 425.500 
Z -3.463 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
a. Grouping Variable: Outcome 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Confidence   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power
b
 
Corrected Model 18.750
a
 1 18.750 18.000 .000 .281 18.000 .986 
Intercept 2465.333 1 2465.333 2366.720 .000 .981 2366.720 1.000 
Outcome 18.750 1 18.750 18.000 .000 .281 18.000 .986 
Error 47.917 46 1.042      
Total 2532.000 48       
Corrected Total 66.667 47       
a. R Squared = .281 (Adjusted R Squared = .266) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Q25: Does any scenario affect perceptions of information overload? 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   InfoOvld   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 1.563
a
 3 .521 .362 .781 
Intercept 180.188 1 180.188 125.348 .000 
Scenario 1.563 3 .521 .362 .781 
Error 63.250 44 1.438   
Total 245.000 48    
Corrected Total 64.813 47    
a. R Squared = .024 (Adjusted R Squared = -.042) 
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Dependent variable: InfoOvld 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Scenario 
Coefficients 1.8333 0.0417 
Standard Error 0.4193 0.1531 
t-Statistic   4.3721 0.2721 
p-Value   0.0001 0.7867 
Lower 5%   0.9893 -0.2665 
Upper 95% 2.6774 0.3499 
 
Test Statisticsa,b 
 InfoOvld 
Chi-Square 1.412 
Df 3 
Asymp. Sig. .703 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: 
Scenario 
 
Q26: Does scenario outcome affect perceptions of information overload? 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   InfoOvld   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .521
a
 1 .521 .373 .545 
Intercept 180.188 1 180.188 128.922 .000 
Outcome .521 1 .521 .373 .545 
Error 64.292 46 1.398   
Total 245.000 48    
Corrected Total 64.813 47    
a. R Squared = .008 (Adjusted R Squared = -.014) 
Dependent variable: InfoOvld 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Outcome 
Coefficients 2.0417 -0.2083 
Standard Error 0.2413 0.3413 
t-Statistic   8.4604 -0.6105 
p-Value   0.0000 0.5446 
Lower 5%   1.5559 -0.8953 
Upper 95% 2.5274 0.4786 
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Test Statisticsa 
 InfoOvld 
Mann-Whitney U 257.500 
Wilcoxon W 557.500 
Z -.675 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .499 
a. Grouping Variable: Outcome 
 
Q27—30: Does age, gender, education, experience, affect ITA time? 
 
Dependent variable: Time 
Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.0575 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.0000 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.2399 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 389.8682 
Number of Observations   48 
   Regression Results         
    Intercept Age Gender Education Experience 
Coefficients 888.2464 1.3545 165.0673 -94.9429 -1.2336 
Standard Error 242.8952 6.0320 141.9960 104.3249 10.3233 
t-Statistic   3.6569 0.2246 1.1625 -0.9101 -0.1195 
p-Value   0.0007 0.8234 0.2515 0.3679 0.9054 
Lower 5%   398.4015 -10.8102 -121.2949 -305.3340 -22.0525 
Upper 95% 1378.0913 13.5192 451.4295 115.4483 19.5852 
 
Q31—34: Does age, gender, education, experience, affect ITA accuracy? 
 
Dependent variable: Accuracy 
Regression Results           
              
Log Likelihood  Value -25.5846   Approach Logit   
              
  Variable   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Z-
Statistic p-Value 
      0.4870 1.3146 0.3704 0.7111 
  Age   -0.0557 0.0358 -1.5542 0.1201 
  Gender   1.3960 0.7897 1.7678 0.0771 
  Education   1.0282 0.6753 1.5227 0.1278 
  Experience   -0.0241 0.0679 -0.3551 0.7225 
 
Q32: Does gender affect ITA accuracy? 
 
Dependent variable: Accuracy 
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Results             
              
Log Likelihood  Value -27.7332   Approach Logit   
              
  Variable   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Z-
Statistic p-Value 
      0.0018 0.6325 0.0029 0.9977 
  Gender   1.1673 0.7386 1.5805 0.1140 
 
 
Q35—38: Does age, gender, education, experience affect ITA performance?  
 
Dependent variable: Performance 
Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.1358 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.0554 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.3685 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 0.4454 
Number of Observations   48 
 
Regression Results         
    Intercept Age Gender Education Experience 
Coefficients 1.1661 -0.0115 0.2089 0.2403 -0.0049 
Standard Error 0.2775 0.0069 0.1622 0.1192 0.0118 
t-Statistic   4.2023 -1.6700 1.2877 2.0161 -0.4188 
p-Value   0.0001 0.1022 0.2047 0.0501 0.6775 
Lower 5%   0.6065 -0.0254 -0.1183 -0.0001 -0.0287 
Upper 95% 1.7258 0.0024 0.5361 0.4806 0.0188 
 
Q37: Does education affect ITA performance? 
 
Dependent variable: Performance 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Education 
Coefficients 1.0802 0.1126 
Standard Error 0.1690 0.1023 
t-Statistic   6.3918 1.1011 
p-Value   0.0000 0.2766 
Lower 5%   0.7400 -0.0933 
Upper 95% 1.4204 0.3186 
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Q39—42: Does age, gender, education, experience affect ITA confidence? 
 
Dependent variable: Confidence 
Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.1359 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.0555 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.3686 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 1.1575 
Number of Observations   48 
 
 
Regression Results         
    Intercept Age Gender Education Experience 
Coefficients 6.5898 -0.0167 0.0153 0.7489 0.0322 
Standard Error 0.7211 0.0179 0.4216 0.3097 0.0306 
t-Statistic   9.1383 -0.9299 0.0362 2.4179 1.0492 
p-Value   0.0000 0.3576 0.9713 0.0199 0.3000 
Lower 5%   5.1355 -0.0528 -0.8349 0.1243 -0.0297 
Upper 95% 8.0441 0.0195 0.8654 1.3735 0.0940 
 
Q41: Does education affect ITA confidence? 
 
Dependent variable: Confidence 
Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.1051 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.0857 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.3242 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 1.1388 
Number of Observations   48 
 
Regression Results   
    Intercept Education 
Coefficients 6.2659 0.5923 
Standard Error 0.4209 0.2548 
t-Statistic   14.8868 2.3247 
p-Value   0.0000 0.0246 
Lower 5%   5.4187 0.0794 
Upper 95% 7.1131 1.1051 
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Test Statisticsa,b 
 Confidence 
Chi-Square 5.456 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. .141 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: 
Education 
 
 
Q43—46: Does age, gender, education, experience, affect the perception of 
information overload? 
 
Dependent variable: InfoOvld 
Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.0944 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.0101 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.3072 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 1.1683 
Number of Observations   48 
 
Regression Results         
    Intercept Age Gender Education Experience 
Coefficients 2.1076 0.0019 0.4193 -0.4044 0.0219 
Standard Error 0.7279 0.0181 0.4255 0.3126 0.0309 
t-Statistic   2.8954 0.1074 0.9855 -1.2934 0.7085 
p-Value   0.0059 0.9150 0.3299 0.2028 0.4825 
Lower 5%   0.6396 -0.0345 -0.4388 -1.0348 -0.0405 
Upper 95% 3.5755 0.0384 1.2775 0.2261 0.0843 
 
Q47—50: Does age, gender, education, experience, affect the perception of social 
impact? 
 
Dependant variable: Social Impact 
Regression Statistics     
R-Squared (Coefficient of Determination) 0.1135 
Adjusted R-Squared     0.0000 
Multiple R (Multiple Correlation Coefficient) 0.3370 
Standard Error of the Estimates (SEy) 1.0872 
Number of Observations   24 
 
  
 257 
Regression Results         
    Intercept Age Gender Education Experience 
Coefficients 2.1164 -0.0130 0.4615 -0.0826 -0.0685 
Standard Error 0.9228 0.0239 0.7105 0.6068 0.0634 
t-Statistic   2.2934 -0.5432 0.6495 -0.1361 -1.0799 
p-Value   0.0334 0.5933 0.5238 0.8932 0.2937 
Lower 5%   0.1849 -0.0629 -1.0257 -1.3526 -0.2012 
Upper 95% 4.0478 0.0370 1.9486 1.1874 0.0642 
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